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Abstract
Green municipal bonds are a novel way to help unlock finance for investment in
sustainable and urban infrastructure in the US. However, issuance lags in the US
market due to negative perceptions such as high cost, low returns, and greater risk.
In this study we aim to demonstrate that US green municipal bond performance is
consistent with the returns of general municipal bonds, which can improve investor
confidence and increase demand. The performance of this bond sector is assessed
through two different means: through the creation of a green municipal bond index
and benchmarking its performance against an overall municipal bond index; and
by looking for a price difference between green municipal bonds and their conven-
tional counterparts through yield curve assessment. Increased investment in this
sector could be triggered by showing that the green municipal bond sector performs
similarly to, or better than, conventional municipal bonds. We found that an in-
dex comprised of green muni bonds outperforms the closest equivalent S&P index
from 2014-2017, and there is a statistically significant green premium (“greenium”)
present in the secondary muni bond market of at least 3 basis points in 2017. There
was no conclusive evidence for the presence of greenium at issue in the primary
market, however there are some signs that this could change, and furthermore we
do not observe that green muni bonds come to market at a discount. These results
are key to encouraging growth in the green municipal bond market, which can help
American cities to target ESG and SRI investors and unlock more capital for green
and climate-aligned infrastructure projects.
Abstract 4
Impact Statement
The research that was undertaken for this thesis focused on green municipal bonds,
which are bonds that are used to finance sustainable infrastructure. This work is
inherently beneficial to society because it shows examples of where these types of
bonds are being used effectively to create more sustainable development and cut
emissions. It also performs a survey of this market to uncover the depth of the
market and trends in market development. Finally, it explores any pricing differen-
tial between these green bonds and conventional bonds to show that investment in
sustainable urban infrastructure via these mechanisms does not necessarily have to
cost bond issuers more, and if anything, could potentially save them (and taxpayers)
money through a cheaper cost of capital.
The market survey and findings, along with the overview of policy mecha-
nisms, are all of practical use to both policy makers and to investors who are in-
terested in increasing their sustainability platform. For policy makers, the business
cases demonstrate workable financial models that can be adapted for use in many
contexts. For investors, the findings show that they may, in the end, have to pay a
bit more for green bonds, however this also demonstrates that these bonds have held
their value over time, and can be more resilient to market downturns.
This is one of the first complete overviews of the green bond market, and more
specifically the green municipal bond market. It uses multiple techniques to anal-
yse the data set, which is uniquely comprehensive and curated to best reflect the
state of the market. The unique contributions of this work include the creation of
a green municipal bond index, along with a yield curve analysis that has not been
undertaken to such depth for this segment of the market until now.
This thesis could potentially help to encourage more green bond issuance for
sustainable urban infrastructure by demonstrating that this is a market that is seeing
solid growth and gains, with benefits both for issuers and investors, and therefore to
the world at large.
Contents
1 Introduction 17
2 Green Bonds 29
2.1 Green Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.1 Green Bond Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.1.2 Advantages of Green Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 State of the Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Green Bonds in the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Challenges to the Green Bond Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Green Municipal Bonds 47
3.1 Municipal Bonds in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Climate Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Green Municipal Bonds: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 History and State of the Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Green Muni Bonds: Policy Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Issuing Green Muni Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7 Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.8 Tax-Credit Municipal Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8.1 Certified Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs) and Qualified
Energy Conservation Bonds (QECBs) . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8.2 Build America Bonds (BABs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.9 Green Muni Bonds Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Contents 6
3.9.1 The Morris Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.9.2 ESCOs with Muni Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.9.3 Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.9.4 The PACE Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.9.5 Green Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 Green Bond Pricing 92
4.1 Greenium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2 Market Performance Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Bond Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4 Yield Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5 Data and Liquidity 108
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2 Index Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3 Yield Curve Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5 Liquidity Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6 Green Municipal Bonds Index Benchmarking 123
6.1 Green Muni Bond Index Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2 Index Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3 Fixed Income Mathematics and Descriptive Characteristics . . . . . 130
6.4 Index Benchmarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.5 Results of Index Benchmarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7 Green Municipal Bonds Yield Analysis 152
7.1 Yield Curve Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Contents 7
7.2 Results of Yield Curve Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.3 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8 Discussion and Conclusions 176
8.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.2 ESG Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.3 Data and Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.4 Market Performance of Green Muni Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.5 Why is there a Greenium? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.6 International Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.7 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Bibliography 193
List of Figures
1.1 Needs for infrastructure investment in the United States to 2025 in
billions of dollars. Source: McNichol (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 A Venn diagram (not to scale) showing the relationship between
green bonds, climate bonds, and municipal bonds. . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 A breakdown of global green bond issuance by sector and by type
of issuer. Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (2017d). . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 A breakdown of global green bond issuance by tenor and rating.
Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (2017d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 A breakdown of green bond issuance by type of issuer. Source:
Climate Bonds Initiative (2017d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Sources of funding for state infrastructure. Source: McNichol (2017). 48
3.2 The amount of spending on public infrastructure in 2004. Source:
McNichol (2017); MSRB (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 The use of proceeds for municipal bonds issued from 2010-2016.
Source: MSRB (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Breakdown of types of bond owners for US municipal bonds.
Source: MSRB (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 The size of the US green municipal bond market by year, both in
terms of issuance and total amount outstanding. Marin et al. (2018). 56
3.6 Amount outstanding for green municipal bonds by sector, 2015-
2017. Marin et al. (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
List of Figures 9
3.7 Amount outstanding for green municipal bonds by sector, 2015-
2017. Climate Bonds Initiative (2018a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.8 Monthly issuance of BABs in millions of dollars from April 2009-
December 2010. Source: MSRB (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1 The returns of the US Investment Grade High ESG corporate bond
portfolio relative to the low ESG portfolio in basis points for the
time frame spanning 2016-2018. Source: (Barclays Research, 2018). 105
5.1 Amount of climate-aligned and labelled green municipal bonds is-
sued by the top five most active states in $M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2 The tenor breakdown of green and climate muni bonds. . . . . . . . 113
6.1 The returns of the climate-aligned and green-labelled municipal
bond indices for 2014-2017 in relation to the S&P Muni Index. Re-
based so that 2014-10-01 = 100; GDP for reference. . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2 Green municipal indices by sector for Energy, Transport, and Wa-
ter, along with the overall climate-aligned and green-labelled muni
indices, and the S&P municipal index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3 Green municipal indices by state, and their corresponding state S&P
municipal index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.4 Rolling information ratio for the Climate-aligned (blue) and Green-
labelled (green) indices benchmarked against the S&P Muni index
with a window size of 365 days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.1 The yield curve for Arizona Board of Regents University of Arizona
series of bonds issued in November 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2 The aggregate primary market yield curve for December 2017. . . . 156
7.3 The aggregated monthly yield curve for the secondary market for
December 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.4 Spreads between the green and vanilla aggregate yield curves in the
primary market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
List of Figures 10
7.5 Spreads between the green and vanilla aggregate yield curves in the
secondary market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.6 Spreads between the green and vanilla pairs in the primary market. . 162
7.7 Spreads between the green and vanilla pairs in the secondary market. 163
7.8 Regression over raw yield data (top) compared with a regression on
the spreads of the same data with the base yield curve subtracted out
(bottom). The yield curves at top are non-linear, so that performing
an OLS regression on top of this unnormalized data could lead to
spurious results. The normalized data is much noisier, so that has a
lower r2 = 0.26 compared with 0.71 for the unnormalized regression.167
7.9 Normalized regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
List of Tables
5.1 Green and Climate issuance by year, including the number of green
labelled bonds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Green and climate municipal bond issuance broken down by sector. 111
5.3 The number and amount of green and climate-aligned issuances by
the top five most active states 2009-2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4 Green and climate muni bonds broken down by Moody’s and S&P
ratings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5 Index characteristics for the Climate-Aligned, Green-Labelled, and
S&P Muni indices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.6 The number of bonds and their volumes in the data sets spanning
January 2015 to October 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.7 The ratings bands for the green/vanilla muni bond pairs, and for the
total green/vanilla data set, of which all are at least A-rated. All of
the bonds in this data set have been rated, and some bonds have both
S&P and Moody’s ratings so they could appear twice in the totals. . 116
5.8 The means and standard deviations of the tenors for the green and
vanilla municipal series bonds in our set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.9 Issuance broken down by sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
List of Tables 12
5.10 The normalized Index of Martin calculated from the traded prices
and volumes of the bonds in the aggregated data sets (the green
and climate-aligned index bonds spanning January 2015 to October
2017, and the green and vanilla series bonds spanning January 2015
through December 2017). The Index of Martin and Amihud met-
ric have both been normalized by the total issue amount of assets
in each basket, and the ratio of these values for each green/vanilla
dataset is shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.11 The mean ratios of Zero Trading Days (ZTDs) to trading days for
the green bonds and the vanilla bonds in our sample, along with
t-test values to assess their statistical significance. The normalized
IoM and AI are also shown for reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.12 The Amihud and Martin illiquidity ratios along with the number
of active aggregated trading days calculated for the strictly paired
green (GTDs) and vanilla (VTDs) bonds in our data set, broken
down by year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.1 The number of constituents and par value of the green and climate-
aligned national and sector municipal bond indices, along with the
number of constituents and par value of the S&P national and sector
municipal bond indices as of mid-2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 The pairs of the climate indices with their S&P muni index bench-
mark counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3 Compound Annual Growth Rate and annualised volatilities for the
period spanning October 2014 to October 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4 Tracking errors in the returns of the climate indices compared with
their respective benchmarks over October 2014 to October 2017. . . 140
6.5 The risk-adjusted relative returns (information ratio), excess returns
(alpha), and correlations (beta) of the climate indices compared to
their corresponding S&P benchmarks for the time span 1 October
2014 - 1 October 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
List of Tables 13
6.6 The results of the linear regressions performed on the excess returns
of the climate and green indices against the excess returns of the
S&P Investment Grade benchmark index, along with their statistical
significance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.7 Three-year annualised returns for the Climate and Green indices,
along with their S&P counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.8 The climate sub-sector index characteristics along with their S&P
counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.9 Drawdowns experienced in the aftermath of the Presidential elec-
tion in the last quarter of 2016. The overall climate and green in-
dices experienced a smaller downturn after the election than their
S&P Muni index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.1 Weighted average characteristics for the green municipal bond data
sets. The index values are for the end of the index (1 October 2017)
and the green+vanilla values are averaged over December 2017. . . 155
7.2 The means and standard deviations of the initial offering yields for
the green and vanilla municipal series bonds in our set. Note the
presence of greenium in 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.3 The weighted average spread between the green and vanilla series
bonds in basis points, along with the standard deviations for these
means. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.4 The weighted average spread between the green and vanilla strict
pairings in basis points, along with the standard deviations for these
means. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.5 The results of linear regressions in the spreads over time for the
green primary series bonds, the vanilla primary series bonds, the
green secondary series bonds, and the vanilla secondary series
bonds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
List of Tables 14
7.6 The results of a fixed effects regression of primary issuing yield
spread against tenor for the series and the paired bonds in our data
set, both pooled and broken down by year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.7 The results of a pooled panel OLS regression of yield spread against
time remaining for the secondary traded bond series and pairs in our
data set, both pooled and broken down by year. . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.8 The results of fixed effects regressions of secondary yield spread
against tenor for the 2017 bonds in our data set, broken down by
month. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.9 The results of a fixed effects regression of the primary yield data,
pulling out the significance of factors like state, issue amount, etc.
This regression has r2 = 0.56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.10 The results of a panel regression of the secondary yield data, pulling
out the significance of factors like state, issue amount, etc. This
regression has r2 = 0.40. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.11 The number of like-for-like green and vanilla paired bonds issued
per year, and how many of these issued with a greenium or vanil-
lium (all others being issued at equal prices). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
List of Abbreviations
ABS.......Asset-Backed Security
ARRA.......American Recovery and Act Reinvestment Act of 2009
BAB.................................................................Build America Bond
bp............................................................basis points, 1bp = 0.01%
CREB........................................Certified Renewable Energy Bond
ESG.........................................Environmental, Social, Governance
ESCO....................................................Energy Services COmpany
EMMA...................Electronic Municipal Markets Access website
GBP..............................................................Green Bond Principles
MUSH.............Municipal, University, School, Hospital (buildings)
PACE...........................................Property Assessed Clean Energy
QECB....................................Qualified Energy Conservation Bond
SREC.......................................Solar Renewable Energy Certificate
SRI...............................................Socially Responsible Investment
ZTDs....................................................................Zero Traded Days
Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2007, the Stern Review stated that climate change was the single biggest market
failure. This report delivered the stark message that failing to act on climate change
would result in a 20% reduction in global economic growth, and calculated that,
at that time, every tonne of CO2 being emitted caused damage valued at over $85
(Stern, 2007).
These findings helped to pave the way to the Paris Agreement in 2016, when
195 countries committed to keeping the increase in global temperature to within
2C above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, it signals their commitment to “mak-
ing finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions
and climate-resilient development” (UNFCCC, 2017). This agreement was ground-
breaking because it was the first time that a many nations committed to reducing
their carbon emissions in an attempt to slow the pace of global warming and miti-
gate the worst effects of climate change.
However, in 2017, the then-new Trump administration withdrew the United
States from the Paris Agreement, stating that it would render the US non-
competitive in economic terms (Rucker and Johnson, 2017). The withdrawal caused
much consternation both in the US and internationally due to the fact that the US
has one of the largest carbon footprints of any nation in the world and is responsible
for nearly 15% of global CO2 emissions (The World Bank, 2018). In reaction to the
statement to withdraw, several American cities and institutions banded together and
announced that they would still independently meet their Paris Agreement commit-
17
ments, under organizations such as We Are Still In and The United States Confer-
ence of Mayors (We Are Still In, 2017; United States Conference of Mayors, 2017;
Bloomberg and Pope, 2017).
Localized commitment by cities to climate action could conceivably enable
the US to honor the spirit of the Paris Agreement by cutting emissions on a local,
rather than national, level. This movement demonstrates the power that federalism
still has in the US, where frequently legislation is driven by bottom-up rather than
top-down political will (Rabe, 2018). Even more importantly, this form of climate
federalism in the US further demonstrates the rise of power of cities in an increas-
ingly urbanised world. Rather than being dictated to by what they perceive to be an
increasingly out-of-step national regime, individual American cities and states are
instead creating their own mandates for sustainable development.
Accordingly, the Fourth National Climate Assessment recently issued by the
US Global Change Research Program (2018) states that “cities across the United
States are leading efforts to respond to climate change.” This report warned that if
climate change is allowed to happen unchecked, then the resulting damage will cost
the US as much as 10% of the national GDP by 2100, which is more than double the
losses incurred in the Great Recession of 2008, with damages including “$141 bil-
lion from heat-related deaths, $118 billion from sea level rise and $32 billion from
infrastructure damage by the end of the century, among others.” Overall, almost two
million labor hours are forecast to be lost every year by 2090 due to temperature ex-
tremes, which will cost $160 billion in lost wages by 2050. In agreement with the
Stern Report, this report concludes that without a significant effort to cut emissions
and improve climate mitigation and adaptation, “substantial losses to infrastructure
and property would impede the rate of economic growth over this century.”
The Climate Assessment (2018) dedicated an entire chapter to the vulnerabili-
ties of and effects of climate change to cities in the US. It states that climate change
can “exacerbate existing challenges to urban quality of life, including social in-
equality, aging and deteriorating infrastructure, and stressed ecosystems,” and that
“damages from extreme weather events demonstrate current urban infrastructure
18
vulnerabilities.”
At present, over half of the world’s population lives in urban areas with this
proportion expected to increase to 66% by 2050 (United Nations, 2014). The US
is already one of the most urbanised regions with 82% of North Americans living
in urban areas (United Nations, 2014). At the same time, cities are the source of
around 75% of carbon emissions from energy use (Seto et al., 2014). Due to the
energy intensive nature of cities, reports have stated that we can cut global carbon
emissions by 30% if we invest in energy efficiency, demand reduction, and sources
of renewable energy for urban areas (Gouldson et al., 2015). Cities are very fre-
quently situated on coastlines or other bodies of water, which leaves them most
vulnerable to the primary effects of climate change, notably rising sea levels and
increasingly severe impacts from major storms. Furthermore, the interconnected
nature of urban infrastructure means that there is a need for “reliable infrastruc-
ture that can withstand ongoing and future climate risks,” because damage to these
systems will “adversely affect urban life” (US Global Change Research Program,
2018). Therefore, while it is in the world’s interest for cities to cut their emissions,
it is particularly in the interest of the cities themselves to try and stave off climate
change, because they will be among the first and most severely impacted.
More sustainable infrastructure (also known as “green infrastructure” in this
work) for cities that addresses the issues of energy and water consumption, along
with cutting emissions and improving resilience against natural disasters, is key to
mitigating climate change. In 2016 in the United States, transportation was the
source of over 28% of greenhouse gas emissions, and electricity generation was re-
sponsible for another 28.4%, so decarbonizing these two sectors alone would make
a considerable impact on the carbon budget (US Environmental Protection Agency,
2018). The IEA estimates that “an additional $36 trillion in clean energy invest-
ment is needed through 2050 or an average of $1 trillion more per year compared to
a ‘business as usual’ scenario over the next 36 years” (OECD, 2017b; IEA, 2016).
A New Climate Economy report (2016) states that it will take $93 trillion to decar-
bonize global infrastructure, with $8 trillion needed in the U.S. alone (Heal, 2016).
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In 2017, the OECD stated that “recent estimates suggest that approximately USD
93 trillion in infrastructure investment will be needed in the next 15 years in a ‘low-
carbon’ scenario” (OECD, 2017a,b).
Currently the majority of infrastructure in the United States is outdated and was
not built with sustainability or resilience in mind. Every four years, the American
Society of Civil Engineers publishes a report card that gives a quality rating for each
sector of existing infrastructure. Overall, in 2017, they rated the infrastructure in
the US as a D+, one grade above failing, meaning it is generally “poor and at risk”
with a “strong risk of failure” (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2017). As
stated in their latest report, “most electric transmission and distribution lines were
constructed in the 1950s and 1960s with a 50-year life expectancy, and the more
than 640,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the lower 48 states’ power
grids are at full capacity,” and this is all while facing “increasing demand, as well
as increasing storm and climate impacts.” Transit, a sector that particularly has an
impact on both emissions and livability of the urban environment, was rated as D-,
because “the nation’s transit systems have been chronically underfunded resulting
in aging infrastructure and a $90 billion rehabilitation backlog.”
Globally, infrastructure has been underfunded, resulting in a situation known
as the infrastructure gap (Inderst, 2013; Subacchi et al., 2014). In the United States
specifically, there is a $5 trillion USD shortfall in infrastructure investment through
2040 (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016), and failing to address the prob-
lems arising from increasingly dilapidated infrastructure will cost the US economy
nearly $4 trillion in GDP by 2025. In addition to mitigation of climate change and
emissions reduction, investment in more sustainable infrastructure will also help to
improve work force efficiency and living standards (McNichol, 2017). However,
most cities barely have the resources to maintain their infrastructure, much less
invest in new. The 2018 budget that was approved by the Trump administration
consisted of “tax credits to private-sector investors, which would boost investment
in projects that will generate revenue like tolls or user fees (such as new roads and
bridges) but leaves out maintenance of existing roads, bridges, and water lines, and
20
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TABLE 2 
Cumulative Infrastructure Needs by System Based on Current Trends Extended to 
2025 (dollars in 2010 billions) 
Infrastructure Systems Total Needs Estimated Funding Funding Gap 
Roads, Bridges, & Transit1 $2,042 $941 $1,101 
Electricity1 $934 $757 $177 
Schools2 $870 $490 $380 
Public Parks & Recreation3 $114 $12 $102 
Airports1,4 $157 $115 $42 
Dams, Levees, Waterways & Ports1,5,6 $162 $38 $124 
Water & Wastewater7 $150 $45 $105 
Rail8 $154 $125 $29 
Hazardous & Solid Waste7 $7 $4 $3 
Total $4,590 $2,526 $2,064 
Source: American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 2017 Report Card for American Infrastructure 
1 Data taken from ASCE Failure to Act Series published 2011-16. 
2 These numbers are based on the latest available national data collection and brought to current market dollars.  
3 Total needs and estimated funding include all costs associated with parks and recreation. Funding gap is capital needs only. 
4 Airport needs and gap include anticipated cost of NextGen: $20 billion by 2020 and $40 billion by 2040. 
5 Total needs number is based on discussions with the National Committee on Levee Safety. 
6 Total needs are federal and non-federal high-hazard dams. 
7 Funding only includes publicly funded remediation, not funds from private sector.  
8 These numbers are based on market projections and current investment trends. 
Figure 1.1: Needs for infrastructure investment in the United States to 2025 in billions of
dollars. Source: McNichol (2017).
construction of public schools and many public transit projects” (McNichol, 2017).
The infrastructure investment amounts cited above do not even include en-
ergy efficiency measures in building stock, whether in encouraging the construction
of more efficient new construction, or the retrofitting older buildings. Yet building
emissions are a significant part of the problem, since in some cities, over half of car-
bon emissions result from the construction and use of buildings and transportation
systems (BPIE, 2011; Merk et al., 2012). Overall, heating and cooling buildings
accounts for about 40% of total energy consumed, with 70% of this energy coming
from fossil fuel sources. As a result, building climate control is estimated to have
been responsible for 30% of CO2 emissions in 2012 (International Energy Agency,
2015).
This is why investment in infrastructure for cities must include a multi-faceted
approach, which involves improved water management, expansion of public trans-
port, decentralised energy generation, significant deployment of renewable sources
of energy with intelligent distribution and demand response, and energy efficiency
21
measures for new and existing building stock. By investing in clean energy for
cities in particular, the world benefits not only from lowered carbon emissions and
improved climate change mitigation, but also from a more resilient and ultimately
more affordable energy supply.
Additionally, financing green infrastructure would help to build a green econ-
omy (United Nations Environment Programme, 2008), and localized investment
could trigger economic growth on a national level. In particular, there has been
extensive discussion about linking green infrastructure development with “green
collar” jobs (Yi, 2013; United States Dept. of Energy, 2017; Gessesse et al., 2017).
The stimulus of a new skilled employment sector could be a positive externality
from investing in green infrastructure, along with improvement in sustainability
and resilience for American cities. Otherwise, retaining a “business as usual” ap-
proach rather than investing in a greener future, cities could face consequences later,
both physically in terms of climate disaster mitigation, and fiscally in terms of dam-
ages and depressed economic prospects that arise from a lack of resilient and robust
infrastructure.
Green bonds can help to unlock financing for green and sustainable infrastruc-
ture. Green bonds are a subset of bonds which are “intended to encourage sus-
tainability and to support climate-related or other types of special environmental
projects. More specifically, green bonds finance projects aimed at energy efficiency,
pollution prevention, sustainable agriculture, fishery and forestry, the protection of
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, clean transportation, sustainable water manage-
ment and the cultivation of environmentally friendly technologies” (Investopedia,
2018). Despite their beginnings in the private sector in the form of corporate bonds,
green bonds are now also increasingly being issued by public governmental bodies,
both in the form of sovereign and sub-sovereign debt. This intersects with the fact
that one of the largest sub-sovereign debt markets in the world is the municipal bond
market in the US, currently with over $4 trillion in debt outstanding for a million
different projects, and $445.8 billion issued in 2016 alone (SIFMA, 2018; Lambert,
2014). As stated by Saha and D’Almeida (2017), “Green municipal bonds are an
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important area for future growth as cities and other sub-national entities look to low-
cost and long-term sources of capital to finance climate mitigation and adaptation
infrastructure requirements.” The New Climate Economy sustainable infrastructure
report (2016) also says that “with the right approach, green bonds can be power-
ful instruments and play a tremendous role in facilitating sustainable infrastructure
investment and growth.”
Green bonds are important for closing the infrastructure gap because they help
to “broaden the universe of highly-rated fixed-income products (bonds) attached
to clean energy, thereby making it easier for investors to increase allocations to
clean energy within existing liquidity/creditworthiness constraints” (Fulton and Ca-
palino, 2014). However, against the background of increasing ESG (Environmen-
tal, Social, and Governance) investment, the question is whether such these green
bonds are competitive with respect to the overall market, which is necessary in or-
der to prove appealing to investors who are subject to fiduciary duty, in that they
are mandated to put profits before all other investment criteria. If, however, it can
be shown that green assets can give returns as good as, or better than, their con-
ventional counterparts, then investors can comply with their fiduciary duty and help
invest in sustainability at the same time (Sandberg, 2011)
Another challenge facing the development of sustainable infrastructure is lack
of access to institutional capital, despite the fact that socially responsible investors
(SRI) are continually searching for investments that meet their ESG criteria (Fulton
and Capalino, 2014). The sustainable investment sector is best situated for lever-
aging capital to close the infrastructure gap via green bonds. At present, there are
$22.89 trillion of assets under SRI management, which is an increase of 25% since
2014, and accounts for 26% of all managed assets (Global Sustainable Investment
Alliance, 2016; US SIF, 2016). Also, there are more than $60 trillion in assets under
management by signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment (OECD,
2017a).
This is relevant at a time where ESG investing is becoming increasingly im-
portant (Chandler, 2018), and where the demands of the socially conscious retail
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investors are starting to influence the mandates of the larger institutional investors.
As stated by Amy O’Brien, head of responsible investment at TIAA Investments
Napach (2017),“we’re seeing the political climate actually act as a catalyst for ESG
and impact investing solutions”.
A primary way to motivate ESG investment in green infrastructure is to demon-
strate that the performance of green assets is comparable to the overall market. As
long as the impression persists that ESG investing means taking a hit in terms of
profitability (Ko¨b, 2018), then most investors (both retail and institutional) will shy
away from ESG investing. However, it is not necessarily true that ESG investing
is less profitable, and now that there is beginning to be enough data to explore this
issue (Barclays Research, 2016, 2018), the best way to trigger more ESG-guided
investment into sustainable infrastructure is to show that it is a good investment in
terms of financial returns in addition to being a good investment in terms of climate
or moral returns. Indeed, the best way to help grow the market is to show that sus-
tainable investing does not have to be a compromise. To this end, we don’t actually
have to demonstrate the that green investments outperform the conventional market,
but rather it is sufficient to show that they perform equivalently, so that the need to
balance ESG returns against financial returns is negated.
The motivation of this work is to explore financial methods that can help to
meet the challenges of sustainability, resilience, and chronic underinvestment in the
infrastructure in American cities. We focus on the advancement of green (sustain-
able) infrastructure in cities, from the perspective that financial instruments like
green bonds can be used to kick start sustainable urban investment in a way that
is currently lacking in the scope of traditional finance. As stated by Mathews and
Kidney (2010), “many renewable energy projects are rendered uncompetitive not
because of technical inadequacies but because funding sources are limited to loans
from very conservative banks.” In particular, the main stumbling block for clean
energy finance is the reluctance of investors to invest in new technologies and/or
business models, especially when their revenues are sensitive to policy risk.
This could arise from market conditions where many investors are put off by
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novel financial instruments, especially after the collapse of the CDO (Collateralized
Debt Obligation) and ABS (Asset-Backed Securities) markets during the subprime
crisis of 2008. Fortunately, there is already an existing financial instrument that has
been used for over 200 years to finance infrastructure in the United States: munici-
pal bonds. In particular, green municipal bonds are an increasingly popular way for
American cities to finance green infrastructure (Sanders et al., 2013). Against this
background, this work seeks to explore the behavior of green and climate-aligned
municipal bonds in the United States with a specific focus on green infrastructure.
This work focuses on the United States municipal bond market because this
market is the largest and most active municipal bond market in the world with al-
most $5 trillion in assets outstanding, and municipal bonds are financial instruments
that are commonly used in the US for investment in infrastructure for cities, towns,
and states (Garrett, 2008). Because the US municipal bond market is the largest of
its kind, it means that it is also the largest aggregation of green and climate-aligned
municipal bond data, and no other bond market has the depth of data available in
terms of infrastructure-related bonds that the US muni bond market does. While
there is a growing corporate green bond market, these bonds are not issued in the
same numbers as US municipal bonds, so in order to obtain the largest possible
homogeneous data source, we focus our investigation specifically on the US munic-
ipal bond market. This also ties in with our initial motivation of investigating ways
to accelerate access to capital for sustainable urban infrastructure, since municipal
bonds are implicitly vehicles for financing urban infrastructure.
The US saw $11 billion in green municipal bonds issued in 2017, the largest
year ever, however these represent only about 2% of the overall US muni bond
market. For the green municipal bond market to scale up and effectively address the
infrastructure investment shortfall, investors need to know that buying green bonds
does not expose them to greater losses than buying into conventional muni bonds.
Moreover, if the green muni bond market showed a green premium, or “greenium”,
this would show that some investors are willing to pay more for these bonds.
In order to investigate the performance of these green and climate-aligned mu-
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nicipal bonds, we collected the relevant bonds into an aggregated data set which
includes all green-labelled municipal bond ever issued in the US, along with a large
sample of climate-aligned bonds, which are bonds that would qualify for the green
label, however for whatever reason they have not been formally declared as green
bonds. We also capture a segment of so-called “vanilla” bonds, or conventional
non-climate-related bonds, that have been issued concurrently with green bonds.
This data allows us to assess the performance of the green and climate municipal
bonds against the prevailing conventional municipal bond market via two methods:
the creation and benchmarking of a green and climate-aligned municipal bond in-
dex, and yield curve spread analysis between contemporaneous green and vanilla
municipal bonds.
Demonstrating that the green municipal bond market is competitive with, or
outperforms, the conventional municipal bond market could help to alleviate some
of the perceived market risks for green municipal bonds and unlock more capital
for investment in sustainable infrastructure. Therefore, our overarching objective
is to assess the competitiveness of the green and climate-aligned municipal bonds
as compared with the prevailing municipal bond market. The techniques used to
accomplish this are twofold:
1. To create an index for this asset class and benchmark its performance against
conventional municipal bonds; and
2. To investigate whether there is any significant greenium in the market for new
green municipal bond issuances via yield curve analysis.
This work makes several contributions to the current state of the art. First of all,
the bond data that has been collected is uniquely comprehensive and well-formed.
No other work has collected the depth of homogenous and manually checked and
cleaned data that is used in our analysis, which is crucial to any study that inves-
tigates the performance of green assets, particularly when so many question what
actually constitutes “greenness”. In terms of the analysis, no one else has created an
index specifically for green and climate-aligned municipal bonds. There are com-
mercially available municipal indices and corporate green bond indices, but there
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is no extant green municipal bond index in order to benchmark the performance of
that market sector. Furthermore, while there have been yield curve analysis for cor-
porate green bonds, and yield curve analysis for the secondary market performance
of green municipal bonds, there has been no yield curve analysis for the primary
market performance of green municipal bonds. Finally, this work includes a pair-
wise like for like analysis between green muni bonds and their vanilla counterparts,
which has not been done before.
The reason that we focus on green municipal bonds is because they are crucial
to helping cities build and retrofit greener, more sustainable infrastructure. How-
ever, in order for the green municipal bond market to scale up – and be able to
effectively address the infrastructure investment shortfall – investors need to know
that buying green bonds will not expose them to greater losses than buying con-
ventional municipal bonds. If the green municipal bond market showed a green
premium, or “greenium”, this could encourage a more diverse pool of investors to
enter the market and potentially push down the cost of capital for municipalities
looking to finance green and sustainable infrastructure projects.
This work is structured as follows: In Chapter 2 we provide background and
context for what green bonds are and the state of the global green bond market.
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the green municipal bond market in the United
States, and provides a history of this market along with giving several case studies
of where municipal bonds have been used to finance sustainable infrastructure in the
US. Chapter 4 focuses on the search for “greenium”, or a premium in the pricing
of green bonds as compared to conventional bonds, and also introduces the two
main tools for market performance analysis that we use in our research. Chapter 5
describes how we collected our data and describes how we assessed the comparative
liquidity of our data. Chapter 6 pertains to the construction and benchmarking of our
green and climate indices as a way of benchmarking the performance of this market.
Chapter 7 describes the construction and spread analysis of the yield curves for
the green municipal bonds compared with the conventional (“vanilla”) municipal
bonds. Chapter 8 brings together our findings from the index benchmarking and
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yield curve analysis and gives context for the implications of these findings.
Chapter 2
Green Bonds
This chapter will provide an overview of the green bond markets, with a particular
focus on applications for investment in green infrastructure. We will set the con-
text for the the research by describing the background and history of green bonds,
describe some of the literature where they are featured, and discuss some of their
disadvantages.
2.1 Green Bonds
Bonds have always had an essential role in financing infrastructure, and with the
increasing urgency behind developing more climate-resilient and sustainable infras-
tructure, there is a burgeoning new asset class that is specifically targeted towards
financing green infrastructure: green bonds. Green bonds are “debt instruments
used to finance green projects that deliver environmental benefits” (OECD, 2017a).
The issuers of these bonds are bound by commitments to use the proceeds that they
raise solely to finance or refinance green and sustainable projects, business activi-
ties, or assets. The Green Bond Working Group defines a green bond as “one for
which the issuer declares that the proceeds will be applied (either by ring-fencing,
direct project exposure or securitization) towards climate and/or environmental sus-
tainability purposes” (Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Citi, 2013).
Green bonds have some significant advantages that lend themselves towards
increasing the size of the market and therefore the capital available to green infras-
tructure. Shislov et al (2016) outline some of these advantages in their report titled
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“Beyond transparency: unlocking the full potential of green bonds”. One key ad-
vantage is that labelling a bond as green has been shown to increase the pool of po-
tential lenders and diversify the investor base. As the report states, “issuing a green
bond can be a way for these organizations to gain visibility, and thus attract more
attention from investors,” which has led to many green bonds being oversubscribed.
Of particular note within the context of the green muni bond market, “the green
bond issued by the State of Massachusetts in 2013 was 30% oversubscribed, while
the regular bond was undersubscribed” (KPMG, 2015). Furthermore, Shislov et al
(2016) state that “at some point, a larger base of investors may also lead to a greater
ability to reach long term lenders and thus have access to longer maturities,” and
that green bonds also serve as a “way [for companies and municipalities] to com-
municate on their sustainability strategy and thus enhance their reputation.” A side
effect of this is that green bonds can “help build stronger sustainability awareness
within the issuing organization and reinforce ties between financial and sustainabil-
ity departments” and, in turn, “help develop and enable the basis for an improved
understanding and integration of climate-related issues in the financial decision-
making process.”
Green bonds are generally labelled as such by the issuers and/or indepen-
dent reviewers, and “labelled green bonds are no different from normal bonds in
the wider market; the difference is that proceeds are transparently channelled for
climate-friendly purposes” (Financing the Future Consortium, 2015). In addition
to labelled green bonds, there are many bonds whose use of proceeds are also for
sustainable and climate-friendly uses and would qualify for the green label, how-
ever for whatever reason, these bonds are not labelled. In this work (in alignment
with others (OECD, 2017a)), we refer to these bonds as “climate-aligned bonds”,
or just “climate bonds”. Climate bonds are the super-set of all bonds whose use
of proceeds finance green and climate-friendly infrastructure, and green bonds are
the sub-set of the climate bonds that are “officially” labelled as green bonds. Ulti-
mately, both climate bonds and green bonds serve the same goal. The relationship
between green bonds, climate bonds, and municipal bonds is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Bond Universe US Municipal Bonds $4 trillion 
Labelled Green Bonds 
$221 billion 
Green Municipal Bonds 
$12 billion 
Climate Bonds 
$895 billion 
Figure 2.1: A Venn diagram (not to scale) showing the relationship between green bonds,
climate bonds, and municipal bonds.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) and World Bank first started issuing
what they call “climate bonds” in 2007 (European Investment Bank, 2015). Since
then, the multilateral lenders have continued to champion green bonds, and in 2013
the first corporate green bonds were issued by EDF, Bank of America, and Vasakro-
nan. The largest corporate green bond issued to date is a EUR2.5 billion offering
from GDF Suez in March 2014 (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015b). One of the main
points for the increasing adoption of the green bond is that they were intended from
conception to be identical to the pre-existing types of bonds in all ways except in
their labelling and use of proceeds (Mathews and Kidney, 2012). The reason for
this is that it keeps the barriers to entry into the green bond market as low as possi-
ble since they can use already existing legal and financial frameworks, which was
considered to be more efficient than creating an entirely new financial instrument.
One of the main reasons for the success of green bonds is that “investors do not have
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to choose between financial returns and environmental benefits, as green bonds of-
fer the same financial terms as other bonds, with the added bonus that their green
label enables investors to identify them as environmentally beneficial investments”
(Climate Bonds Initiative et al., 2015).
As opposed to (unlabelled) climate bonds, labelled green bonds have gone
through the process of the issuers agreeing to the Green Bond Principals (GBP)
(ICMA, 2016). The GBP states that use of bond proceeds must go towards eli-
gible projects, specifically those that fulfil environmental objectives. In addition,
the issuers also agree to provide periodic reports in order to ensure accountability
and transparency, and also enable the stated objective of having third party auditing
and/or certification (frequently from CICERO). Issuers that agree to the GBP and
fulfil the criteria can then refer to these bonds as labelled green bonds. However,
as stated previously, there is a larger universe of bonds that are issued for climate-
friendly projects that are unlabelled. These bonds can be referred to as unlabelled
green bonds or climate-aligned bonds. One of the main objectives of the green la-
bel is to serve as a “discovery tool” (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2016), which has the
potential “to reduce friction by allowing investors to find environmentally sustain-
able securities while minimising transaction costs incurred through the diligence
and research normally required to find and compare unlabelled bonds in the broader
market.” In short, one of the main advantages of the green label is that it makes
green bonds easier to identify for investors that are specifically looking for green
investments.
2.1.1 Green Bond Standards
There are a number of different frameworks and taxonomies that deal with the
project definitions of what is eligible for the green bond label, but the two major
international standards are the aforementioned Green Bond Principles (GBP), and
the Climate Bonds Standard (CBS), both of which are described below.
The Green Bond Principles (GBP) (ICMA, 2017) are voluntary guidelines that
“recommend transparency and disclosure and promote integrity in the development
of the Green Bond market by clarifying the approach for issuance of a Green Bond.”
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The GBP recognises “several broad categories of eligibility for Green Projects with
the objective to address key areas of environmental concern such as climate change,
natural resources depletion, loss of biodiversity, and air, water or soil pollution.”
The framework includes but is not limited to: renewable energy (including produc-
tion, transmission, appliances and products); energy efficiency (such as in new and
refurbished buildings, energy storage, district heating, smart grids, appliances and
products); pollution prevention and control; environmentally sustainable manage-
ment of living natural resources and land use; terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity
conservation; clean transportation; sustainable water and wastewater management;
climate change adaptation; circular economy adapted products; and green build-
ings. The basis for the labelling of a green bond as green according to the GBP
is that the use of proceeds for a bond must go to green projects, “which should be
appropriately described in the legal documentation for the security. All designated
Green Projects should provide clear environmental benefits, which will be assessed
and, where feasible, quantified by the issuer.” Furthermore, “The net proceeds of
the Green Bond, or an amount equal to these net proceeds, should be credited to a
sub-account, moved to a sub-portfolio or otherwise tracked by the issuer in an ap-
propriate manner, and attested to by the issuer in a formal internal process linked to
the issuer’s lending and investment operations for Green Projects,” and green bond
issuers should issue regular (annual) reports on project progress and information on
the actual use of proceeds. The GBP are voluntary guidelines with no means by
which to enforce compliance with their standards, nor are their standards rigorously
defined or intended to serve as a legal framework.
The Climate Bonds Standards (CBS) (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017a) builds
on the GBP, but goes a step further in seeking third party verification for green
claims. As of 2017, the CBS is in full alignment with the GBP, and similarly re-
quires “clear mandatory requirements for use of proceeds, tracking, and reporting
and specific eligibility criteria for low carbon and climate resilient projects and as-
sets. However, it also provides “an assurance framework with independent verifiers
and clear procedures” and furthermore encourages “certification by an indepen-
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dent Climate Bonds Standard Board.” This certification by an external third party
addresses potential greenwashing worries and “allows investors, governments and
other stakeholders to prioritise green bonds with confidence that the funds are being
used to deliver a low carbon and climate resilient economy.” However, certifica-
tion is still voluntary under the CBS. Advantages of going through the certification
process are described as the prevention of investors “having to make subjective
judgements or do expensive due diligence on the green attributes of certified invest-
ments.” This, in effect, puts the onus on the issuer to go through the certification
process, which while it may open the pool of interested SRI investors, could add
to transaction costs due to the time and effort required. Furthermore, the CBS are
separated into pre-issuance and post-issuance requirements, the former for a bond
to gain certification, and the latter are reporting requirements to retain certification.
While the types of projects that could be financed by a CBS certified green bond are
in alignment with those covered by the GBP, the requirements for capital accounting
and reporting on use of proceeds is much more proscriptive. Also, the sector-based
requirements for green eligibility are still under development for many sectors. The
CBS take a more rigorous legal approach and address what to do when a bond’s
actual use of proceeds ends up falling outside of the “green” category.
2.1.2 Advantages of Green Bonds
Green bonds are beneficial because they deepen the pool of available investors, help
address maturity mismatches between long-term projects and short-term financing,
and potentially offer cost advantages amongst other things. In particular, institu-
tional investors with long investment horizons, such as pension funds and insurance
companies, are increasingly interested in investing in green infrastructure in order
to help hedge against long term climate risks inherent to their current investment
portfolios (Shishlov et al., 2016). They also provide “much-needed diversification”
for investment portfolios while at the same time providing stable returns (Climate
Bonds Initiative, 2015c). However, the market faces challenges in the form of lack
of awareness, added transactional costs, and lack of standardisation (OECD, 2017a).
In order to overcome some of these challenges, many ESG investors and issuers
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are looking for a green premium, or “greenium”. This would provide evidence that
green bond buyers are willing to pay more for green bonds, a point that this research
explores in detail.
Furthermore, the green label helps to give a “green halo” (Hale, 2018) effect to
the issuer, in that “the green label provides a good indication that, all things being
equal, the given issuer has a stronger focus on governance, which in turn lowers the
overall credit risk” (Michaelsen, 2018). Issuing green bonds helps to lower the cost
of capital for an issuer because the “value ascribed to green bonds are not exclusive
to the bond itself but is rather issuer-specific, such as improved governance and
stronger strategic alignment towards a sustainable agenda, which also benefits non-
green bonds.” A study done by NatWest also reported these findings, stating that
“green bond issuance helps attract a broader sustainability-focused investor base to
the company’s debt as a whole, thereby putting downward pressure on the entire
[yield] curve” (Hale, 2018).
This green halo effect can also positively impact the bottom lines of the com-
panies that have issued green bonds. Flammer (2018) found that the stock market
responded positively to news of corporate bond issuances, finding a 0.67% in the
cumulative abnormal return in a company’s stock price around the times of an-
nouncements of green bond issues. The issuance of corporate green bonds was also
associated with an increase in long term company value along with an increase on
the return on assets. In addition to positive associations with book value, green bond
issuance also correlated positively with an increase in the company’s environmental
score and a decrease in their CO2 emissions.
2.2 State of the Market
Over the past decade, a growing market for green bonds has emerged in the wake
of pioneering early issuers. The size of the green bond market grew from $3 billion
in 2011 to $95 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2017a). Between 2008 and 2013, the World
Bank (2013) issued approximately $4 billion in green bonds, and uses the proceeds
raised for eligible projects that meet their project selection criteria, which include
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Figure 2.2: A breakdown of global green bond issuance by sector and by type of issuer.
Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (2017d).
mitigation projects such as solar and wind generation, along with efficiency, among
others. As of mid-2015, there were $40 billion in labelled green bonds issued,
and $532 billion of unlabelled climate bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015b).
However, in the American context, green bonds (both corporate and municipal)
make up only 0.061% of the total US bond market, which, percentage-wise, is much
lower than “China, India, and South Africa, and an order of magnitude below the
share in the Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands, and France” (Chiang,
2017).
In their 6th annual State of the Market report in 2017, the Climate Bonds Ini-
tiative (2017d) estimated the size of the global climate-aligned bond market to be
worth just under US$895 billion, $221 billion of which are labelled green bonds,
and includes 3,493 bonds from 1,128 issuers. The largest sector for bond issuances
is transport, specifically rail, however clean energy is the second largest sector with
21% of issuances (see Figure 2.2). This is likely due to the developed nature of
the rail bond market, and to the “greenness” inherent to rail transport that makes it
relatively easy for these bonds to be labelled as green. Over $600 billion in green
bonds are issued by sovereign or sub-sovereign governmental entities (which in-
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The average bond size is approximately 
$262m with a similar distribution of  
issue sizes for both green bonds and  
climate-aligned bonds. The largest number 
of bonds fall into the $10-$100m bracket  
– a large number of municipal bonds fall 
into this bracket as do corporate bonds, 
particularly in emerging market currencies 
where bond sizes of less than $100m  
are common. 
The main currencies are broadly similar 
to the major bond market currencies, 
with USD and EUR well represented. One 
difference is the dominance of RMB5 and 
the very limited presence of JPY. There are 
a few reasons for this: a) RMB figures are 
very large because the largest issuer in the 
dataset – China Railway Corp makes up 
25% of the universe alone. China Railway 
Corp raises the finance for China’s extensive 
and rapidly-growing rail network; b) RMB 
bonds have become a large proportion of the 
green bond market (which in turn makes up 
a growing percentage of the total market) 
while there are almost no JPY denominated 
green bonds. 
The majority of issuance has tenors  
in excess of 10 years, with the average  
tenor of climate-aligned bonds at 11.7  
years. This is similar to the average global 
corporate bond tenor of just over 11 years. 
Long tenors are common in state-backed  
rail entities or utilities whose assets have 
long lifetimes and which have the credit 
rating to issue longer-dated debt. These 
bonds make up the majority of the climate-
aligned bond universe.  
A large proportion of bonds do not have a 
credit rating. Issuers such as China Rail Corp 
have a local credit rating but no international 
credit rating. For this report, only the 
international rating agencies were used.
Climate-aligned bond 
universe in the global bond 
market context
An $895bn universe is big but how  
big is this in the context of the global 
bond market? 
The value of climate-aligned and green 
transactions in Q2 2017 amounted 
to just over $43bn while the value 
of international debt capital market 
transactions in the same period 
amounted to $1.1tn6 putting climate-
aligned transactions at just under 4% of 
the total volume. Growth is encouraging 
but also indicates that there is 
headroom for an even bigger climate-
aligned bond universe.
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Figure 2.3: A breakdown of global green bond issuance by tenor and rating. Source: Cli-
mate Bonds Initiative (2017d).
cludes municipal bonds), also as shown in Figure 2.2.
This State of the Market report also found that the majority of the climate bond
universe is investment grade (rated BBB- or above), and most green bonds issued
are $10 to $100 million in size, however the average bond size is $262 million. This
could be due to influenced by the municipal bond market, which features many
smaller issue bonds rather than large monolithic ones, but there is also a pipeline
of large benchmark size green bonds that would explain the high average. A break-
down of the relationship between tenor and rating is shown in Figure 2.3, which
shows that 61% of issued green bonds have a tenor longer than 10 years, which is in
alignment with the long term nature of infrastructure investment. This report states
that the amount of bond issuance in the global debt capital markets in Q2 2017 was
$1.1 trillion, compared with $43 billion of climate and green bond issuance, or 4%
of the overall total.
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The labelled green bond market is growing rapidly
There has been an increasing diversity 
of structures within the last 2 years, with 
the first covered bonds (Pfandbrief), the 
first green Schuldschein, and the first green 
residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) coming to market.
Country issuance continues to be driven 
by China and the major North American 
and European markets, but there has been 
issuance from emerging and new markets 
including India, Brazil and South Africa. In 
comparison with the global bond markets, 
the main missing market is Japan with less 
than $3bn outstanding. With new green 
bond guidelines having now been issued by 
the Ministry of the Environment of Japan in 
March 2017, we expect this to change. 
China was the largest source of issuance in 
2016, and 2017 is expected to exceed that of 
2016. In H1 of 2017, France was the leader of 
the country table on the back of the EUR7bn 
($7.5bn) sovereign bond. Green bonds have 
been issued in 40 different countries and 
from all habitable continents. 
Strong demand continues to drive the 
market with oversubscription being the 
norm. The French sovereign bond was a 
particular highlight with the sovereign 
initially going to market for EUR3bn and 
upsizing to EUR7bn, after receiving orders 
in excess of EUR20bn. While it is difficult to 
know whether there is an upper limit on the 
demand for green product, two features are 
notable: 1) numerous green bond-specific 
funds and indices have been launched in 
the past year which is both indicative of 
strong demand and may lead to further 
demand; 2) while demand from investors 
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with a green mandate has been a driving 
force behind market growth, a key success 
has been that green bonds are identical 
in structure to vanilla bonds making them 
equally attractive to investors without a 
green mandate.
Development banks have maintained  
a strong presence and leadership role  
in the market despite the fact that they 
have been outgrown by corporate and 
sub-sovereign issuers. The EIB, KfW and 
World Bank take the top three spots in terms 
of total issuance to date. All three have 
been involved in pushing best practice in 
the market through the Working Towards 
a Harmonized Framework for Impact 
reporting54 launched in 2015. Several new 
players have entered this market in the past 
year, including the China Development Bank 
and Brazil’s BNDES. 
Issuance from corporates and commercial 
banks has grown but there’s plenty of headroom 
for more. In some countries, corporates and 
commercial banks make up a large proportion of 
issuance – e.g. the Netherlands (69% by value) 
and France (65% by value). In other countries, it 
is lower – in the U.S., corporates and commercial 
banks account for 56% and Germany just 20%.
External reviews in the form of second 
opinions and third-party certification are 
vital for maintaining transparency and 
credibility in a market and are recommended 
by the Green Bond Principles. Over the 
past few years there has been an increase 
in the percentage of bonds that have had 
external reviews. By value, the percentage of 
green bond issuance which has received an 
external review has been steadily increasing  
from 65% in 2015, to 77% in 2016 and to 
82% so far in 2017. 
Figure 2.4: A breakdown of green bond issuance by type of issuer. Source: Climate Bonds
Initiative (2017d).
In terms of labeled green bonds, in 2016 $81.4 billion in labeled green bonds
was issued, double the amou t of 2015 issuance, with the trend projected to con-
tinue. By the end of 2017, total green bond issuance was $155 billion, beating the
projection in this report of $100 billion, and according to analysis by Moody’s, 2018
is forecast to see issuance of over $250 billion (Sharma, 2018).
In their S&P report, Marin et al. (2018) discuss the application of their “Green
Evaluation methodology to a sample of 45 self-labeled U.S. municipal green bonds”
issued from 2012-2017 and found that “the U.S. green bonds scored on par with
their international counterparts.” This is based upon the Green Evaluation frame-
work that S&P released in April 2017, which “scores how green a bond is, rather
than providi g an opinion whether or not it is green.” This green evaluation tool
establishes a score for the total environmental benefit or resilience impact “relative
to a regional baseline and compared with that of similar projects and technologies
globally” and also provides a second-party opinion consistent with the GBP. This
method quantifies the “greenness” of a bond “based on three components with dif-
ferent weightings–Governance (25%), Transparency (15%), and Environment l or
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Resiliency impact (60%)” with each transaction scored from 0 to 100 to reflect
“the transaction’s overall environmental contribution as well as its alignment with
climate-change mitigation or adaptation goals.” Then this score is expressed as a
quartile from E1-E4, with E1 projects having the most benefit. They found that “the
majority of global self-labeled green bonds evaluated under our Green Evaluation
tool scored E2, with an average score of 70”. This report concludes with a forecast,
stating, “in the near-to-medium term, we expect growth in both labeled green bonds
and unlabeled climate-aligned bonds as issuers seek to make investments that miti-
gate or adapt to the impacts of climate change, and as investors increasingly pursue
yield associated with improving the environment.”
2.3 Green Bonds in the Literature
One of the first papers to appear in the literature about green bonds was “Mobilizing
private finance to drive an energy industrial revolution” (Mathews et al., 2010). This
policy paper says, “if capitalist industrialism created the problem in the first place,
then in our view a way has to be found for capitalist processes to solve the problem.”
It proposes the establishment of “Climate Bonds”, stating that “privately financed
instruments (that may tentatively be termed Climate Bonds) will have to play a
significant role in the transformations that lie ahead.” Furthermore, “when we look
back at the history of financing of major infrastructure projects, we see that private
debt finance instruments (bonds or debentures) have done the heavy lifting in getting
the projects off the ground.”
This was followed up by a paper called “Financing climate-friendly energy de-
velopment through bonds” by Mathews and Kidney (2012). It states that “we see
bonds as private and public sector financial instruments that are uniquely suited to
facilitating major infrastructure investment projects” and focus on them as “criti-
cal component of any future financing system capable of scaling up energy invest-
ments.” Their cited case studies include Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs)
in the US muni market, Climate Awareness Bonds as issued by the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB), Green bonds issued by the World Bank, Breeze Bonds in
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Germany, and the then-proposed Green Investment Bank in the UK. This paper
seeks to “explain what these financial instruments have in common and discuss
how they can be generalised and scaled up so as to meet the challenges of building
new energy systems around the world.” They propose four essential characteristics
for “climate bonds” to be successful. Firstly, the bonds needs to be backed by assets
which can be aggregated, so that the climate bond acts as a bridge “and is designed
to attract primarily institutional investors such as pension funds.” Secondly, “the
bonds are intended to be ‘asset-backed’”, or securitized on the basis of actual assets
or cashflows. Third, these bonds need to have the longest possible tenors in order to
“give the underlying renewable energy projects time to move from loss-making to
making better profits than fossil fuel energy projects” in order to better match their
profitability horizon. Finally, these bonds “need to be as closely modelled on exist-
ing ‘vanilla’ bonds as possible” so that they appeal to the widest range of investors
as possible.
Specific examples given in this paper include: “1) single project bonds, which
provide exposure to specified projects that are aligned with a transition to a low-
carbon economy (such as wind farms); 2) bonds whose proceeds are invested di-
rectly in asset portfolios (such as onshore and offshore wind farms); and 3) sec-
ondary project finance loans that are bought from commercial banks and bundled
by asset class into new bond issues.” Overall, this asset class seeks to remedy the
fact that “many renewable energy projects are rendered uncompetitive not because
of technical inadequacies but because funding sources are limited to loans from very
conservative banks.”
In a report authored by Shishlov et al. (2016) under the auspices of the Institute
for Climate Economics, titled “Beyond transparency: unlocking the full potential of
green bonds”, they state that “the green bond market unlocks a number of benefits
by increasing the transparency of information available to investors on underlying
assets and companies.” Additionally, green bonds can “help bond issuers commu-
nicate their sustainability strategies, create internal synergies between financial and
sustainability departments, and expand and improve relationships of borrowers with
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debt providers.” One of the greatest benefits of green bonds is that they can broaden
the pool of lenders and diversify the investor base. Nevertheless, this report does
take the cautious viewpoints that “their tangible contribution to the low-carbon tran-
sition has so far been marginal”, and “green bond market does not currently appear
to directly stimulate the increase of green investments.” This report seeks to explore
the challenges facing green bonds and makes recommendations to overcome these
challenges. The first challenge to be addressed is the risk of greenwashing. The
second challenge is to enhance the financial benefits of green bonds. This report
concludes by making a number of policy recommendations “aimed at informing
systemic decision-making by policymakers and financial stakeholders to help them
evaluate the options available”.
In a report published by Ceres, “Investing in the Clean Trillion: Closing the
Clean Energy Investment Gap”, Fulton and Capalino (2014) provide 10 recom-
mendations to increase global investment in clean energy “to at least $1 trillion by
2030”. These recommendations include setting goals “such as 5% portfolio-wide
clean energy investments”, increased scrutiny on fossil fuel companies’ exposure to
stranded asset risks, and the standardisation of clean energy investment data. Fur-
thermore, they focus on encouraging “green banking” to increase private capital
investment in clean energy, and call for support for green bonds and “issuances of
asset-backed securities to expand debt financing for clean energy projects”.
In 2015, a report titled “Shifting Private Finance towards Climate-Friendly In-
vestments” by Financing the Future Consortium (2015) was released with the aim
of encouraging EU policymakers to foster the growth of climate finance. Their spe-
cific recommendations include increased green bond issuance from European public
financial institutions, credit enhancement policies, policy risk insurance, fostering
green securitisation, lengthening the time horizon of institutional investors, and the
use of tax incentives (similar to those that are used in the muni bond market in the
US).
In 2017, the OECD published a book entitled Mobilising Bond Markets for
a Low-Carbon Transition (OECD, 2017a). This book “proposes a framework for
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understanding possible directions of bond market evolution and for analysing the
potential contribution that the bond markets can make to a low-carbon transition.”
In their analysis, they study: “1) how much debt finance is needed to meet the IEA’s
2C energy investment scenarios (2DS) between 2015 and 2035 in the four markets
studied (the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, Japan and the United
States); 2) how the bond market might evolve in the same period to account for part
of these debt finance needs; and 3) the implications for institutional investors that
have driven the growth of the green bond market to date.” They found that by 2035
in a 2DS regime, green bonds in these four markets have the potential to “scale to
USD 4.7-5.6 trillion in outstanding securities globally and USD 620-720 billion in
annual issuance,” which is about 4% relative to the overall debt capital markets in
these countries. In particular, this report states that “the share of municipal, sub-
sovereign and sovereign bonds could grow over time but is seen as constrained by
public finance limits and the fiscal capacities of governments”, however, “efforts
to expand the creditworthiness and ability of cities to issue bonds could positively
impact these figures in emerging and developing economies.”
In terms of assessing the size of the green bond market, the Climate Bonds
Initiative issues an annual State of the Market report, which is sponsored by
HSBC. This report is based upon green bond data that they aggregate by search-
ing Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters issuer data and “reviewed over 1,700 issuers
to identify those with over 95% of revenue derived from climate- aligned assets.”
They also added renewable energy project bonds and “domestic Chinese bonds from
the ChinaBond China Climate Aligned Bond Index.” The majority of the unlabelled
issuers are pure-play green companies, and all of their bonds issued since the be-
ginning of 2005 are included (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017b). These reports also
track developments in the size of the green municipal bond market, and the use of
green bonds to foster investment in green infrastructure for cities.
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2.4 Challenges to the Green Bond Market
One of the main criticisms levelled at green bonds is that there is the risk of labelling
bonds as green when in fact the proceeds do not go to projects that are considered
clean and/or sustainable. Given that the green bond market is currently unregulated
and relies upon the good faith of issuers to ensure that the capital raised from a
green bond issuance is invested according to the GBP, CBS, etc., there is no formal
mechanism by which to enforce compliance. As the green bond market grows, there
is a risk that some bond issuers may knowingly or unknowingly issue green bonds
that actually finance projects or activities that do not fall into the “green” category,
as declared by the Green Bond Principles or otherwise. As stated by Chiang (2017),
“Greenwashing – issuance of bonds labeled as green that lack genuine environmen-
tal benefits – remains a concern for investors, while issuers worry about reputational
and legal risks if green claims can’t be substantiated.”
Overall, “the lack of universal rules and standardisation of green definitions, re-
porting, and impact assessment is a shared and enduring source of concern” (OECD,
2017a). To try and remedy this situation, “some second opinion providers have de-
veloped their own assessment frameworks,” which include CICERO, the Global
Infrastructure Basel (GIB) Foundation, Sustainalytics, Trucost, the Climate Bonds
Initiative, and UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) (Shishlov et al.,
2016). However, it remains that some bonds that are qualified as green by a number
of second opinion providers may not be eligible for the CBS label and vice versa, so
there is no canonical definition of what exactly is considered a green bond (OECD,
2017a; AfDB et al., 2015; World Wildlife Fund, 2016). As an attempt to address
these problems, “a significant amount of effort has gone into shaping and cultivat-
ing a better-defined market with assurances for environmental integrity and impact
of green bonds while keeping ‘green transaction costs’ low” (OECD, 2017a).
In 2016, the World Wildlife Fund issued a report entitled “Green bonds must
keep the green promise! A call for collective action towards effective and credible
standards for the green bond market”. This report addresses some of the disadvan-
tages of the current green bond system, namely that the GBP and CBS are voluntary
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standards with little to no oversight. The report raises the issue that these standards
are more focussed on self-declared sustainability measures rather than post-facto
demonstrable environmental benefits, such as tonnes of CO2 emissions reduced, or
litres of water saved. They state that the “WWF believes that only a bond for which
the issuer can actually demonstrate measurable environmental benefits according
to widely-accepted, fully-developed standards should qualify as a ‘green bond’”,
and particularly wish to see a focus on “developing criteria around adaptation and
climate resilience assets and environmental challenges beyond climate change,” in-
cluding “ecosystem conservation, sustainable water use and pollution prevention.”
In large part, their argument rests on the lack of consideration for the preservation
of natural capital by the existing green bond standards, however their key point is
that “focussing on promised environmental impacts rather than actual performance
raises the risk of greenwashing if bonds are issued and perceived as green, while
only achieving minor or in fact no actual environmental benefits.” This is crucial in
light of the fact that there is relatively little impact reporting as of yet in the green
bond marketplace, and there are few attempts to quantify actual carbon emissions
reductions by the projects being financed by green bonds (Floods, 2017).
A related criticism is that green bonds do not actually lead to additionality,
in that green bonds do not actually end up financing projects that wouldn’t have
come to market through conventional means. This assessment of green bonds is
becoming more and more vociferous. In relation to green muni bonds in particular, a
Forbes commentator (Amante, 2018) states that green bonds are nothing more than
a marketing exercise, whereas “no investment is more fundamentally focused on
improving people’s lives than the municipal bonds. The explicit purpose of the $3.8
trillion municipal market is to function for the public good.” They then assert that
green bonds are “a marketing technique, used to generate interest in a new issuance
and to attract interest from millennials or other investors searching for green and
sustainable investments, according to market sources – an underwriter, portfolio
manager and issuer – specializing in green bonds.” Furthermore, “more demand
should, in theory, drive the cost of borrowing down, resulting in cost savings for
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the issuer. However, significant cost benefits as a result of issuing green bonds have
not materialized.” This is in agreement with the WWF report, which questioned
the posited benefits of additionality in the green bond market, citing the Natixis
(2014) report that failed to find any bond over $200M that wouldn’t have been
funded through traditional means. The WWF stated that thus far “evidence of price
premiums as well as ‘additionality’ remains anecdotal and controversial” (World
Wildlife Fund, 2016).
In addition to exposure to greenwashing and policy risk, the process of issuing
green bonds, even though they are fundamentally identical financial instruments to
conventional bonds, still incurs extra transaction costs due to the level of disclosure
and reporting required. Saha et al (2016) bring out the additional transactional costs
and additional work that arise as part of issuing a green muni bond by saying, “extra
work is needed to track the use of proceeds and report the information to investors,
for example. The estimated cost of an independent review is $10,000-50,000, de-
pending on who is doing the review and other factors.” This is part of the reason
why both issuers and investors are very interested to see if a greenium materialises
in the green bond market: higher green bond prices at issue help translate to lower
cost of capital, thereby offsetting some of these additional costs. Without effectively
being reimbursed for the extra reporting and paperwork, it could be hard to convince
more (particularly smaller, more cash-strapped) issuers to issue more green bonds.
Furthermore, as stated by Preclaw and Bakshi (2015), “we have not yet encountered
mandates that specify a price (in terms of foregone return) that investors are willing
to pay for their environmental friendliness.”
In order to help overcome these challenges to the green bond market, Shislov
(2016) lays out some policy recommendations. First, the market players should
“clearly lay out the objectives of different standards in order to define ‘greenness’.”
Also, governments should “clarify investment areas compatible with long-term na-
tional sustainable development pathways, and publicly endorse standards that are
aligned with long-term decarbonization strategies.” Secondly, to deal with trans-
parency risk in relation to reporting, market players should seek “convergence
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around the enhanced transparency frameworks”, and “reinforce the global efforts
around standardizing practices.” On the government side, policies should be set in
place to “support the issuance of green bonds by public institutions, and mandate
similar disclosure requirements for all asset-linked bonds.”
Furthermore, one of the key ways to try and overcome the risk of greenwashing
in the market is through external reviews and certification of green bonds. In the
external review process, second party reviews brought in to assess the green bond’s
use of proceeds and compliance with reporting requirements, and these external
reviewers then report on the eligibility for the bond to be labelled “green”. As an
additional step, issuers can also seek formal third-party certification, in which an ex-
ternal auditor reviews the bond and certifies it as green if it complies with an appro-
priate standard. (OECD, 2017a; Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017a). To date, dozens
green bonds have been certified green with a total of $31.2 billion in issuance as of
Q4 2017 (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017a). Looking specifically at US green muni
bonds, as of mid-2018, 23 of of these have been certified, most of them issued by
New York state agencies, namely Metropolitan Transport Authority (MTA), New
York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), and New
York State Housing Finance Authority (NYSHFA) (New York Governor’s Press Of-
fice, 2016; Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017a; Metropolitan Transportation Authority
of New York, 2017).
The next chapter will focus specifically on this green municipal bond sector of
the green bond market.
Chapter 3
Green Municipal Bonds
So far, most issuance of green bonds has come in the form of corporate bonds,
or bonds that are issued by companies in order to finance their private activities. In
contrast, municipal bonds are bonds that are issued by public entities, such as towns,
counties, public universities, public utilities, etc. This research focuses specifically
on the sub-set of green bonds that are also municipal bonds, which are green bonds
that are issued by public entities in the United States. This allows us to target the
market dynamics of the sector of the bond market that most directly affects sustain-
able infrastructure development in American towns and cities. These green munic-
ipal bonds are a small but growing part of the overall bond universe, and represent
an opportunity where investment in these bonds can directly impact the carbon foot-
print and climate resilience of infrastructure in the United States. Furthermore, this
green municipal bond market has the potential to grow to other countries.
3.1 Municipal Bonds in the United States
This work will focus on municipal bonds because they enable direct investment into
public infrastructure. Municipal bonds are sub-sovereign bonds that are issued by
non-national public entities, such as cities, counties, universities, etc. In the United
States, municipal bonds have been a means of raising capital for investment in in-
frastructure since New York City issued a bond to finance the building of a canal
in 1812 (Fahim, 2012). As of 2017, over a million municipal bonds were outstand-
ing in the U.S., with a total principle value of $3.8 trillion (MSRB, 2017; Lambert,
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How States Pay for Infrastructure Projects 
States pay for public buildings, facilities, roads, and other infrastructure somewhat differently than 
they fund other types of spending.  For example, they use debt more frequently and often rely on 
user fees like tolls to fund infrastructure.  In addition, the federal government provides grants for 
roads, transit, and other infrastructure.  But state revenues are required, regardless of the funding 
method that’s used. Borrowing must be repaid and federal grants often require matching funds. 
Borrowing.  There are sound reasons why states and localities borrow to pay for infrastructure, 
rather than use annual tax collections and other revenues.  Public buildings, roads, and bridges 
are used for decades but entail large upfront costs; borrowing enables the state to spread out 
those costs.  As a result, taxpayers who will use the infrastructure in the future help pay for it, 
which promotes intergenerational equity.  Borrowing also makes infrastructure projects more 
affordable by reducing the pressure on a state’s budget in any given year.  On average, states 
finance 32 percent of their capital spending with bond proceeds. 
 
Some states, either by law or by tradition, do not usually issue general obligation bonds for 
infrastructure or other spending.  Twenty-two states report that they maintain a formal or informal 
policy of funding infrastructure on a pay-as-you-go basis, according to a recent National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) survey. a  This means they look exclusively or 
primarily to cash on hand from taxes, fees, grants, or other sources to pay for capital projects.  
Bond proceeds make up less than 10 percent of funding for capital projects in 17 states.b 
Taxes and Fees.  On average, states finance only a small share (less than 6 percent) of 
infrastructure with general fund taxes (typically sales or income taxes not designated for specific 
purposes).  However, this practice varies by state.  States that shy away from borrowing for 
infrastructure projects depend much more heavily on general fund taxes to pay for building and 
maintaining infrastructure.  General fund spending makes up more than 20 percent of funding for 
Figure 3.1: Sources of funding for state infrastructure. Source: McNichol (2017).
2014). As show in Figure 3.1, 32% of state infrastructure is financed by bonds
(McNichol, 2017). The US muni bond market has financed three-quarters of U.S.
infrastructure, “including 4 million miles of roadways, 500,000 bridges, 1,000 mass
transit systems, 16,000 airports, 25,000 miles of inter- oastal waterway , 70,000
dams, 900,000 miles of pipe in water systems, and 15,000 waste water treatment
plants” (CDFA, 2011). A breakdown of the use of proceeds from US municipal
bonds issued from 2010 to 2016 is shown in Figure 3.3.
The 90,000 local gover ments that have municipal bond issuing authority may
be relatively small individually, but in aggregate, their spending can be substan-
tial. As stated in The Handbook of Municipal Bonds (Feldstein and Fabozzi, 2008),
“In 2003, federal spending was just 48% greater than state and local spending,” as
shown in Figure 3.2. In terms of infrastructure investment, according to the MSRB
(2017), “Federal spending is generally directed at transportation projects; state and
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Municipal Securities: Financing the Nation’s Infrastructure
Congress directs a considerable portion of its agenda toward legislation to provide 
for investment in highways, transportation and water infrastructure. However, it is 
state and local governments that commit the bulk of the capital required to pay for 
U.S. infrastructure. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly reports on public 
spending on transportation and water infrastructure, and its analysis shows that state 
and local government spending eclipses the federal share of the nation’s infrastructure 
spending. The federal government spends less than state and local governments 
on each type of infrastructure, and since 1987, state and local governments have 
contributed approximately three quarters of total public spending for transportation, 
and water infrastructure.3 Note in Figure 1, reflecting the most recent comprehensive 
government data across infrastructure categories, state and local government 
spending in 2004 was nearly on par with private sector spending, and three times 
federal spending overall, with federal, state/local and private sectors focused in 
different infrastructure categories. 
In addition, the nation’s infrastructure has aged to a point that it requires considerable 
maintenance beyond simply funding new projects, and it will be state and local 
governments that primarily pay those costs. State and local governments own more 
than 90 percent of non-defense public infrastructure assets, and pay approximately 
75 percent of the cost to maintain those assets, with the balance paid by federal and 
private capital.4 
Data from a 2014 CBO study on transportation and water spending show that state 
and local governments spent $320 billion on transportation and water infrastructure 
alone5 — not accounting for spending on schools, typically their largest expenditure.6 
Federal, state and local public spending for operation and maintenance exceeded 
capital spending in 2014, and state and local governments provided 88 percent of  
that operation and maintenance spending.7 
Source: McNichol, Elizabeth. February 23, 2016. “It’s Time for States to Invest in Infrastructure.” 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/
its-time-for-states-to-invest-in-infrastructure.
Public Infrastructure Federal State and Local Private
Schools $0.40 $75.50 $23.80 
Highways 30.2 36.5 n/a
Drinking Water 2.6 25.4 n/a
Mass Transit 7.6 8.0 0.0
Energy 1.7 7.7 69
Telecommunications 3.9 n/a 68.6
Other 16.1 17.2 12.1
Total $62.50 $170.30 $173.50 
FIGURE 1: State and Local Governments Account for Nearly 75% of Public 
Infrastructure Spending, 2004 (in Billions)
Federal, state and 
local governments 
and the private 
sector each invest 
in public works 
such as surface 
transportation, water 
and wastewater 
infrastructure, 
electric utilities, 
airports, ports,  
dams, waste facilities, 
parks, railways, 
schools and more.
Figure 3.2: The amount of spending on public infrastructure in 2004. Source: McNichol
(2017); MSRB (2017).
local government spending focuses on schools, highways and water syste s; and
private-sector investment is concentrated in electricity and telecommunications as-
sets,” and furthermore, “it is state and local governments that commit the bulk of
the capital required to pay for U.S. infrastructure,” which is why municipal bonds
are crucial to infrastructure investment in the US.
As McNichol (2017) sta es, although the 2018 US budget included tax credits
for private-sector infrastructure investors, it left out consideration for “maintenance
of existing roads, bridges, and water lines, and construction of public schools and
many public transit projects.” Nevertheless, states are actually cutting funding to in-
frastructure in terms of real dollars: state and local spending on capital projects has
decreased from “a high of 3 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in
the late 1960s to less than 2 percent in 2015. Falling federal spending on infrastruc-
ture is exacerbating the problem.” Furthermore, the most recent American Society
of Civil Engineers (2016) infrastructure rating report card gave US infrastructure
a D+ or “poor” rating, and estimated that it would require $4.6 trillion in invest-
ment to bring it back to a state of good repair. Since state and local governments
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Municipal Securities: Financing the Nation’s Infrastructure
State and local governments use direct spending, intergovernmental transfers, 
grants and loans to fund or finance their needs, but their primary means of financing 
public infrastructure is the municipal securities market. According to one analysis, 
approximately 90 percent of state and local capital spending is financed with debt.8 
Municipal securities ensure state and local governments can affordably access capital 
markets to build and maintain infrastructure on every scale, from big cities to small 
towns, from roadways to alleyways, and from universities to elementary schools. The 
municipal securities market provides nationwide access to capital to address localized 
community needs and priorities for more than 50,000 individual state and local entities 
that issue municipal securities.9 
Each year, state and local governments borrow hundreds of billions of dollars from 
investors to finance their infrastructure needs. From 2010 to 2016, approximately 
$3 trillion of municipal bonds were issued by state and local governments with an 
annual average volume of $430 billion.10 Figure 2 illustrates how the proceeds from 
these bonds were spent, with education, transportation and “general purpose” bonds 
(including those for broad-based capital improvement plans) as the three largest 
categories.
As these snapshots of public spending illustrate, the municipal securities market must 
be understood as the basis for making policy choices about maintaining the nation’s 
public works and driving additional infrastructure investments.
State and local 
governments use 
direct spending, 
intergovernmental 
transfers, grants 
and loans to fund or 
finance their needs, 
but their primary 
means of financing 
public infrastructure 
is the municipal 
securities market. FIGURE 2: Use of Proceeds from Municipal Bonds Issued 2010–2016
Source: MSRB, Thomson Reuters. 2016.
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Figure 3.3: e use of proceeds for municipal bonds issued from 2010-2016. Source:
MSRB (2017).
use municipal bonds to finance over 32% of their infrastructure investments (Mc-
Nichol, 2017), it is crucial to focus on this market in order to leverage investment
in sustainable infrastructure.
The US municipal bond market has unique characteristics in that it is one of
the more mature bond markets with a high rate of issuance. Additionally, unlike
the corporate bond market, the muni bond market is not dominated solely by large
bonds issued for and purchased by large institutional investors. Instead, around 40%
of muni bonds are bought by individuals in the retail market (SIFMA, 2018). As
a group, household retail investors represent the single largest sector of buyers of
municipal bonds in the U.S., as shown in Figure 3.4, and by 2012 they collectively
held nearly $2 trillion of these securities (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 2012). This makes muni bonds a way for individual Americans to directly
invest in their local infrastructure, and muni bonds are issued by all sizes of munic-
ipalities and governmental agencies. Overall, “the municipal bond market plays a
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A Primer on Municipal Securities
Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds
A municipal bond is a debt obligation issued by a state or local government, or one 
of its agencies or authorities (including cities, towns, villages, counties, special districts 
and other political subdivisions — collectively referred to as “municipal entities”). 
The purpose of this debt obligation is to raise funds for public projects, such as 
schools, roads, sewers and other community needs. In essence, a municipal entity 
(“issuer” or “borrower”) sells a bond to receive a loan from investors (“bondholders”), 
and uses the proceeds to finance a project with a public benefit. The issuer must 
pay bondholders principal plus interest over the life of the bond, typically until its 
maturity.11 Maturities of municipal securities range from short-term (months to two 
years) to 30 years or more, with longer maturities reflecting the useful life of public 
assets. Most municipal bonds are held by individual retail investors, either directly or 
through municipal bond mutual funds (see Figure 3).
A municipal bond 
is a debt obligation 
issued by a state or 
local government or 
one of its agencies or 
authorities (including 
cities, towns, 
villages, counties, 
special districts 
and other political 
subdivisions). 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, as of December 2016. “Household” may include both 
direct investments by individual investors as well as other accounts that do not fall into other 
tracked categories. “Other” includes non-financial corporate and non-corporate business, state 
and local governments, credit unions, state and local government retirement funds, exchange-
traded funds, government-sponsored enterprises, brokers and dealers and non-U.S. entities. 
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Mutual Funds
Figure 3.4: Breakdown of types of bond wners for US mu icipal bonds. Source: MSRB
(2017).
vital role in lowering the cost of capital for state and local governments” (Chiang,
2017).
A key reason for the uptake by the retail market in the U.S. is that “interest
paid on municipal securities is typically exempt from federal income taxation and
may be exempt from state income and other taxes as well” (U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2012). Therefore, the muni market is “supported primarily
by individual investors seeking to shield income from taxes”, and this tax exemption
“allows issuers to offer lower yields than those carried by comparable taxable debt
offerings” (Chiang, 2017). This tax efficiency, along with historically low default
rates and a sense of local engagement, has made investing in muni bonds popular
for retail investors in America.
Municipal bonds broadly have two types: general obligation bonds, or revenue
bonds. General obligation bonds are guaranteed on the basis of local tax receipts,
and revenue bonds are secured on the expected revenues generated from a public
project. Revenue bonds are issued for specific projects, so that the proceeds raised
from the bond sale earmarked so that they can be applied only to the to the purposes
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described in the “Use of Proceeds” section in the bond’s Official Statement. The use
of proceeds for general obligation bonds are not necessarily restricted to specific
projects. In the case of default, general obligation bonds have full recourse to the
issuer. The debt recourse for revenue bonds consists of revenue streams from the
issuer, such as taxes, but not recourse to the issuer themselves.
There are two further muni bond category types that can come into play in
the green bond universe: project bonds and asset-backed securities. The proceeds
from project bonds are ring-fenced for use in a specific project, and accordingly
debt recourse is restricted to solely the project’s assets and revenues rather than the
issuer’s. Muni bonds that are issued as asset-backed securities raise funds that are
either earmarked for various use of proceeds, or ring-fenced for a specific project.
These types of bonds are guaranteed on the basis of a collection of assets that have
been grouped together as collateral. These types of bonds can be a promising way
to group together smaller projects and raise money at benchmark size for further
development, which could be an efficient way of raising capital for the types of
smaller, more fragmented projects that are common in urban areas. An example of
which includes PACE bonds, which are described in detail in Section 3.9.4.
In recent times, a new type of muni bond has entered the U.S. market, the
green muni bond, the proceeds of which are used to fund eco- and climate-
friendly projects, such as renewable energy, building retrofitting for energy effi-
ciency, LEED-certified building development, new sewers and storms drains, public
transport projects, etc. The rest of this chapter will discuss these bonds in detail.
3.2 Climate Federalism
According to the Climate Bonds Initiative (2016), “the U.S. continues to be a leader
in muni green bonds despite the political context.” Notwithstanding the fact that
the US national government has withdrawn their support for the Paris Agreement,
15 states have grouped together under the US Climate Alliance in order to honor
their Paris Agreement commitments and to “address the existential threat of climate
change by investing in clean energy, energy efficiency and clean transportation and
3.2. Climate Federalism 52
making our communities and our economy more resilient to the climate impacts that
are already occurring” (US Climate Alliance, 2017). This Alliance represents 36%
of the US population and $7 trillion dollars in economic activity, “enough to be the
world’s third largest country.” The primary objective of the Alliance is meeting their
share of the emissions cuts agreed to previously by the US in the Paris agreement,
“a 26-28% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 2005 levels by 2025.” This
movement is echoed by We Are Still in and the Council of Mayors, a group of
over 2,600 signatories that have signed up with the intention of honouring their
Paris Agreement obligations (We Are Still In, 2017; United States Conference of
Mayors, 2017; Bloomberg and Pope, 2017).
The reason that individual American cities and states have the political will
and fiscal capacity to essentially defy the national US government over their climate
policies is because of the way that the country’s government is federalised, so that
states and cities can function as semi-autonomous regions (Rabe, 2018; Lutsey and
Sperling, 2008; Marlowe, 2014). The US muni bond market thrives because of the
federalised borrowing powers that are given to cities, counties, and states (Feldstein
and Fabozzi, 2008; MSRB, 2017). The federalism of the American government
was set in place intentionally very early on in the establishment of the country. This
system of federalism has led to conflict between the national government and local
governments many times, not least as one of the causes of the American Civil War
from 1861-1865.
Even now, the political landscape of the US is highly fragmented, with each
individual state or municipality representing a population with a range of different
political viewpoints, as is apparent from the willingness of many state and city
governments to break with national policy over climate action. While federalism
can make it difficult to navigate policy on the national level, it does enable a pluracy
of political regimes that may not be readily apparent on the international scale. This
is one reason why this research into US green muni bonds is timely and relevant: the
viewpoints and political will of a large segment of American society is not being
reflected in national policy, however this does not necessarily stymie progress on
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the climate front as many observers may have feared.
3.3 Green Municipal Bonds: Background
A growing number of muni bonds are being issued in the US as green-labelled
municipal bonds. A useful definition of a green municipal bond is given by Saha
and D’Almeida (2017), who state that:
a green municipal bond is a fixed-income financial instrument for rais-
ing capital through the debt capital market. As with any other bond,
the bond issuer raises a fixed amount of capital from investors over
an established period of time (the “maturity”), repays the capital (the
“principal”) when the bond matures, and pays an agreed-upon amount
of interest (“coupons”) during that time. The key difference between a
green bond and a regular bond is that the former is explicitly labelled
as “green” by the issuer, and a commitment is made to use the proceeds
of the green bond to exclusively finance or re-finance projects with an
environmental benefit.
Overall, green municipal bonds are essentially identical to regular municipal
bonds and “to date have been largely identical in structure, risk, and return to regu-
lar bonds.” Just like green bonds in general, there is a segment of bonds that could
qualify has green, but issuers have not, for whatever reason, chosen to label them
as green. Projects that are eligible to be financed by green bonds include, “re-
newable energy, energy efficiency, sustainable waste management, sustainable land
use, biodiversity conservation, clean transportation, clean water, and various climate
adaptation projects”, among others (Saha and D’Almeida, 2017; Climate Bonds Ini-
tiative et al., 2015). Their relationship to municipal bonds and green bonds in shown
in Figure 2.1.
The advantages of green muni bonds are outlined in Saha and D’Almeida
(2017) and are similar to those of the green bond market in general. To summarise,
green muni bonds are helpful to issuers who wish to grow and diversify their in-
vestor base, especially those who want to appeal to the expanding ESG investor
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class. “By issuing a green bond, municipalities have attracted investors who do not
typically buy municipal bonds, including environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) investors and institutional investors.”
Green muni bonds also foster greater cross-agency collaboration, because the
“process of structuring and issuing a green bond can also promote cross-agency
cooperation within a city by bringing together departments responsible for finance,
sustainability, infrastructure, and planning.” Green issuance sends a green signal to
the market that the issuer is interested in sustainable development, and the investors
of green bonds are interested in supporting that agenda.
One of the biggest challenges to the green bond market is the lack of bankable
green projects or project pipelines. In order to be financed through the debt capital
markets, the projects need to have proven cash flows and sufficient backing from
their issuers in order to sufficiently de-risk the project enough to attract funding.
One key problem with the green infrastructure pipeline is that, especially in terms of
energy projects, these types of projects are generally smaller in scale than the bond
markets typically like to see come to market. Aggregation and securitisation are
keys to scaling up this market, because “without suitable aggregation mechanisms,
the typical small-scale green projects can find it difficult to tap into the bond market”
(Saha and D’Almeida, 2017).
Institutional investors such are generally only interested in benchmark size
bonds of about $250 million and up, however the US municipal bond market is
different from the overall bond market in that it has a large amount of smaller-sized
yet successful issuance. This is largely due to the fact that most muni bonds are
issued as series bonds, where a larger bond is broken down into a series of bonds
with differing sizes, tenors, and coupons. So far, this has not noticeably been a
barrier to entry for the muni bond market, although only the larger bonds are given
prominence, such as in index listings, as will be seen in later sections.
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Chart 3 
U.S. Municipal Green Bond Issuance – Par And Issues 
 
 
Sources: Climate Bond Initiative, S&P Global Ratings. 
Copyright ©2018 by S&P Global Ratings. All rights reserved. 
 
Chart 4 
Top 9 U.S. States For Green Bond Issuance Ranked By 
Par, 2013-2017
 
 
 
Our analysis found that, in 2017, the use of green bond proceeds was primarily for water, buildings 
and industry, transport, energy, waste and pollution control, and forestry and agriculture projects. 
While sustainable water management has consistently led municipal green bond issuances by 
sector, green transport has grown considerably (see charts 5a and 5b). Issuances within this 
sector have more than doubled year-over-year over the past three years. Similarly, the rates of 
growth of issuances within the green building sector have also accelerated.  
 
Chart 5a 
Number Of U.S. Municipal Green Bond Issues By Sector 
(2015-17)  
 
Source: S&P Global Ratings. 
Copyright ©2018 by S&P Global Ratings. All rights reserved. 
 
Chart 5b 
Par Amount Of U.S. Municipal Green Bond Issuance By 
Sector (2015-17) 
 
 
 
The State of New York was a leader in green bond issuance in 2017, with the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority issuing $2.17 billion in green bonds to support projects. It was the sixth-
largest green bond issuer globally during 2017. Other notable issuance in 2017 included California 
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Figure 3.5: The size of the US green municipal bond market by year, both in terms of
issuance and total amount outstanding. Marin et al. (2018).
3.4 History and State of the Market
The first green muni bond was issued by Massachusetts in 2013, and the market has
grown rapidly since then. By 2017, green labelled muni bond issuance reached $12
billion, which was 27% of the total US green bond issuance for that year (Marin
et al., 2018; Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018a), as shown in Figure 3.5. So far, 31
states have issued green muni bonds, although the top 3 states account for 64% of
activity. As of mid-2018, “New York ranks first (USD7.2bn issued as of end Q2
2018), followed closely by California (USD6.9bn). The third largest is the pioneer:
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (USD2.9bn)” (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018a).
In the 2016 Climate Bonds Initiative State of the Market report, they stated
that “2015 saw significant growth in the labelled green muni bond market, with $4.7
billion in issuance, up by 47% over 2014”, making a total of $9.7 billion outstanding
and an additional $20.6 billion in unlabelled but climate-aligned bonds (Climate
Bonds Initiative, 2016). An S&P report published in 2016 said that “we believe
the market for U.S. municipal green bonds could be significantly larger” due to the
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Cumulative issuance 
from 2013 to 2017 
was mainly in New 
York, California, and 
Massachusetts. 
State Of The U.S. Municipal Green Market  
Using data from the Climate Bonds Initiative, Bloomberg, and MuniOS, S&P Global Ratings 
analyzed the 2017 self-labeled U.S. municipal green market, and trends from our most recent 
report (see "What’s Next For U.S. Municipal Green Bonds?" published Sept. 7, 2016) are 
continuing. In our view, state and municipal government-driven leadership on environmental and 
sustainability issues, along with a concerted focus on climate-aligned infrastructure 
development, will likely continue to affect the diversity and range of projects that green bonds 
support.  
Chart 2 
Total U.S Municipal Green Bond Par By Sector, 2015-2017 
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Self-labeled green issuance grows 
Self-labeled municipal green bond issuance continues to rise, marching up steadily to 65 issues 
totaling $10.4 billion in 2017 (see chart 3), representing about 25% of the $42.2 billion par total of 
U.S. green bond issuances that year from corporate and municipal issuers. We estimate additional 
growth in 2018 as more issuers look to expand their investor base, meet sustainability objectives, 
and test the waters for preferential pricing. However, the tax law changes that eliminated 
advance-refunding transactions could depress issuance. In 2017, there were 15 refunding 
transactions totaling $3.8 billion labeled as green – equaling 23% of the transactions and 36% of 
the par issued in 2016. 
Cumulative issuance from 2013 to 2017 was mainly in New York, California, and Massachusetts. 
Combined, they generated 64% of all par value and 48% of transactions over that five-year span 
(see chart 4). These states have been leaders in the movement for environmentally conscious 
investing, and issuers in these states that have pursued the green label benefit from generally 
supportive management and governance structures, in our view. 
There has been notable growth in green bond issuance in Connecticut, Colorado, and the District 
of Columbia. The data indicate that, while the number of green issuers is increasing on opposite 
coasts and in states with higher concentrations of major cities and infrastructure, growth could 
also continue in other regions of the country. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Amount outstanding for green municipal bonds by sector, 2015-2017. Marin
et l. (2018).
large amount of climate-aligned bonds that haven’t been labelled green. In 2017, a
Bloomberg New Energy Finance report stated that the US was likely to sell more
than $10 billion in green municipal bonds in 2017, an increase over the $6.8 billion
issued in 2016.
Saha and D’Almeida (2017) state that, “of last year’s [2016] $41.8 billion of
gr n bond issues, over $5 billion came from regional governments or municipal-
itie , making this the third-largest category of issuer after development banks and
corporations.” Furthermore, according to Bloomberg, “U.S. State and local govern-
ments have issued $7.5 billion of green-labelled bonds since 2010, with a record
issuance of $3.8 billion in 2015 – a 55 per cent increase over 2014.” The Climate
Bonds Initiative released findings in late 2017 that “annual US green municipal
bond issuance reached a new record in 2017, passing the symbolic $10 billion mark
with New York retaking the lead from California and becoming the US state with
the highest 2017 issuance of municipal green bonds and the highest cumulative is-
suance,” and forecasts that 2018 issuance should grow to $20 billion.
According to the S&P Global report titled, “2018 U.S. Municipal Green Bond
& Resiliency Outlook” (Marin et al., 2018), “volume [...] continues to increase,
and market estimates for 2018 suggest that issuance could top $15 billion,” up from
$10.4 billion in 2017. They found that the majority of the labelled green muni
bonds are for “water, green buildings, and transportation projects” (see Figure 3.6),
and that “self-labeled municipal green bond issuance continues to rise, marching up
steadily to 65 issues totalling $10.4 billion in 2017, representing about 25% of the
$42.2 billion par total of U.S. green bond issuances that year” (shown in Figure 3.5.
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They found that 64% of issuance from 2013-2017 was from New York, Cali-
fornia, and Massachusetts, but growth has been seen in issuance from Connecticut
and Colorado, but overall most green muni bond issuance is in the more urban ar-
eas and states. They also state that “we believe the market for financing projects
with environmental benefits is significantly larger than the self-labeled universe of
municipal green bonds,” which is in alignment with the non-labelled but climate-
aligned universe of bonds. As of 2017, 43% of green muni bond issuances have
been reviewed externally, up from only 13% in 2013.
In a report issued recently specifically about US municipal green bond issuance
by the Climate Bonds Initiative (2018a), they noted that “US Muni green bond
issuance dropped in H1 2018” (see Figure 3.7). This is occurring as a result of
changes in the tax code in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that was passed by Congress
in 2017, and generally has curtailed the ability to issue refunding bonds in the mu-
nicipal market in general. Overall muni bond issuance decreased by 22% in the first
half of 2018 due to this effect: while new capital bond issuance increased almost
20%, refunding bond issuance decreased by 58%, depressing the entire market.
This report also identified US municipal issuers who were issuing climate-
aligned but unlabeled bonds who could potentially help build the green labeled
muni bond sector. They found nearly 1,500 issuers whose revenues come from
climate solutions, who have a total of $254 billion in bonds outstanding. Only $14
billion of these bonds (from 23 issuers) are green labeled. This report targets spe-
cific pure play issuers that could easily label their bonds as green as an illustration
of how much headroom this market has to grow. Agencies that they identified as
issuing qualifying bonds include the New York City Municipal Water Finance Au-
thority, Chicago Transit Authority, Ohio Air Quality Development Authority, the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and The Tuolumne Wind Project
Authority.
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Can US municipals scale up green bond issuance? Likely, “yes” 
We conducted a scoping exercise and identified USD250bn of outstanding bonds from specialised US municipal 
issuers, which are climate-aligned, but not labelled ‘green’. Refinancing needs from these issuers offers an 
opportunity to label bonds and consolidate US municipals’ position in the green bond market. 
 
 
The first US municipal green bond was issued in 2013 by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Over the next four years, issuance 
went up and up to reach USD12bn in 2017, or 27% of the total US green 
bond issuance for the year. 
Green bond issuers from 31 US states have issued to date. The top 3 
states account for 64% of US Muni green bond issuance: New York ranks 
first (USD7.2bn issued as of end Q2 2018), followed closely by California 
(USD6.9bn). The third largest is the pioneer: Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (USD2.9bn). 
However, US Muni green bond issuance dropped in H1 2018. This is in 
line with a wider trend in US Muni issuance. The passing of the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Acts of 2017 by Congress in December 2017 resulted in major 
alteration to US tax law, and that has impacted the issuance of refunding 
bonds in particular, according to SIFMA monthly data. 
 
 
 
 
SIFMA data shows a very clear trend: US Muni issuance decreased 22% 
from Jan-May 2017 (USD162bn) to Jan-May 2018 (USD127bn). While 
issuance of new capital bonds has increased 19%, refunding bond 
issuance has plummeted by 58%, dragging overall numbers down. The 
trend is even more apparent for Q1 2018: refunding bond issuance was 
65% below the Q1 2017 level. 
 
 
So, how can US Munis scale up green bonds? 
We screened the EMMA website to identify climate-aligned US 
municipal entities in the water, waste, transport, renewable 
energy and land use sectors, i.e. key sectors under the Climate 
Bonds Taxonomy. We acknowledge that there are many entities 
issuing bonds for climate-aligned projects but for the purpose of 
this scoping exercise, we honed in on specialised agencies with 
more than 95% of their revenue derived from climate solutions 
(pure-plays). 
We identified 1,436 issuers with USD264bn in bonds outstanding. 
These include USD14bn in green bonds outstanding already 
issued by 23 pureplay US Muni issuers. Over half the volume 
(54%) is attributable to 50 pure-plays with USD1-10bn of 
outstanding bonds. 
Issuers from the transport and water sectors account for most of 
the related bonds. The two issuers with outstanding debt 
exceeding USD10bn are also from these sectors and account for 
a quarter of volume. The smaller issuers are primarily from the 
water industry. 
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Figure 3.7: Amount outstanding for green municipal bonds by sector, 2015-2017. Climate
Bonds Initiative (2018a).
3.5 Green Muni Bonds: Policy Review
The Clean Energy and Bond Finance Initiative (Milford et al., 2012) has discussed
using the municipal bond market in the United States to scale up investment in
green infrastructure, stating that municipal bonds are an “old, well-established con-
ventional tool” in the US, and they could therefore be key to scale up clean energy.
However, there needs to be one critical change: “Energy policy makers must figure
out how to successfully transfer conventional credit enhancement tools to the clean
energy sector.” There is discussion about novel financial instruments for climate-
friendly projects, but as pointed out by Richard Kauffman (Chairman of Energy
and Finance for New York State) (2013), the key could lie in “applying financial
techniques that have already been invented and are used widely in other parts of the
economy, but have not yet been applied to this sector”, such as green muni bonds.
A report, “How to Scale up Demand for U.S. Clean Energy and Green Bonds?”
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(2014), also recommends that clean energy bonds could be fostered by issuing green
muni bonds with longer tenors, larger issuances, more taxable bond offerings, and
aggregation of multiple energy projects into a single offering. They also advocate
“explicitly label[ling] all clean energy bonds as ‘green bonds’ in order to harmo-
nize and integrate bond financing for renewables and energy efficiency into what is
clearly consolidating into a distinctive category of the bond market.” Milford et al.
(2014) also state, “using bonds in new ways, states and regions can lead the way in
a new era of clean energy finance that reduces the cost of capital and financial risk.”
Within this context, green bonds can be seen to have an important role in the
financing of green infrastructure for cities, especially against the background of
“declining federal subsidy support and tighter bank lending, and a growing interest
in bond financing” (Clean Energy Group and Croatan Institute, 2014). In their re-
port titled, “What Investors Want: How to Scale up Demand for U.S. Clean Energy
and Green Bonds”, the Croatan Institute in collaboration with the Clean Energy
Group (2014) examine investor demand for clean energy bonds in the US market.
In particular, this work delves into the investment characteristics that institutional
investors are particularly looking for, based on interviews with “over three dozen
bond buyers”, including corporations, investment banks, and public pensions. They
discuss the distinctions between corporate green bonds and municipal green bonds,
and outline “key investment criteria these investors use when evaluating green and
clean energy bonds: liquidity, credit quality, size, terms, use of proceeds, and label-
ing.”
Saha (2016) published a short policy paper that reiterates the point that the US
muni bond market could be ideally situated to raise capital for sustainable infras-
tructure via green muni bonds, and that this is a nascent but growing sector. This
paper uses the same figures from the Climate Bond Initiative that have been dis-
cussed previously, and claims that no pricing premium has been found as of yet
despite higher issuance costs. Overall, the confluence of climate urgency and in-
vestor demand will “provide a unique opportunity for state and local governments
to tap into the growing market to access financing for a multitude of infrastructure
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and climate projects.” In 2017, Saha followed this up with a chapter on green mu-
nicipal bonds in a book titled Finance for City Leaders (Saha and D’Almeida, 2017)
. This chapter provides an overview of what green municipal bonds are and how to
issue them, along with their advantages and the challenges they face. This is a high
level introduction to the market, which is an appropriate resource aimed at city pol-
icy makers. This chapter is a useful reference and summary of the green municipal
market to date, and also describes some specific green muni bond business cases
and provides some policy recommendations to help spur growth. The information
in this chapter is very similar to that presented in a preceding report authored by
the Climate Bonds Initiative, titled “How to Issue a Green Muni Bond: The Green
Muni Bonds Playbook” (Climate Bonds Initiative et al., 2015).
In 2014, while the New York City Comptroller’s Office was exploring the feasi-
bility of a green muni bond programme for the city (Stringer, 2014), they found that
institutional investors “expressed an unwillingness to accept lower yields” in ex-
change for positive environmental externalities, indicating that the market demands
that green bonds remain competitive with conventional bonds (Stringer, 2015), a
point which informs the main objective of this research and our inquiry into the
presence or absence of greenium.
Comptroller Stringer posits three benefits for NYC from green bond issuance:
“expanding our investor base, creating a model program for other cities around the
United States to follow, and encouraging a greener capital program.” New York
City is already one of the largest issuers of municipal debt, “with an anticipated $30
billion of borrowing over the next four fiscal years.” Furthermore, the tracking of
use of proceeds that is required to issue a green bond “could lead to greater focus
on environmentally beneficial projects,” so that “sustainability could be tracked and
such capital needs prioritized.”
A subsequent report by Stringer (2015) reports on market research that was
conducted to gauge market demand for green muni bonds issued by NYC. Repre-
sentatives from the city’s Office of Management and Budget met with seven large
institutional green bond buyers, including money managers, insurance companies,
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and investment firms with ESG mandates. These stakeholders were supportive of
expansion of green muni bond issuance, stating that “the lack of supply in both the
primary and secondary market remains a concern” in light of increasing demand.
Furthermore, the investors felt that a high quality green bond program would reflect
favourably on the city’s reputation, and in turn, the size and credibility of NYC’s
bond issuance could add credibility to the green muni bond market. Overall, it
would “re-confirm the City’s strong management practices and improve the City’s
risk profile amongst investors.” One of the main takeaway messages was that “the
City may be able to realize a quantifiable pricing impact depending on the addition
of new green investors, potentially saving taxpayers money over the long-term.”
In 2017, California State Treasurer, John Chiang, spearheaded the release of a
report entitled “Growing the U.S. Green Bond Market, Volume 1: The Barriers and
Challenges” (Chiang, 2017), which outlines some of the findings that resulted from
a listening tour of 57 participants from 27 institutional investors and underwriters
active in the green muni bond market around the US between February and August
of 2016. The findings of this report echo some of the points made in the previously-
discussed sources: there is a lack of supply, not demand. The main issues that are
flagged as reasons the market has been slow to grow are “a combination of spo-
radic deal flow, small offering size, index ineligibility, illiquidity, and lack of stan-
dardization,” however, “the more fundamental explanation for green bonds’ slow
takeoff in the United States lies not in the bond market itself, but in the broader
cultural, political, and legal environment that holds back action” due to the fact that
there is no national political consensus or mandate on climate change. Neverthe-
less, other issues that may prevent an issuer from issuing a green bond includes the
“widespread perception that green issuance adds cost and complexity without pro-
viding a demonstrable benefit in pricing,” and participants in the listening tour had
so far seen little to no evidence for a green bond premium, “particularly for new
issues.” However, some participants said that “it is possible – perhaps even likely
– that persistent premiums will eventually emerge as the U.S. green bond market
matures.”
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Furthermore, the listening tour participants “emphasized that improving liq-
uidity is a major hurdle for green bonds from U.S. issuers” which would help to
dispel the “myth that green bonds are expensive, exotic, and illiquid”. However, the
participants ranked credit quality and yield as the most important factors influenc-
ing their green bond portfolio decisions, with liquidity coming in third. The main
factor affecting liquidity is small offering size, with the report stating that “issues
much reach a $250 million threshold to be eligible for index inclusion”, however
this is only true for corporate bonds, not muni bonds, with the report itself stat-
ing that “liquidity is not as severe a problem in the municipal green bond market,
which has always featured smaller offerings.” Nevertheless, there is still demand for
state-level aggregators to bundle up smaller projects into larger bonds.
One of the very first reports to suggest that clean energy projects in the US
could be financed through muni bonds was “Clean Energy and Bond Finance Initia-
tive (CE+BFI): An Action Plan to Access Capital Markets”, released by the Clean
Energy Group and the Council of Development Finance Agencies (Milford et al.,
2012). This report opens with the statement: “The prospect for sustained and grow-
ing federal financial support for clean energy is, to put it bluntly, bleak, especially
without additional congressional action. Other options must be pursued, especially
state, regional and local financing tools.” As a result, “more clean energy experts
are looking to the states, regions and localities–a return to federalism–as an invest-
ment strategy.” One of the mechanisms that could be leveraged are the over 50,000
development finance agencies, which are “state, county, and municipal agencies
and authorities that provide or support economic development financing programs,
including tax-exempt and taxable bonds”. At the time this report was written, the
development agencies had not been very active in the clean energy sector. The pro-
posals in this report, according to Milford et al, make sense against a background of
increasing energy federalism. This paper also discusses the tax treatment of bonds,
and raises Private Activity Bonds (PABs) as one possible instrument for clean en-
ergy financing. Overall, the main thrust of this policy paper is that the existing
development agencies can use their tax-advantaged status to help with clean energy
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financing.
The previous paper was built upon by another report from the Clean Energy
Group and Council of Development Finance Agencies, this one titled “Reduce Risk,
Increase Clean Energy: How States and Cities are Using Old Finance Tools to Scale
Up a New Industry” (Sanders et al., 2013). This paper explores many of the same
concepts as the previous one, stating that “conventional tools such as bonds can
meet much of the [clean energy] challenge to dramatically increase investment.”
However, this report expands on this idea to elaborate on mechanisms for credit
enhancement as a way of stimulating the sector. In particular, “states and cities, for
the first time, are beginning to use these credit enhancement tools to finance clean
energy technology deployment.” This report also discusses some of the more re-
cent bond issuance models, such as the Morris Model from New Jersey, the Hawaii
securitised bond issue, the Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility (DSEU), and the
NYSERDA model, which are discussed further in Section 3.9. Credit enhance-
ments that can be used to de-risk clean energy projects are discussed, including
loan guarantees, debt service reserves, subordinated debt, interest rate buy-downs,
bank letters of credit, and credit insurance. Rydin et al. (2015) also provides an
overview of the Morris Model.
Milford et al. (2014) wrote a report for the Brookings Institution in entitled
“Clean Energy Finance Through the Bond Market: A New Option for Progress”,
which follows on from the previous report. The main point from this work is that
“state and local bond finance represents a powerful but underutilized tool for future
clean energy investment.” As this report states, “different types of financing are go-
ing to be required to scale up the clean energy industry”, and “bond finance holds
tremendous potential for future clean energy investment, perhaps at levels in the tens
of billions of dollars in the next several years.” This report also addresses some of
the challenges facing this market sector, namely: “Weak cooperation between devel-
opment finance agencies and clean energy offices”, “lack of a large market for clean
energy bonds”, “spotty performance data and the lack of standardized documenta-
tion”, and limited institutional investor demand. Despite these limitations, “states
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and regions have led clean energy policymaking in the United States,” including
the use of renewable portfolio laws and green banks, and “given this history, states
and regions should once against lead from the front to scale up the use of existing
development finance tools for clean energy.” The policy recommendations that are
made include fostering partnerships between finance experts and clean energy of-
ficials at the state and local levels, and the use of credit enhancement to mitigate
risks for bond financed clean energy projects. Also, the availability of data should
be improved, and documentation should be standardised in order to better manage
investment and project risk. These policies can help create a pipeline of “rated and
private placement deals” in order to “meet demand by institutional investors for
fixed-income clean energy securities.”
3.6 Issuing Green Muni Bonds
Green muni bonds are issued in largely the same way as conventional municipal
bonds in the US, however there are some extra steps involved in order to label the
bond issuance as green. The steps involved are described in detail by Saha and
D’Almeida (2017) and in the Green Muni Bonds Playbook authored by the Climate
Bonds Initiative (2015), but the general process is as follows:
• Identifying qualifying green projects and assets: The issuer goes through their
portfolio of existing assets or projects they have in development and select
those that qualify as green according to the GBP (or other green bond stan-
dard). As stated by the CBI, “The ‘greenness’ of the issuer is irrelevant – it’s
about the physical assets or projects” (Climate Bonds Initiative et al., 2015).
• Arranging independent review: A second-party external reviewer is brought
in to look at “the green credibility of the proposed Green Muni Bond in-
vestments” along with “the processes established for tracking funds and for
reporting.” This step is key to verifying that any so-called green bonds are
credibly green and thereby prevents greenwashing.
• Setting up tracking and reporting: “It is critically important that issuers of
green municipal bonds always maintain full disclosure on the allocation of
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proceeds” (Saha and D’Almeida, 2017). This step also ensures that the total
amount of financing raised by the bond issue is fully allocated to the green
projects specified in the use of proceeds.
• Issuing the green bond: this step is generally the same as with a conven-
tional bond. First, if approval for the bond issuance is required, that is ob-
tained. Then, “working with an investment bank or advisor, they structure the
bond.” After that, a credit rating is assigned, and the bond is marketed and
priced. “It should be noted that creditworthiness is judged the same as for
other bonds. Issuers should expect to get credit rated in the usual manner”
(Saha and D’Almeida, 2017).
• Monitor Use of Proceeds and Report Annually. It is a requirement of the GBP
that in order to “maintain the status of a green municipal bond, the issuer
would need to provide confirmation to investors at least once a year that the
funds are being used for qualifying green projects.”
While the additional steps can add some costs and workload to getting the bond
to market, subsequent green bond issuance will be simpler, because “repeat green
municipal bond issuers can use the same framework for identifying green projects
and assets, the same independent reviewer, and the same processes for management
of proceeds and reporting” (Saha and D’Almeida, 2017; Climate Bonds Initiative
et al., 2015).
As stated by Saha and D’Almeida (2017); Climate Bonds Initiative et al.
(2015), “the majority of green bonds issued are green general obligation bonds
backed by the issuer’s entire balance sheet. The other types are green revenue
bonds, green project bonds, and green securitized bonds.” However, there is a larger
universe of bond types, and several of these are particularly relevant to green muni
bonds. The different types of bonds are set apart not only by the guarantees upon
which they are issued, but also by their different debt recourses in the case that
things go wrong and the bond goes into default (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015a).
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3.7 Taxation
A feature of municipal bonds is that their interest is usually exempt from federal in-
come tax, and is also frequently exempted from state taxation as well when the bond
buyer lives within the state in which the bond was issued (Feldstein and Fabozzi,
2008). This has the result of raising the effective yields of tax exempt muni bonds
relative to their taxable counterparts, which in turn affects both the price to the
buyer, and the cost of capital for the issuer, because the tax exemption acts as a
form of subsidy. As stated by Milford (2012), “A bond issuer’s objective is to raise
capital at the lowest cost. Tax-exempt treatment of Governmental Bonds makes
them the lowest cost option.”
In 2014, over $2 billion of tax-exempt green muni bonds were sold in the U.S.
(Clean Energy Group and Croatan Institute, 2014). Individual investors are particu-
larly active in the tax-exempt green muni bond market, especially since these types
of local-issue bonds also provide a means of informing residents of the municipali-
ties about capital investment decisions, and a way of earning tax-exempt income by
investing in their local communities. Nevertheless, tax exempt muni bonds are still
crucial to financing infrastructure in the US, because “between 2000 and 2014, the
federal tax exemption saved state and local governments an estimated $714 billion
in additional interest expenses” with savings of $8 billion in 2015 alone (United
States Conference of Mayors, 2017a). Without tax exemption for muni bonds, is-
suers will be forced to pass on higher interest rates to investors in order to cover
their increased cost of capital due to taxation.
Regardless of whether they are general obligation or revenue-backed bonds,
this tax exemption is in place (for domestic investors in the US) as a form of a
subsidy for infrastructure that is for the public good. Tax exemption benefits both
the issuers and retail bond buyers, because “tax exemption effectively lowers the
borrowing cost for state and local government bond issuers, as investors are willing
to accept a lower yield comparable to other taxable securities of similar risk and
maturity due to the tax benefit offered by municipal bonds” (Luby, 2012). However,
there is also a segment of the muni market that are taxable, whether because they
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are for projects that seemingly do not provide major benefit to the public, or because
they are targeting investors that can’t take advantage of tax exemption in order to
achieve the right yields, such as institutional investors or other corporate entities.
According to the SIFMA Municipal Bond Issuance Survey for 2017, tax-exempt
municipal issuance is expected to reach $375.0 billion in 2017, compared with a
total taxable issuance of $42.5 billion (SIFMA, 2018). This tax exemption status
has an important effect on the effective yield of municipal bonds, and this difference
in yield can have a significant impact on the cashflows of returns from muni bonds
(O’Hara and SIFMA, 2012). However, while taxable muni bonds may seem to be
at a disadvantage for many domestic retail investors, they open up the market for
international and institutional investors, which, in addition to stricter rules around
qualifying for tax exemption, explains their growing use (Invesco, 2013; Barnett,
2017).
The initial impression is that it would be disadvantageous to issue taxable mu-
nicipal bonds in a market where nearly half of the buyers are retail investors, who
are individuals who stand to benefit from the beneficial tax treatments that tax-
exempt munis provide. However, this particular characteristic of the US muni bond
universe is changing rapidly, especially under the regime change resulting from the
Trump presidency. There were fears in the market that Trump would remove the
tax-exemption status from muni bonds as a whole, which is one explanatory factor
around the decline in market returns in the aftermath of his election in 2016. While
the most recent budget has not removed tax-exemption, it has made it impossible
to issue refinancing bonds, which normally makes up almost 20% of the market.
Many institutional investors such as public pensions and charitable foundations al-
ready have tax-exempt status, so there is no particular advantage to investing in
tax-exempt bonds for them (Clean Energy Group and Croatan Institute, 2014).
However, in the California Treasurer’s report (Chiang, 2017), many partici-
pants felt that “the unique tax treatment of muni bonds in the United States impedes
green bond market growth” because it essentially excludes all foreign investment
and sizeable amount of domestic investment from this asset class. They proposed
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state or national subsidies that would allow taxable green bonds to be issued with
the same yields as tax-exempt green bonds, thus levelling the playing field for those
that don’t benefit from tax exemption. As stated in (Kalaitzidis, 2010), “Taxable
municipal bonds possess several qualities that make them particularly attractive
when compared to taxable corporate bonds and Treasuries,” including favourable
spreads, higher yields, and lower historical default rates along with higher average
recovery rates. These works cited the model of the Build America Bonds (BABs)
or other tax credit bonds as a potential existing mechanism to emulate or expand, as
explained in the next section.
3.8 Tax-Credit Municipal Bonds
A class of muni bonds that could be leveraged to finance green infrastructure devel-
opment in the US are the tax credit bonds, such as the Build America Bonds (BABs),
Certified Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs), and Qualified Energy Conservation
Bonds (QECBs). These bonds were created as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and were intended to encourage investment in
recovery from the credit crisis of 2008 (Marlowe, 2014). It is unlikely that the
Trump administration would bring them back in name or form, however the BABs
could be slightly modified to fit with the prevailing mandate to increase investment
in infrastructure.
3.8.1 Certified Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs) and Quali-
fied Energy Conservation Bonds (QECBs)
Two types that are particularly relevant to the energy sector are CREBs and QECBs,
which were bonds that were created at the federal level explicitly to serve as a
stimulus for investment in clean energy infrastructure. According to Milford et al.
(2012), “ARRA has been the largest stimulus program for clean energy in American
history, about $65.6 billion dollars from 2008-2012. This includes the $3.2 billion
energy efficiency block grant funding for municipalities.” CREBs, Clean Renewable
Energy Bonds, are tax-credit muni bonds that were created specifically to provide
a mechanism for raising money for energy technologies such as: geothermal, solar,
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wind, biomass, hydroelectric, waste to energy, and tidal. Eligible issuers included
local and state governments and schools (DSIRE, 2015a). QECBs, or Qualified
Energy Conservation Bonds, could finance the same types of energy projects as
CREBs, however the funds were allocated from the federal government to each state
in proportion to population. From there, each state could distribute its QECB funds
to eligible energy project applications that came from municipal governments as a
means of offering low cost financing. QECBs offered the bond holder tax credits
rather then cash interest payouts, which was the mechanism of subsidy by the U.S.
government (DSIRE, 2015b).
Some accused the QECB program of “chronic underutilization” (Milford et al.,
2012), however, some municipalities, such as Los Angeles and Louisville, Ken-
tucky, fully utilised their QECB allocation (Clean Energy Group and Croatan In-
stitute, 2014). Nevertheless, there were many reasons behind this low uptake, in-
cluding high transaction costs due to small issuances, and “a lack of awareness and
capacity in bond issuance” (Kidney and Oliver, 2014). Nevertheless, the CREB and
QECB bond mechanisms, amongst others, encouraged about $230 million annually
in new bond issuances. This is in addition to the nearly $2 billion of tax-exempt
green muni bonds that have been sold in the U.S. since September 2014 (Clean
Energy Group and Croatan Institute, 2014).
3.8.2 Build America Bonds (BABs)
BABs (like CREBs and QECBs) were created as part of the ARRA plan to help
the US recover from the Great Recession of 2008, which “led to a 68 percent drop
in monthly municipal bond issuances and a doubling of borrowing costs” (Puentes
et al., 2013). BAB bonds are taxable bonds that were issued specifically in 2009-
2010 that either received a 35% federal subsidy to the issuers (Direct Payment
BABs) or a federal tax credit worth 35% of owed interest to the bond buyers (Tax
Credit BABs). One of the key motivations behind the creation of BABs was that
they would provide “access to the much bigger $30 trillion conventional taxable
bond market, which includes more long-term institutional investors.” Overall, “by
broadening the set of investors interested in holding municipal bonds, BABs helped
3.8. Tax-Credit Municipal Bonds 70
© 2017 Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 8 msrb.org
Municipal Securities: Financing the Nation’s Infrastructure
Alternative Tax-Preferred Bonds
The tax-exempt municipal bonds described in the previous section provide affordable 
borrowing costs for state and local governments accessing capital to finance the 
nation’s infrastructure. While tax-exempt bonds represent the majority of the market, 
Congress has also established alternative, taxable municipal bond structures. These 
structures are designed to increase the federal subsidy available to the issuer, expand 
the market for the security or achieve both goals. One such structure is the tax-credit 
bond, which subsidizes the issuer’s cost of borrowing by providing a tax credit to 
the investor in lieu of or in addition to providing taxable interest payments to the 
bondholder. “Qualified Zone Academy Bonds” to finance schools were the first tax-
credit bond program established by Congress, but other examples are modeled on 
that program (see the glossary in Appendix A). 
A second, more popular alternative municipal security structure is the direct-pay 
bond. These bonds pay taxable interest to investors, but the issuer is subsidized 
directly through a payment from the U.S. Treasury that offsets a portion of the interest 
the issuer pays to the investors, thereby lowering the issuer’s borrowing costs. “Build 
America Bonds” (BABs), enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, are the best-known example of direct-pay bonds. From the inception 
of the program in April 2009 to its expiration on December 31, 2010, 2,275 BABs 
were issued, providing more than $181 billion of financing for new public capital 
infrastructure projects.19 Much like the market for corporate bonds, direct-pay bonds 
draw from a broad base of investors, including those that would not benefit from a  
tax exemption or tax credit, such as pension funds and foreign investors. 
A direct-pay bond is 
a municipal security 
that entitles the 
issuer to receive 
a federal cash 
subsidy paid directly 
to the issuer of 
municipal securities 
in an amount that 
may be equal to a 
percentage of the 
interest paid on the 
municipal securities.
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FIGURE 4: Build America Bonds Monthly Issuance, April 2009–December 2010
Source: MSRB, Bloomberg and Thomson ReutersFigure 3.8: Monthly issuance of BABs in millions of dollars from April 2009-December
2010. Source: MSRB (2017).
to reduce issuer borrowing costs, especially on longer maturity issues.” (U.S. Trea-
sury Department, 2011)
There are several papers that specifically discuss the use of BABs to help fi-
nance infrastructure, although BABs are not climate-specific. The first paper to
discuss the preliminary results of the BAB programme was issued by the US Trea-
sury Department (US Treasury Department, 2010). In a “fixed-effects” regression
model, they found that issuers of BABs saved 31 bp on yield on a 10 year bond,
and 112 bp on 30 year bonds. They also did a comparison of underwriting fees, and
found that while they were initially higher than normal muni bonds, they quickly
came down to comparable levels. Overall, this report projects that BAB issuers
would have saved “$12 billion in borrowing costs on bonds issued during the first
year of the program.”
In a follow up report also by the Treasury issued in the following year (U.S.
Treasury Department, 2011), they assessed the BAB market from inception in April
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2009 to expiry on December 31, 2010. This report states that issuers saved “84
basis points on interest costs for 30-year bonds and also received significant sav-
ings on shorter maturities”, as compared to traditional tax-exempt bonds, using the
same regression methodology as the previous report. Overall, this paper claims that
“BABs issuers saved an estimated $20 billion in borrowing costs”, and makes the
recommendation that BABs be renewed in 2012 at a revenue neutral rate of 28%.
This report claims that “BABs more efficiently deliver the federal subsidy for state
and local government borrowing because each dollar of subsidy goes directly to the
issuer,” as opposed to tax-exempt bonds, where federal revenue costs in terms of
lost taxes are greater than the benefits to local governments in terms of lower costs
of capital.
In 2010, Ang et al released a paper assessing the market performance and
take up of BABs, stressing that theirs was the only paper not issued by the US
Treasury Department (Ang et al., 2010). They state that “by the end of December
2009, around $63.4 billion of BABs have been issued compared with $332.2 billion
of regular municipal bonds. Thus, BABs represent 16% of all municipal finance
raised during this period [since February 2009]”, as shown in Figure 3.8. This pa-
per specifically looks at whether “opening up the municipal bond market to a a
larger clientele has lowered the cost of borrowing for state and local governments.”
They compare the price returns of BABs to “traditional municipal markets, Trea-
sury bonds, and high credit quality corporate bonds” and determine if individuals
benefit from holding BABs rather than regular muni bonds. Using a collection of
6,177 Direct Pay BABs issued between April and December 2009, they compare
them with all 95,233 tax-exempt muni bonds issued over the same time period by
comparing “the BAB issue yield with hypothetical yields computed using different
discount rates.” Overall, they found that “the BAB program has succeeded in lower-
ing the cost of funding for state and local governments with BAB issuers obtaining
finance 54 basis points lower, on average, compared to issuing regular municipal
bonds.” One of the key reasons they posit that BAB yields are lower is because “the
BAB program has succeeded in opening up the municipal market to non-taxable and
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other non-traditional investors,” and this increased liquidity compared with regular
muni bonds makes the BABs seem “less risky”, however they accept the caveat that
measuring liquidity in the muni bond market is difficult.
In 2013, after the BAB program had ended, Puentes et al. (2013) released a
position paper for the Brookings Institute stating that BABs “financed one-third of
all new state and local long-term debt issuances”, with “(47.6 percent) for projects
in the 100 largest metropolitan areas” based on the US Treasure figures (U.S. Trea-
sury Department, 2011). One interesting key point in the Puentes paper is that “the
federal government forgoes nearly $26 billion in lost revenue from tax-exempt mu-
nicipal bonds every year, which significantly exceeds the value of the interest rate
deduction passed on to states and localities,” and about 20% of this subsidy is passed
on to bondholders, who are primarily high net worth individuals in the higher tax
brackets. Overall, this paper also recommended reinstating the BAB program but
with the subsidy set at 28% rather than 35% to make it revenue neutral to the US
Treasury.
The end result of the BAB program was not all positive, however, as outlined
by Luby (2017). BABs were successful at stimulating the muni bond market, “the
program even propelled total bond issuance in 2010 to $433 billion, a record that
still holds today” (Farmer, 2018). However, in 2013, due to failure to agree to
federal budget cuts, the entire budget was subject to sequestration. Due to these
mandatory sequestration cuts, “BAB subsidy payments were reduced by 8.7 per-
cent” through the end of 2013, and have continued, so that there was a 6.9% reduc-
tion in 2017. The cutbacks affected the direct subsidy payments for BABs, leaving
the local government issuers obliged to make up the shortfall. Luby (2017) found
that in the case of Illinois alone, $70 million has had to be paid out by state and
local governments. Overall, the annual subsidies for BABs decreased from 9 to 7
percent. Additionally, since BABs are generally not eligible for refinancing, the
issuers were unable to find cheaper ways of financing. Assuming that the seques-
tration rate remains at 6.9% for the life of the bonds, “we can estimate that the full
term to maturity BAB subsidy reduction would be $394 million” for the City of
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Chicago alone. Overall, “nationwide, Luby figures the total subsidy losses are in
the billions.” As stated by Luby, “It’s stressing out these governments one way or
the other, and the expectation is, it’s just going to continue” (Farmer, 2018).
Within the context of using green muni bonds to help finance green infrastruc-
ture for cities, it is of particular note that 47.6% of BABs were issued for funding
projects in the 100 largest US metropolitan areas (Puentes et al., 2013). One in-
teresting point in the Puentes paper is that “the federal government forgoes nearly
$26 billion in lost revenue from tax-exempt municipal bonds every year, which sig-
nificantly exceeds the value of the interest rate deduction passed on to states and
localities,” and about 20% of this subsidy is passed on to bondholders, who are
primarily high net worth individuals in the higher tax brackets. This paper recom-
mended reinstating the BAB program but with the subsidy set at 28% rather than
35% to make it revenue neutral to the US Treasury.
3.9 Green Muni Bonds Case Studies
This section will explain some of the implementations and business models that
have proven to be innovative uses of green municipal bonds. As the market devel-
ops, these business models have also evolved to become more and more sophisti-
cated uses of a relatively straightforward financial instrument, bonds, in an innova-
tive way to help foster investment in green infrastructure. Given that many of these
bonds are included in our analysis, it is worthwhile delving into the details of these
deals to better understand how some of these securitizations are structured. These
case studies serve as illustrations of how conventional finance in the form of the
municipal bond market can be used in new and inventive ways, particularly in the
clean energy sector.
3.9.1 The Morris Model
The Morris Model originated in Morris County, New Jersey (2016), and was an
innovative way to using a public-private partnership to finance the installation of
solar panels on public buildings . This was a bond/PPA (power purchase agree-
ment) hybrid, where “a public entity issues a government bond at a low interest
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rate and transfers that low-cost capital to a developer in exchange for a lower PPA
price” (Kreycik, 2011). In this model, the municipal administrator arranges a lease-
purchase agreement with winning solar developer, who in turn constructs a PPA
on behalf of the municipality to buy the electricity from the PV system. The solar
developer, who is the owner of the installation for tax reasons, sells the power back
to the municipality. Bonds are issued by the municipality in order to raise low cost
development capital to initiate the project. In terms of cashflows, the municipality
pays the developer the start up capital (resulting from the bond proceeds) and makes
payments for the power received. The solar developer pays the municipality lease
payments for roof access (Kreycik, 2011).
This model was used to finance solar installations on schools and county ad-
ministrative buildings in several districts in New Jersey (Morris, Somerset, and Sus-
sex counties), and the cost savings were meant to materialize as the solar PPA un-
dercut the price of electricity on the overall net present value (Milford et al., 2012,
2014). The bonds that were issued to finance these project were issued on a taxable
basis since “the proceeds are used to fund a project owned by a private entity”, the
solar developer (Kreycik, 2011). The bonds lowered the cost of capital through the
good credit rating of the municipal agency that issued the bonds, so the solar lease
payments were lower than could have otherwise been leveraged. The cheaper cost
of capital enabled the solar developer to make a profit while still offering an attrac-
tive PPA tariff. In this model, the public entity secures the lower cost of capital,
and also takes on the risk. By the end of 2012, $88 million in bonds for these solar
projects had been raised (Sanders et al., 2013; Kreycik, 2011; Milford et al., 2012,
2014; Rydin et al., 2015).
What actually happened with the Morris Model was very different from the ex-
pectations set by the literature at the time of its instantiation. As stated by Stephen
Pearlman, one of the key architects of this bond/PPA hybrid, in (Rydin et al., 2015),
“the county guarantee will only get called on if the developer does not live up what
they said they would do.” Also, the value of the cash flows was “highly dependent
on negotiation with reference back to market price-setting in investment and energy
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markets but with discounting to share out the financial benefits of the coordinated
arrangement.” In particular, the Morris Model had risk exposure to SREC (Solar
Renewable Energy Certificates) prices, where in New Jersey, “each time a solar in-
stallation generates 1,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity, an SREC is earned”
(New Jersey’s Clean Energy Program, 2018), which can then be sold in over the
counter markets to entities that buy them in order to conform with renewable port-
folio standards. New Jersey has the largest SREC market in the United States (New
Jersey’s Clean Energy Program, 2018).
The main reason that the projects ran into cashflow trouble was because the
value of the SRECs potentially generated by the projects plummeted shortly after
the deals were made, curtailing a main source of repayment money. In late October
of 2012, NJ SREC prices unexpectedly bottomed out at around $60/SREC, com-
pared with $230/SREC for April 2018 (Flett Exchange, 2018). One of the main
problems that seem to have beset the Morris Model was the sharp decline in SREC
prices in 2012 after the deals were brokered. Interestingly, the literature pre-dating
the legal and money troubles make only passing mention of the SREC aspect of the
deal (it is listed parenthetically as “other revenues” in (Kreycik, 2011)) . It seems
that that was insufficient cashflow analysis done around the risks around the value of
SRECs, which unfortunately led to cashflow problems, despite the known volatility
of the SREC markets (Coulon et al., 2015).
Additionally, the developer and the contractor fell into dispute over late pay-
ments as these cashflows were curtailed (Horowitz and Augenstein, 2015). The
project developer, SunLight General, kept having trouble with cost overruns and
“failed to make scheduled lease payments, according to material events notices the
Somerset authority filed on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s EMMA
systems. The Morris authority, which also issued bonds for Sussex County, reported
‘events of default’ by the lessee [contractor].” (Coen, 2015) As a result, several law-
suits were filed and the projects were halted. Even worse for the bond buyers and
tax payers, the three counties that issued these bonds were on the hook for the full
$88 million (Horowitz and Augenstein, 2015; Coen, 2015).
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Despite the fact that “the structure of the model makes it very unlikely that
the county’s guarantee will be called upon because the debt was reduced ‘to just an
amount that can be covered from PPA and some minimum SREC value’” (Rydin
et al., 2015), that is exactly what happened. In the end, the projects in Somerset
County were completed, but as of 2015, only half were completed in the remaining
two counties. Eventually, a settlement was made in court, leaving the counties liable
for $22.2 million in order to complete the projects. However, the counties involved
were never in danger of defaulting on the bonds, and in terms of credit rating, Morris
and Somerset Counties are rated Aaa, and Sussex County rated Aa2 (Coen, 2015).
Despite the pitfalls that has befallen these projects, Somerset County should still
see a reduction in electricity costs by around 60% or $19 million. (Coen, 2015)
In the aftermath of these legal troubles, questions inevitably arise around the
viability of the Morris Model. In an article in the Bond Buyer (Coen, 2015), there
were some relevant quotes from interested parties. Stephen Pearlman, special en-
ergy counsel for the three counties, said, “The model is still sound, but any time
the public and private sectors get together for a P3 there are risks.” Nevertheless,
he thinks that “the essence of the model holds and you can structure around these
situations in the future.” Similarly, Kim Magrini, an associate at Philadelphia-based
law firm Ballard Spahr LLP, who represents municipalities in P3 and other pub-
lic finance transaction, stated, “There is always an inherent risk in project finance
due to many unforeseen factors, including cost overruns and contractual disputes.
However, these types of risks are not necessarily more prevalent with ‘green’ bonds
over other types of financings and should not be seen as a deterrent for other public
green initiatives.” Similarly, Moody’s senior analyst Lisa Heller said that, “more
municipalities are using the green bond approach to gain more interests for these
projects.”
Around 2013, much of the prevailing literature about energy and bond financ-
ing mentioned the Morris Model as a successful model that could be deployed to
other states. While New Jersey has an SREC market, not all states do, thus po-
tentially simplifying the model for deployment to other markets. However, there
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are other legal restrictions that may make PPP deals like the Morris Model legally
unviable in many areas where regulations do not easily allow third-party PPA agree-
ments, or may have rules against long term contracts such as PPAs. Kreycik (2011)
does a comparison of the regulatory frameworks in states where the Morris Model
could potentially be deployed: AZ, CA, CO, FL, HI, MA, NC, OR, PA, TX. The
three categories that were compared were PPA legality and contracting, bond is-
suance laws, and laws governing procurement. Of these states, Florida did not
allow PPAs at all, but the other states allowed them. Other than Florida, “significant
legal barriers to the hybrid model do not appear in the states evaluated.” However,
the Morris Model could be replicated in other states, but it remains to be seen if any
other bond/PPA type deals develop.
3.9.2 ESCOs with Muni Bonds
The Morris Model could be seen as an implementation of ESCO contracting com-
bined with municipal bonds. ESCOs are energy service companies, which are busi-
nesses that specialise in energy efficiency solutions (Medda et al., 2015). They are
usually privately held companies that create revenue through energy savings, which
result from providing clients with more efficient equipment. These energy savings
are used to pay for the new equipment and the services of the ESCO, usually though
energy performance contracting (EPC), which overcomes the initial financial con-
straints of energy efficiency projects by paying off investment costs through the
future energy savings that result from reduced energy consumption. ESCOs often
perform energy efficiency services for municipal, governmental, educational, and
hospital (MUSH) buildings, particularly for customers who spend at least $1 million
per year on energy (Sclafani, 2008), since a sizeable economy of scale is required
to generate enough energy savings with which to finance the project. ESCO ser-
vices generally consist of three components: integration of a wide range of project
services including design and implementation, facilitation of financing, and moni-
toring of project performance (Limaye and Derbyshire, 2014).
ESCOs can interface with municipal bonds in order to finance energy effi-
ciency retrofitting on a municipal basis, as was done in New Jersey. This approach
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can be used for EE projects for MUSH buildings, with initial investment capital
provided by the proceeds of a muni bond issuance, with the bond securitised on
the cashflows arising from energy savings. Another example is the Delaware Sus-
tainable Energy Utility (DESEU) (see Section 3.9.3). Energy efficiency measures
for existing buildings has been a particularly tricky sector of energy infrastructure
to address, and as noted by Helm (2008), “has not had a significant take-up.” This
is despite “claimed positive-NPV investments,” as stated in the McKinsey report,
“Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the US Economy” (McKinsey, 2009), which also
states that “a $279 billion investment could yield $1 trillion in return in energy sav-
ings within the US building sector over a ten-year period.” Furthermore, Limaye
and Derbyshire (2014) state that “many municipalities have limited technical ca-
pacity to design, develop, and implement viable EE projects.” In these contexts,
“municipalities should give consideration to how energy service providers, such as
ESCOs, operating under energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) can help in
project implementation and provide access to financing.”
The ESCO business model operates on the basis that if the project does not
save the customer money by saving energy, then the ESCO does not receive any
revenue from that project. Working with ESCOs can help to overcome the upfront
costs generally required for energy efficiency (EE) projects by financing the project
against future cost savings that will result from reduced energy consumption. By
sharing the risk in energy projects, ESCOs “offer an opportunity to curb increas-
ing energy demand and control CO2 emissions while capturing market benefits by
decreasing clients’ energy costs and making profit for themselves” (Bertoldi et al.,
2006). However, some municipalities remain skeptical about the ESCO approach,
for reasons ranging from high transaction costs to concerns about transfer of risk,
particularly with questions around the uncertainties that could arise if a municipal-
ity wishes to sell a building during the contract period (Taylor, 2014). In particular,
“deep renovation of buildings with payback periods of 15-20 years is a trickier
proposition for investors, but essential to achieve decarbonisation of the buildings
sector” (Taylor, 2014).
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Because of their underlying mechanism of promoting energy efficiency and re-
duction in power consumption, ESCOs are inherently green. More efficient energy
production and management can help to reduce up to 58% of CO2 emissions re-
ductions worldwide before 2030. This is particularly relevant to cities because EE
technologies are “the fastest, highest impacting and most cost-effective way of re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in densely populated areas” (BASE,
2006).
While the precise definition of the term ESCO varies throughout the world,
they all tend to have similar business models that involve taking on the risk of EE
projects while benefiting from energy savings. Directive 2006/32/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on Energy End-use Efficiency
and Energy Service (European Parliament, 2006) defined an ESCO as ”a natural or
legal person that delivers energy services and/or other energy efficiency improve-
ment measures in a user’s facility or premises, and accepts some degree of financial
risk in so doing. The payment for the services delivered is based (either wholly or
in part) on the achievement of energy efficiency improvements and on the meeting
of the other agreed performance criteria.” Satchwell (2010) defines an ESCO as
a company that provides energy-efficiency-related and other value-
added services and for which performance contracting is a core part
of its energy-efficiency services business. In a performance contract,
the ESCO guarantees energy and/or dollar savings for the project and
ESCO compensation is therefore linked in some fashion to the perfor-
mance of the project.
In the US in 2014, ESCOs reported revenues of $5.3 bn, ESCOs reported 2014
industry revenue of approximately $5.3 billion (Stuart et al., 2016), while in Eu-
rope in 2012, the ESCO market had a volume of around EUR3 billion (Taylor,
2014). ESCos have been used extensively in Denmark, and in the UK, there was
a national rollout of the Greater London Authority RE:FIT project that outsourced
energy sources via standardised contracting and refined procurement procedures
(Taylor, 2014).
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Energy efficiency projects done by an ESCO can broadly be financed in one
of three different ways, either through self-financing, by sharing the risk with the
ESCO, or by the ESCO taking the risk entirely (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2003;
Stuart et al., 2016). With all three methods of funding, the ESCO guarantees the
project’s energy savings and performance. Through Energy Performance Contract-
ing (EPC), however, the attained energy savings will finance the project, and gives
a financial basis for securing a loan to cover the capital. There are two ways of
structuring an EPC: In the guaranteed savings model, the loan goes on the client’s
balance sheet, and in the shared savings model, the loan goes on the ESCO’s bal-
ance sheet. In the guaranteed savings model, the ESCO takes the performance and
design risk, but not the credit risk, which instead is carried by the client (Bertoldi
et al., 2006). Usually the value of energy savings is guaranteed down to a certain
base price sufficient to meet debt service obligations. In the shared savings model,
the ESCO carries the full project risk, including credit risk. This model is often of
particular interest for MUSH projects since the projects are kept off balance sheet.
Typically the payments to the ESCO are linked to energy prices (Poole and Stoner,
2003).
According to Vine (2005), trends that are affecting the ESCO market include
the removal of energy subsidies, institutional privatization, international competi-
tion. There has also been significant ESCO market consolidation through buyouts
and mergers (Satchwell, 2010) which will have the affect of lessening the number
of players in the EPC field. While most ESCOs are privately held companies, there
are some examples of public ESCOs, particularly in Europe (Bertoldi et al., 2007).
In these arrangements, typically the energy agency will act as an ESCO in order
to facilitate EPC for municipal projects with high social importance. These public
ESCOs tend to be more willing to accept higher risk or smaller profit than private
ESCOs, which helps to fund EE projects in cities that might not otherwise find suf-
ficient investment, and they are ideally situated to enable programmatic investment
by leveraging the municipal bond market, as is described in the next section.
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3.9.3 Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility
The Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility (DESEU) is a non-profit organization of-
fering energy efficiency advice and financing to both businesses and homeown-
ers. It was established in 2007 to help promote sustainable energy use in the state
of Delaware, and is the first agency of its kind established in the US. This SEU
“promotes energy economy restructuring along principles of sufficiency, dialling
back energy use where possible and using onsite renewable energy where needed”
(Taminiau and Byrne, 2016). It was particularly innovative in issuing $70.2 million
in muni bonds where the use of proceeds financed energy efficiency retrofitting in
state-owned buildings. In this example, the “credit enhancement takes the form of
a general obligation guaranty of each state agency that is implementing efficiency
measures, combined with the guaranty of each participating, pre-qualified ESCO”
(Sanders et al., 2013).
One particularly unique aspect of the DESEU is that it was one of the first
initiatives to combine ESCO with tax-exempt municipal revenue bonds through its
performance contracting program aimed at MUSH and commercial buildings. This
program addresses both energy consumption and water use by ”providing contrac-
tual and financing mechanisms to execute the upgrades with minimal financial risk”
(Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility, 2016). The performance contracting program
uses energy and water savings to finance the improvements, which are implemented
by a pool of pre-approved ESCOs. These ESCOs offer ”guaranteed energy savings
which cover annual payments for project costs, usually over a contract terms of 15
to 20 years.” Institutions with utility bills in excess of $100,000 pa can be eligible.
Legislation was passed that enabled the DESEU to issue tax exempt bonds
and to participate in performance contracting under Delaware state law in accor-
dance with The Energy Performance Contract Act in Title 29, Subchapter V of the
Delaware Code. It operates under the trade name “Energize Delaware”, and financ-
ing for the program was intended to be raised primarily from the issuance of bonds.
This means that participants are generally in the public MUSH sector due to the
tax-exemption qualification, however projects for commercial projects could poten-
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tially receive low interest rate bridge loans from the proceeds of the bonds. They
state that taxable bond financing may be used in the future for non-public partici-
pants. In line with the ESCO model (see Section 3.9.2), “debt service repayment is
ensured through the guaranteed savings agreement with the ESCOs pledging con-
tractual monetary savings to the public participant” (Taminiau and Byrne, 2016).
The process for financing follows the usual ESCO process: a public agency
signals it intent to enter into performance contracting to Energize Delaware, who
then help oversee the initial energy auditing and reporting. An investment grade
audit is performed, and at least 10% energy savings must be planned for in order for
the project to be eligible. Also, extensive consumption measurement is undertaken
in order to establish a baseline. Assuming the 10% of savings can be guaranteed,
the agency then executes the contract with the ESCO, and the project commences.
Upon completion, annual reports must also be provided to the agency and to Ener-
gize Delaware.
The various projects that have been undertaken can then be aggregated for the
purposes of bond issuance, much the same way that PACE bonds are securitized
(Section 3.9.4). As DESEU states, “once sufficient project dollar volume has been
aggregated, the bond issuance process will begin” (Delaware Sustainable Energy
Utility, 2016). A series of muni bonds totaling $67,435,000 was issued by Energize
Delaware in 2011, which was secured on the proceeds of projects undertaken by
6 different ESCOs at 3 state agencies, Delaware State University, and Delaware
Technical and Community College (Delaware Sustainable Energy Utility, 2011),
and invested in measures that stand to deliver $48 million in energy savings. A
key aspect of this program that allowed for its success was the use of pre-approved
ESCOs which enabled the use of standardized contracts, which are a crucial element
to being able to aggregate deals and securitize bonds on their basis.
The SEU model has gone on to be implemented elsewhere, such as in Wash-
ington DC, Vermont, and New Jersey, so that “the mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. is
emerging, alongside Vermont, as a hub for innovation in sustainable energy service
delivery models” (Houck and Rickerson, 2009).
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3.9.4 The PACE Model
One problem with the ESCO model is that while it is viable for use in larger build-
ings, and can be particularly effective for MUSH facilities, it is difficult to leverage
ESCO financing for smaller scale retrofitting, such as on a residential scale. With
this in mind, this is where Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) bonds come
into their own and help homeowners in the US to finance their domestic energy sav-
ing measures. Similar to commercial scale ESCO, energy efficiency measures can
be rolled out on a residential basis, and these projects aggregated under one over-
arching bond issuance, again securitised on the either assessed property taxes, or
from utility payments, as described by the Climate Bonds Initiative report, “Break-
ing Through the Energy Efficiency Logjam” (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2010).
The fundamental idea behind PACE is that it enables residential energy up-
grades to be made via an energy services company, and then retrofitting repayments
are made through property tax payments. Within the context of ARRA (mentioned
passim), a report was published called “Recovery Through Retrofit” (Middle Class
Task Force, 2009) which made several policy recommendations that paved the way
for PACE programs. One of the key recommendations to reduce upfront costs and
costs of borrowing for domestic energy retrofits was to use property tax or munic-
ipal energy financing which would allow “the costs of retrofits to be added to a
homeowner’s property tax bill, with monthly payments generally lower than util-
ity bill savings. This arrangement attaches the costs of the energy retrofit to the
property, not the individual, eliminating uncertainty about recovering the cost of
the improvements if the property is sold.”
The link to residential property taxation mechanism is crucial, because “Prop-
erty Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing programs enable the costs for energy
efficiency retrofits to be added to an owner’s property tax bill as part of a munic-
ipal property tax assessment, which takes the same priority as traditional property
tax liens and assessments” (Middle Class Task Force, 2009). This in effect acts
as a governmental guarantee which de-risks the projects for investors and there-
fore brings down transaction costs, because it “provides strong debt collateral in
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the event of the homeowner – or business owner – defaults on the assessment”, and
because the lien is tied to the property, it can be transferred on sale. The time scale
of the assessment repayments are generally 15 to 20 years, and as with mortgages
in the US, the interest on the PACE assessment is tax-deductible (NREL, 2010).
Another important element of PACE financing is the establishment of special
tax districts by municipalities, called “clean energy assessment districts”. These
districts serve two purposes: firstly to reduce the financial risk to the municipality
and thereby protect their credit rating, and secondly to facilitate levying the PACE
assessment only on properties who opt into the scheme. The establishment of clean
energy assessment district then paves the way for the other crucial element of PACE
programmes: if funds are not available in the municipal budget for the scheme, they
can be raised by the issuing of municipal bonds. This keeps these energy efficiency
projects off the balance sheets of the local governments (NREL, 2010).
PACE programmes have been shown to help unlock investment in energy effi-
ciency. In an NREL report about the economic benefits of the PACE programme of
2009 in Boulder, CO (Goldberg et al., 2011), they found that the local PACE pro-
gramme financed over $9 million in retrofits, and contributed to the creation of over
100 jobs and nearly $20 million in economic activity state wide. The first phase
of the residential CSLP financed about $9.8 million in residential energy retrofits,
most of which were completed in 2009. Overall, this programme, “saved partici-
pants a combined total of about $125,000 during the first year on their electric and
gas utility bills.”
Unfortunately, the PACE programme faced a challenge in 2010 when the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency issued a statement the Freddie Mae or Fannie Mac
mortgages must have first-lien priority, and any properties with a PACE lien claim-
ing superpriority would be disqualified for federal mortgage financing or support
(Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2014). As a result of these measures, all PACE
programmes were placed on hold for two years while these statements were tested
in court (Saha, 2012), due to the fact that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac finance
about 90% of mortgages in the US. However, since then, PACE financing has car-
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ried on in some regions, with the states of California and Florida being particularly
active (PACE Nation, 2016).
One interesting recent development that has arisen from PACE financing is that
some third parties have aggregated PACE contracts across municipalities and used
them as collateral on which to issue green asset-backed securities (ABS) bonds.
The first such issuance was the HERO Funding 2014-1 bond which had an 11-year
maturity and 4.75% coupon (Tempkin, 2014). This ABS was launched by Renovate
America, a firm that has financed over 90% of PACE deals in California, the main
market. In 2014 and 2015, Renovate America launched five ABS PACE bonds
in total, the most recent issuance was $201.5 million in green bonds, representing
nearly 9,000 home improvements (Hales, 2015).
Despite all of its promise, there are some disadvantages to the PACE model.
Firstly, PACE is not a one size fits all scheme: in the American context, it must
be tailored to each municipality’s tax codes and debt rating. Additionally, in some
programmes (e.g. Boulder, CO), the liens are placed on the properties at project
inception, whereas in others (e.g. Berkeley, CA), the liens are placed after project
completion, which has an effect on who holds the construction risk (NREL, 2010).
Also, in order to truly take off and achieve scale, there is a need for debt aggregation
and securitisation, such as what the recent PACE ABS green bonds have accom-
plished. While this could raise transaction fees, it could lower the costs of capital
due to risk sharing and larger deal size. Finally, the major issue of the priority of
the debt/lien on the property still remains to be settled in the US.
As of 2018, there are 34 states with PACE-enabling legislation, 20 of which
have active markets (PACE Nation, 2016). Renovate America has issued 13 green
bonds secured on the proceeds of residential PACE assessments through their HERO
bond program, some of which are certified green (HERO Program, 2016). The
HERO program is currently the largest issuer of green ABS bonds. The 13th series
in particular were secured on assessments levied on “6,332 residential properties in
43 California counties and 12 Missouri counties.” The PACE assessments have an
average balance of $23,700 with “a weighted annual interest rate of 6.7 percent and
3.9. Green Muni Bonds Case Studies 86
a weighted-average original term of 17.8 years.” The bonds that underlie this pool
of assessment were issued between January and May, 2018.
PACE bond issuance has been increasing year on year, to the extent that in the
past two years, a secondary market specializing in trading these bonds has emerged.
According to Nicole Montecalvo, head of investor relations at Renovate America,
“volumes are up by six times from an average of $5m a month in 2016 to $30m a
month in 2017” (Padbidri and Kerr, 2018). This momentum is helped by increasing
interest from foreign bond buyers, and the signing of two consumer protection bills
for PACE in California just came into force in January 2018, which help to de-risk
the business model. According to Greg Frost, the national communications director
at Renovate America, “as of April 1, 2018, all PACE providers will be required to
verify income and conduct an ability-to-repay analysis as part of their underwriting
process” (Padbidri and Kerr, 2018).
PACE is not restricted to residential renovations, but also operates in the com-
mercial sector. This segment of the PACE market has also seen considerable growth,
with “origination levels more than doubling since December 2015 to reach $493M
as of the third quarter of 2017” (Padbidri and Kerr, 2018; PACE Nation, 2016). As a
result of this growth, the first commercial PACE $75M securitization was completed
in September 2017. This model is also expanding into the international markets,
with a PACE-like program due to launch in Spain imminently (EuroPACE, 2018).
3.9.5 Green Banks
The OECD (2016) defines a green bank as “a publicly capitalised entity established
specifically to facilitate private investment into domestic LCR (Low Carbon, Cli-
mate Resilient) infrastructure and other green sectors such as water and waste man-
agement.” Rather than giving out grants to eligible projects, green banks instead act
more like revolving funds, and “seek to recycle public capital and focus on mobil-
ising private investment using public capital.” Green banks are active in working
with ESCOs and help facilitate PACE financing. They can receive their initial cap-
italization when they are established through various means, including government
capitalization, emissions trading schemes, utility bill surcharges, loans, etc. How-
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ever, the means with the greatest potential is through the issuance of green bonds.
Green banks are important because “federal financial support for clean energy
projects will likely decline” (Berlin et al., 2012), a fact that is especially press-
ing as many programs that were funded by ARRA, which was “the largest federal
investment in clean energy in American history”, have ended. Additionally, state
budgets continue to be highly restrictive in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
particularly for state investment in clean energy. As a result, there is a gap in the
market that green banks could play a vital role in, especially when studies show
that “that lowering the cost of clean energy loans by 225 basis points and providing
long-term loans to all developers would lower the cost for a clean energy project by
15 to 20 percent”, which would make many projects cost-competitive with conven-
tional generation. As stated by OECD (2016), ”by issuing bonds, GIBs can draw
large amounts of private institutional capital to LCR infrastructure investment, and
depending on the legal authority, a GIB may be able to issue government-backed
bonds. This facilitates lower interest rates, enabling the GIB to lend the funds at a
lower cost of capital.”
So far, the several US states have established green banks, including California,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Hawaii. US Department of
Energy (2015) provides an overview of all the green bank type programs that were
extant in the US as of 2015. This section will focus on the specific cases where green
banks have issued bonds in order to help finance clean energy projects: Connecticut
and New York.
Connecticut Green Bank
We focus on Connecticut Green Bank because it has a history of issuing munici-
pal bonds, and was the first green bank to be established in the US in 2011 with
the objective of achieving “cleaner, less expensive, and more reliable sources of en-
ergy” with the intention of “working with private-sector investors to create low-cost,
long-term sustainable financing to maximize the use of public funds” (Connecticut
Green Bank, 2004b,a). This green bank is active on many different customer levels,
from residential to the commercial and infrastructure sectors. Since inception, the
3.9. Green Muni Bonds Case Studies 88
Connecticut Green Bank has deployed over $1 billion in capital for clean energy
projects, and they have leveraged $6 in private investment for every $1 of public
funds committed by the state. The support of the green bank has created “over 936
direct and 312 indirect and induced job-years in the state from installing nearly 60
MW of Residential Solar PV” (Connecticut Green Bank, 2004b,a), and overall it
has created nearly 12,000 clean energy jobs in the state (Coalition for Green Capi-
tal, 2014).
The Connecticut Green Bank has also implemented C-PACE, one of the most
successful PACE programs in the US. It was launched in early 2013, and in under
two years financed retrofitting for 89 buildings totalling $54 million in costs. While
Connecticut is not the only state to have a PACE market, “it is the only one to
have created a state-wide program with centralised administration through a GIB”
(OECD, 2016). This happened as a result of the reluctance of private lenders to get
involved with PACE “despite pre-approving multiple banks to participate”, “they
were still hesitant to be the first investors in a new and unfamiliar structure.” In
response, the Connecticut Green Bank decided to finance PACE loans off its own
balance sheet through the creation of an internal $40 million fund. Later, the bank
issued a series of bonds totalling $30 million to recapitalise, demonstrating that
green banks can effectively interface with the debt capital markets to bring innova-
tive financing to the clean energy sector.
Overall, the state of Connecticut has been the issuer of no less than five series
of labelled green muni bonds, all of which are trading at a premium (Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, 2018).
New York Green Bank
The New York Green Bank was established in 2013 because “it wanted public fund-
ing that had previously been used almost exclusively for grant programmes to go
further and attract greater private investment” (OECD, 2016). This green bank is
a division of NYSERDA, the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, which is notable for creating a bond deal to finance its Green Jobs/Green
New York (GJGNY) program. The GJGNY Act of 2009 allocated $112 million in
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proceeds from selling carbon credits towards the “support of sustainable commu-
nity development; create opportunities for green jobs; and establish a revolving loan
fund to finance energy audits and energy efficiency retrofits or improvements for the
owners or occupants of residential, multifamily, small business, and not-for-profit
structures” (NYSERDA, 2018).
In order to raise the capital for GJGNY, NYSERDA issued nearly $25 million
in AAA-rated QECB bonds in August of 2013. When they first proposed the deal,
they received a much lower credit rating due to the novel structure of securing the
bonds on their GJGNY residential energy portfolio. In order to raise the rating and
lower the cost of capital, the New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation
established an $8.5 million collateral reserve account out of their Clean Water State
Revolving Fund under federal EPA approval on the basis that these energy efficiency
measures contributed to clean air and water by lowering emissions. With this col-
lateral in place, the credit rating was raised to the highest possible rating, AAA by
S&P and Aaa by Moody’s, and the deal was brought to market (CE+BFI, 2013; US
Department of Energy, 2015). Trading data shows that these bonds have traded at a
premium in the secondary market (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 2018).
Hawaii Green Infrastructure Authority
Hawaii established its Green Infrastructure Authority in 2014 in order to help the
state meet its renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS) goals, after declaring that
it intended to adopt a 100% RPS in the electricity sector by 2045, after histori-
cally being the most oil-dependent state in the US. The first program it brought to
market was the Green Energy Market Securitization program (GEMS), which was
designed to ‘make clean energy investments accessible and affordable to a broader
cross-section of Hawaii’s utility ratepayers, with a portion of its funds to benefit
underserved communities, low- and moderate-income households, renters and non-
profits” (Hawaii Green Infrastructure Authority, 2018; OECD, 2016). It helps pro-
vide low-cost capital to finance solar PV and other clean energy systems for those
who otherwise have difficulty qualifying for financing. Overall, “GEMS has the
ability to finance the installation of over 44 MWs of energy, assisting as many as
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30,000 Hawaii consumers, greatly reducing their energy expenses and advancing
Hawaii’s aggressive clean energy mandates” (Hawaii Green Infrastructure Author-
ity, 2018).
So far, Hawaii has issued two series of taxable green bonds in 2014 (Munic-
ipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 2018), raising $150 million in capital. These
bonds were issued as revenue bonds securitized on the basis of a green infrastruc-
ture surcharge that has been imposed on electric utility customers since December
2014. According to the state, the majority of utility customers will see no change in
their bills, as the $1.29 per month surcharge is offset by “a reduction in a separate
public benefits fund surcharge already paid by utility customers to support energy
efficiency programs.”
However, despite raising the initial capital needed, this program has been beset
by problems, and as of 2016, only 17 residential loans totalling $14 million had
been given out, and no commercial loans (Shimogawa, 2016). In 2017, they made
adjustment to their loan approval process to make it more approachable to a wider
market, and as of May 2018, the state also approved an on-bill financing program,
so that the utility bears the burden of the up-front capital costs, which the consumer
then repays through their energy bill payments (Mai, 2018).
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of what green municipal bonds are, how
they work, and the scale and growth of the market. We also discussed some of the
supporting policy mechanisms that help build capacity in this sector. While policy
support is crucial to helping to build the sustainable infrastructure pipeline that can
be financed with these bonds, another very important factor in the uptake of green
muni bonds is their market performance, which we consider in the next chapters.
Chapter 4
Green Bond Pricing
This chapter will discuss the pricing performance of green bonds, and includes a
review of the existing literature on the subject. We will also introduce the techniques
that are used to evaluate comparative pricing performance of bonds.
4.1 Greenium
When there is considerable demand for green bonds, this can enable issuers to adjust
the terms of their bond issuance to lower the coupon rates, which leads to a better
deal for them because it lowers the cost of capital. In order for this to happen,
investors must be willing to accept a lower repayment rate in order to become bond
holders. This market dynamic is a crucial focus to this research, since evidence
of demand for green bonds can manifest as a pricing premium, where issuers are
willing to pay more for less yield, and in subsequent issuances, bond issuers will
adjust their terms to leverage this demand.
A recent example of this occurring in the corporate green bond market is the
first green bond issued by SSE, one of the Big 6 energy utilities in the UK. Their
EUR600 million bond was issued in September 2017, and at the time it was was
the largest green bond ever issued in the UK. SSE stated that due to “significant
demand” for the issuance, it was able to set its lowest ever coupon rate at 0.875%
for an 8-year bond (John, 2018). Because the issuance was so successful, another
EUR650 million green bond was issued by SSE in September 2018.
Because demand for green municipal bonds also currently outstrips supply,
4.1. Greenium 92
these green bond issuances are usually oversubscribed. As a result, “the issuer
can try to leverage this demand to seek more favorable terms,” and that “some is-
suers have achieved a better price (cheaper debt) through green bonds” (Saha and
D’Almeida, 2017), which also states that “there is also anecdotal evidence to sug-
gest that green bond investors may be willing to accept a longer term to maturity
(i.e., a later principal repayment date).”
This green bond pricing dynamic is the primary focus of our research because
it helps to overcome some of the perceived or actual expense incurred as part of
issuing a green bond (Chiang, 2017). Investors and issuers are keen to discover the
presence of a green premium, or “greenium”, in the green bond markets, however
evidence so far has been mixed. This is because, as the Climate Bonds Initiative
(2018b) pricing report explains, “intuition suggests that a bond being green should
not influence its price. Green bonds rank pari passu (on equal footing) with bonds
of the same rank and issuer. There is no credit enhancement to explain pricing dif-
ferences, and issuers of green bonds do incur minimal additional costs.” However,
greenium is essential to some market players, since on the issuance side, higher
prices and lower yields at time of issue translate to lower costs of capital, thereby
offsetting some or all of the additional expenses of disclosure. On the investor side,
a greenium may reduce the yields for the bond holder, but rising prices in the sec-
ondary market mean that they could more easily sell the green bonds on at profit.
Therefore, greenium is fundamental for making or breaking the green bond market.
The distinction between the primary and secondary markets in relation to
bonds and fixed income securities is fundamental to the understanding of the dy-
namics of this market. Unlike equities, bonds have one market at issue, the primary
market, and then another market for subsequent after issue trades, the secondary
market. The reason the primary market is considered separately is because the
prices that the bonds are issued at determine the amount and cost of capital that the
issuers actually receive once a bond reaches the market. Once these numbers are
fixed at bond issue, the issuers’ terms do not change as the resulting cashflows are
then fixed. However, the prices and yields of the bonds will still fluctuate according
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to supply and demand in secondary market trading. In this case, it is the bond buyer
and sellers that are exposed to the investment risk, not the issuer. The secondary
market prices do not directly affect the issue terms already set in place by the pri-
mary market for the issuers, however, they can serve as an indicator about what
the market considers to be a fair price, and will therefore inform the initial offering
prices of subsequent bonds by that issuer.
The presence of a greenium in the primary market would help to lower capi-
tal costs for green infrastructure, and a pricing differential in the secondary market
could lend pressure to primary market prices, since secondary market prices are an
indicator of what the market will bear. As stated in the latest CBI pricing report
(Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018b), “when green bond curves have a handful of ma-
turity points, they could be used as a reference for pricing new green bonds. If
green bonds were trading tighter than vanilla bonds, we would reasonably expect to
see a consistent greenium emerging,” however, “a secondary green curve does not
guarantee a greenium.” Zerbib (2016) also states, “the secondary market structure
seems to have the potential for increasing the green bond issuance and offering a
primary yield which is slightly lower than that observed on the conventional bond
curve”.
Michaelsen (2018) states that, “the true test of a green bond price difference
would be to have two identical bonds (i.e. same issuer, tenor, format) pricing on the
same day – something few issuers would be willing to do,” however, this is not un-
common in the US municipal market, which is why we chose to focus our analysis
on this market in particular. At the same time, “green bond price differential will
vary depending on a range of factors such as the given market, ratings, sectors, and
issue sizes,” so that even if a consistent greenium is found in the US muni market,
this does not mean that it is as easily realized in other green bond sectors.
However, while there is a growing body of support for the need for and imple-
mentation of green bonds and green municipal bonds, it has been difficult to bench-
mark the performance of green municipal bonds against prevailing market trends
to see if their returns are competitive with conventional bonds. At time of writing,
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no one has published any assessment of greenium in the primary muni market, nor
has anyone published any work relevant to the construction or benchmarking of a
green municipal bond index as a tool for assessing secondary market prices above
and beyond extrapolated yield curves.
To explore the market dynamics of green muni bonds and to benchmark their
performance against conventional muni bonds, we used two approaches: bond index
creation and benchmarking, and yield curve analysis, which are described below.
4.2 Market Performance Review
This particular area of research is very new, so there is a paucity of literature in the
academic context, however there are a few reports that have been published stating
that they have found evidence of a greenium signal in the secondary green bond
markets. One of the earliest was Preclaw and Bakshi, from Barclays (2015). Their
research consisted of a regression run on green bond credit spreads that “decom-
poses OAS (option-adjusted spreads) into common risk factors and an indicator
variable for green bonds.” They conducted their analysis on seven cross-sections
of data, on a quarterly basis since 2014. They found that, at the time the report
was issued, “green [corporate] bonds trade a statistically significant 17bp tighter
in OAS after accounting for their other characteristics”. Overall, they state that
“investors are currently paying a premium to acquire green bonds, at least in the
secondary market [...] which we see as partly attributable to opportunistic pricing
based on strong demand from environmentally focused funds.” The implications of
these findings are that “investors and their sponsors will need to consider exactly
how much they are willing to pay to be green.” This report posits some reasons for
the difference in green bond prices, with the first being potentially a “growing inter-
est in the product and a resulting mismatch between the supply of and demand for
green issues.” Some have suggested that “green bonds should trade at tighter spreads
to reflect their externalities”, however these are difficult to price in on a cash flow
basis. Furthermore, “tighter spreads could reflect a simple preference on the part of
investors, which could be the case if investors accrue enough other benefits to offset
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the lower cash flow”, again raising the question of how much greenium the mar-
ket is willing to bear before reverting. Finally, they suggest that “it is possible that
green bonds are actually less risky or volatile than otherwise similar conventional
bonds, making the tighter spreads appropriate to their risk-adjusted return.”
Another early report about green bonds released by Natixis (2014) also dis-
closed a potential primary greenium of “between 2bp and 6bp over the secondary
spreads of these same issuers for similar maturities”. Moreover, they also checked
the volatility and found that green bonds were equivalent to the non-green.
Zerbib (2016) published a paper about the green bond premium, which is pos-
sibly the “first academic study focusing on the specific cost of green bonds.” This
paper raises a particularly interesting point in that “while a negative premium favors
the issuing of green debt, it subdues the appetite of investors that are not compelled
to dedicate part of their balance sheets to the purchase of green assets. If the equiv-
alent conventional debt gives greater yields, green debt will be forsaken by those
investors who do not have to meet any green investment obligations.” In essence,
what the author is describing is a potential flight to yield away from green bonds
if conventional bonds are perceived to be significantly cheaper, thus undermining
growth in the green bond market. This paper is considered in more detail below.
In January 2018, Bos from NN Investment Partners issued a report titled “Un-
ravelling the Green Bond Premium” (Bos et al., 2018). This research used the
Bloomberg MSCI Global Green Bond Index as the source of their identified green
bonds. They collected monthly bond data from December 2014 to November 2017,
and their sample includes “133 unique labelled green bonds issued by 59 enti-
ties from 16 countries and 7 supranational organizations.” The non-green bond
group was comprised of “the bonds from green bond issuers in the Bloomberg
Global Aggregate, Bloomberg Euro Aggregate, Bloomberg Canadian Aggregate
and Bloomberg Australian Aggregate indices” in order to identify non-green bonds
that have been issued by green issuers around the same time. They then use this
data to construct yield curves, where the yield curve was interpolated on a monthly
basis per issuer. The interpolated yields and the yield of the corresponding green
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bonds are then compared monthly, where “a negative difference means the interpo-
lated yield is higher than the yield of the green bond with the same maturity and
seniority.” For each month, a straight average was taken to calculate the average
yield difference.
Overall, “on average every green issue is matched with 14 non-green bonds of
the same issuer with similar seniority. Our full sample includes 2,417 data points
of green bonds (36 months, 133 unique green bonds).” They found that green bond
yields were on average lower than the interpolated yield of the non-green bonds, and
“the difference between the observed and interpolated yields for the entire sample
was -0.011% [11 bps],”, although 37% of the green issues “had a yield above the
interpolated curve.” They attempt to explain the presence of greenium as one of two
factors: “One is a possible mismatch between supply and demand,” and another is
that green bonds may be less volatile. As they state, “in periods of risk aversion,
green bonds tend to be more stable, due to more buy-and-hold investors holding the
bonds in their portfolios. The bond’s lower volatility compensates the investor for
its lower yield.”
The Climate Bonds Initiative has released a series of reports about green bond
pricing in the primary market, the most recent of which was released in February
2018b and covers green bonds that were issued Q3 2017. For dollar denominated
bonds, they found that green bonds were issued with prices 12 bps lower than initial
price talk, “compared to vanilla average of -10.2 bps”, with a similar difference of
2 bps for Euro denominated bonds. Overall, green bonds were oversubscribed by
about 2.5 times, compared with 1.5 times for their vanilla counterparts. In a sample
of 12 green bonds, 2 bonds exhibited a greenium at issue, 4 bonds exhibited lack of
a new issue premium (or possible greenium), and 6 bonds had neither. As explained
in this report, “the new issue premium is the extra yield that a buyer gets, and a
seller pays, for a new bond, when compared to where seasoned bonds from the
same issuer are trading in the secondary market.” Because new issue premiums are
standard features of new bond issuance, any absence of this is notable. This follows
on from their previous report for Q2 2017 and Q1 2017 (Climate Bonds Initiative,
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2017c), which had similar findings.
There are only a few papers that have been published so far that deal with
green premiums in the green municipal bond market, and all of these were released
as this work was being written up. One of the first was published by Karpf and
Mandel (2018), who performed an analysis to look for a price premium in the sec-
ondary green muni bond market by looking at the yield spreads between green and
conventional muni bonds. Their data set included 1,880 municipal bonds that were
labelled green by Bloomberg, along with 36,000 conventional bonds by the same
set of issuers from 2010-2016. The Bloomberg green bonds are a superset of la-
belled green bonds, which encompasses both labelled green bonds and some unla-
belled climate bonds that Bloomberg analysts deem worthy of the green label. Their
pricing data came from the same source that we used in our analysis: the EMMA
MSRB database. They used the technique of constructing yield curves to determine
whether the green bonds in their data generally fell inside or outside of the issuer’s
yield curves. By using a regression analysis on the yields, they found that “the over-
all mean spread in returns between conventional and green bonds is 0.23%; that is,
23 basis points.” They failed to find a clear greenium signal until 2016.
The drawbacks to their method are that their data is not as comprehensively
or rigorously screened as our dataset for “greenness”, and in particular they do not
consider climate-aligned but unlabelled bonds separately, because they have relied
on the Bloomberg “green” label to identify bonds for study rather than a manual data
mining and screening process, as we have done. They also do not break the bonds
down by sector or state, and while yield curve analysis can uncover a premium via
yield spreads at a particular point in time, it is difficult to draw out historical trends.
For example, they analyze the yield spreads on an annual average basis, but this
loses much of the intraday pricing movements and trends, rendering any nominally
annualized yield trends as meaningless because the timeframe of the analysis is not
specific enough. For example, they show a comparison of green and conventional
yield curves in their Figure 1, stating “the green bond yield curve is systematically
below the conventional bond one. This means that investors require, on average, a
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lower interest rate to invest in green bonds.” However, they do not state which time
instance this yield curve depicts. An inspection of their code indicates it is relevant
to 23 January 2017, but it is tenuous to extrapolate market trends out from the
yield curves of one given day, just as it is equally tenuous to investigate the spreads
of annualized yield analyses as yields could change dramatically through the year
(especially in a year like 2016 which was affected by the presidential election). This
is the reason why our approach here has used an index to examine historical trends:
it is easier to see relative price movements for an aggregate of assets over time via
an index, and an index is also necessary for benchmarking a market sector against
existing indices.
Baker et al. (2018) performs an analysis of 2,083 municipal bonds defined as
“green” by Bloomberg, which could include climate-aligned but not labelled green
bonds. Their comparison was based on 643,299 conventional municipal bonds, with
the data spanning the years 2010 through 2016. Their focus was solely on the yields
at issue, or the primary market. Through a linear OLS regression with fixed effects,
they found an average greenium of 6 bp. Because their sample included taxable and
tax credit muni bonds, they adjusted the yields of these bonds to an effective after
tax yield before performing the regression. This crucial step is in contrast to the
previous paper, and is in fact why Baker et al assert that Karpf and Mandel (2018)
failed to find a greenium in the early years of the sample, since “early [Bloomberg-
classified] green bonds were disproportionately taxable,” and state that “our results
suggest that this conclusion is incorrect.”
A drawback of both of these papers is that both of them ran their regressions
on the yields to call or maturity without subtracting out the underlying general mu-
nicipal bond yield curve. These studies benefit from artificially high statistical sig-
nificance scores due to the fact that the yield curves exhibit a strongly functional
form, albeit not linear. It is the spreads between the green bond yields and their
conventional counterparts that is measurement being investigated, which is actually
highly non-linear. Performing a linear regression over a non-linear set of data can
lead to spurious findings.
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Two papers that regress the spreads rather than the raw yields are Febi et al.
(2018) and Zerbib (2016), which also take any potential in differences in liquidity
into account. In Zerbib (2016), 115 green (mostly corporate) bonds were analyzed
over the years 2012-2016, and their secondary market yields were found to be lower
than their corresponding synthetic conventional bonds, indicating a greenium. The
greenium signal was particularly pronounced for bonds rated below AAA (-6.70%)
and Euro-denominated bonds (-8.47%). According to this paper, “the rating is the
major driver of the green bond premium: the riskier the bond is, the greater the
negative premium will be,” with currency found to be a secondary driver. The
methodology used in this paper involved the creation of an “equivalent synthetic
conventional bond for each green bond issued on March 15, 2016” in order to eval-
uate any green premium by a fixed effect panel regression. This paper quantifies the
green premium as “the unobserved specific effect of the regression of the difference
in yields between the two bonds on the difference in liquidity.” In this paper, the
proxy used for the liquidity measure was Zero Trading Days (ZTDs).
This work refined in a later paper by Zerbib (2018), where he explains that
he is explicitly using a matching method to directly compare the yields of green
bonds with synthetic conventional counterparts. These synthetic bonds were ex-
trapolated from the bond data for the closest relevant bonds issued by that issuer,
and the matched pairs are constructed to be identical except for their liquidity. The
drawback of this approach is that because the proxies for the conventional bonds are
synthetic, they are not based on the trading data from actual bonds out in the market,
but rather are extrapolated from two conventional bonds from that issuer having the
closest tenors. As stated by Zerbib, “the difference between the green bond yield
and the equivalent synthetic conventional bond yield is therefore precisely the cu-
mulative effect of the liquidity differential and the green bond premium.” The green
bonds in this sample are the 1,065 bonds labelled as “green” by Bloomberg as of
the end of 2017, so this sample will include both corporate and municipal bonds. In
this paper, a green premium of -2 bp is found across the sample.
Febi et al. (2018) compared 64 green labelled corporate bonds with 56 conven-
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tional corporate bonds over 2013 to 2016, looking at both primary and secondary
prices. They use a LOT liquidity metric to account for liquidity premium in the
green bonds. Using a pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions, they found a gree-
nium of 70 bp in 2016. They used the spread between government bonds and their
sample bonds in order to correct for the term structure curve. They only find a
significant LOT liquidity difference in their bonds in 2016, and they found that gen-
erally green bonds are more liquid than the conventional bonds in their sample. The
liquidity was positively related to the yield spread, however this effect has dimin-
ished over time.
Other papers that have looked at liquidity for muni bonds are Harris and Pi-
wowar (2006), which investigated secondary trading costs in the municipal bond
market and found that “transaction costs decrease with trade size and do not depend
significantly on trade frequency.” They also found that muni bond trades are more
expensive than similarly-sized equity trades, and attribute these results to “lack of
bond market price transparency.’” They observe, “Not surprisingly, the municipal
bond market is not noted for its great liquidity.” However, this paper was published
in 2006 before the opening up of real time price data via the MSRB’s EMMA web-
site, which has considerably improved muni bond price transparency. A more recent
report on muni market liquidity was published by Markit researchers (Fenske and
Chen, 2016). They analyzed 570,000 trades spanning January 2015 through March
2016 and found that liquidity was “stable during that period” and that the market
was “relatively efficient”. Their methodology involved comparing the number of
muni bond trades with the number of quotes generated. They posit that in a very
liquid market, “price transparency and dealer inventories would both be higher than
usual, so the breadth and volume of quoted bonds should also increase,” whereas
in an illiquid market, “quotes would not be as broadly disseminated.” They found
a very linear relationship between the number of trades and quotes, and across the
types of muni bonds, found that in general, the daily trade count is 75% of the daily
quote count, and remained stable across the time frame considered. They comment
on this stability, stating that it is “likely due to brokers adeptly adjusting the breadth
4.3. Bond Indices 101
and quantity of bonds they are quoting to match the overall demand on a given day.”
4.3 Bond Indices
All of these reports and studies mentioned in Section 4.2 relied on the analysis of
yield spreads to detect any difference in green bond pricing as compared with com-
parable conventional bonds. While yield spread analysis is important for assessing
bond pricing relative to the surrounding market conditions at a moment in time, it
cannot sufficiently capture pricing trends as the markets evolve. Because of this,
bond indices are a better tool for doing overall performance analysis for an asset
class, especially with regards to the dynamics of pricing behavior over time.
An index is defined by European Union Law (2013) as “a statistical measure,
typically of a price or quantity, calculated from a representative set of underlying
data.” Indices are most commonly used as market benchmarks, and are used as “the
standard against which the performance of a financial instrument can be measured”
(IBoxx, 2016). When used as a benchmark, an index “provides a way to measure
the performance of a specific segment of a financial market” and is used to “measure
the value of a section of the bond market.” Indices are commonly used by investors
and regulators to measure performance and monitor market developments.
The primary motivation behind creating a bond index is to facilitate the ability
to assess and compare the performance of a bond market. As stated by Brown
(1994), the main purpose for bond indices are: “to act as a benchmark for portfolio
management; to act as an indicator of market performance and development [...];
[to act] as a comparator for different markets”. Most of all, “one should try to
compare instruments like with like,” which is why we chose to re-implement the
S&P methodology on a subset of bonds with characteristics that are as close as
possible to the S&P index constituents. An index allows the market performance
of a great many assets to be reduced down to a single time-series, which can be
used as an indicator of the overall performance of the assets included in that index.
Indices allow one to take a broader view on the performance of a market sector over
time, and also to be able to compare the returns of one index with other indices in
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order to assess their competitiveness. Overall, “bond indices are used by bond funds
to benchmark individual issuances and measure their relative performance” (Clean
Energy Group and Croatan Institute, 2014). The creation of indices can also help to
“promote investment in certain markets” (Bacon, 2008).
Indexes are important for encapsulating historical market data and price trends
(Goltz and Campani, 2011). They enable an investor to view the overall perfor-
mance of a market sector in aggregate and how that performance has evolved over
time. Indices are usually constructed so that yesterday’s market values inform to-
day’s index returns. In particular, “today’s index value is defined to be the previous
calculation times the aggregate percentage change in the value of the current con-
stituents since the previous calculation” (Brown, 1994).
At present, there are a few green corporate bonds indices, including Bank
of America Merrill Lynch, Barclays/MSCI, and S&P, which the Croatan Institute
states is “clear evidence of a swiftly maturing market” (Clean Energy Group and
Croatan Institute, 2014). While there are also municipal bond indices, such as the
S&P, there is to date no index specific to the green or climate-aligned sector of the
municipal bond market. Therefore, one major objective of this work is to create an
index for the green municipal bond sector in order to be able to benchmark its per-
formance relative to the overall municipal bond market. A primary way to motivate
ESG investment in green infrastructure is to demonstrate that the performance of
green assets is comparable to the overall market. To this end, our objective was to
create indices in order to benchmark the performance of the green labelled and cli-
mate aligned muni bonds respective to their conventional muni bond counterparts.
While there is no existing academic paper discussing green bond indices, Co-
eslier et al. (2016) discusses low-carbon stock indices in relation to fighting climate
change. This paper brings to light two interesting points about attempting to create
low carbon indices in order to encourage emissions reduction and to hedge against
climate risks. First, they found that the ability to avoid carbon risk is questionable at
best once global carbon intensity of the constituent firms is considered. Secondly,
they state that “current optimization methods do not improve the contribution of
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portfolios to the financing of the energy transition; the quantity of avoided emis-
sions does not rise and the investment exposure to solutions for the energy transi-
tion (renewable energy, energy efficiency) remains steady or decreases.” This po-
tentially also diminishes access to capital for firms where they have positive climate
impacts, but only in their extended boundaries, as compared with highly pollut-
ing firms. Overall, they show that low-carbon equities indices insufficiently hedge
against carbon risk, and furthermore they are ineffective tools for financing the en-
ergy transition. It is important to note that equities indices will be comprised of
fundamentally different assets to bond indices. Particularly in the case of our work,
we can capture green infrastructure investment through green municipal bonds in a
much more direct manner than an equities index is able to.
In 2016, Barclays Research published a report detailing their research into the
effects of ESG impact investing on bond portfolio performance. This work focused
on the corporate bond sector, and broadly diversified portfolios were constructed to
track the Bloomberg Barclays US Investment-Grade Corporate Bond Index. These
portfolios matched “the index’s key characteristics (sector, quality, duration) but
imposed either a positive or negative tilt to different ESG factors.” They found that
the positive ESG tilt correlated with a “small but steady performance advantage”.
Additionally, they found that “ESG attributes did not significantly affect the price
of corporate bonds.”
This report was followed up by another report by Barclays Research (2018),
where they used a larger data set to build on these results. They confirmed their 2016
findings, and also found that “tilting a credit portfolio in favour of high-ESG bonds,
while keeping all other risk characteristics unchanged, tends to lead to higher per-
formance in all three markets considered.” This survey used data from Bloomberg
Barclays Bond Indices for bond characteristics and returns, and MSCI ESG Re-
search and Sustainalytics for the ESG scores. Additionally, this report states that
“one might have expected increased interest in sustainable investing to have driven
up the prices (thus, reducing the spreads) of high-ESG bonds. This is not, however,
borne out by the data, and we do not see a downward trend in ESG-related spreads
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Figure 4.1: The returns of the US Investment Grade High ESG corporate bond portfolio
relative to the low ESG portfolio in basis points for the time frame spanning
2016-2018. Source: (Barclays Research, 2018).
in IG markets; if anything, they seem to have increased,” however this does not ex-
plain why the high ESG portfolios would then see better performance. One reason
for the higher returns attributed to the high-ESG portfolio in the report is the lower
rate of downgrades in the high-ESG bonds.
Our index construction and benchmarking methodology is discussed in detail
in Chapter 6.
4.4 Yield Curves
Yield curves are commonly used to analyze the behavior of a bond or set of bonds
by showing the relationship between yield and maturity graphically. Yield curves
are constructed by plotting the yields to maturity (YTM) of bonds along with their
time remaining to maturity. As stated by Bodie et al. (2011), “the yield curve is one
of the key concerns of fixed-income investors,” because they are “central to bond
valuation and, as well, allow investors to gauge their expectations for future interest
rates against those of the market.”
The important information that a yield curve gives is a snapshot of the per-
formance of a particular set of bonds at a specific time, which enables one to see
which bonds are selling at a discount (falling above the yield curve, since prices are
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inversely proportional to yields), and which ones are selling at a premium (falling
below the yield curve). We have used yield curve analysis to look for trends in how
green muni bonds perform, and in particular whether or not they exhibit a green
premium, or “greenium”, both at time of issue in the primary market and later on
for seasoned bonds in the secondary market.
Yield curves usually exhibit a curved trend rather than a linear one due to
the term structure of interest rates, which is the relationship between bond yields
and different maturities, and how bond investors have different expectations for
bonds of different durations (Malkiel, 1989). Generally put, investors expect higher
yields for longer term bonds, due to more exposure to uncertainty over changes in
interest rates, etc. Furthermore, investors prefer more liquid assets, and will pay
a liquidity premium for them (Bodie et al., 2011). Yield curves encompass these
market dynamics, so they can be used to assess the expectations for short term
interest rates, which bonds have liquidity premiums, and possible trends. In this
work, we compare vanilla bonds that were issued at the same time as green bonds
in order to explore how the green bonds perform compared with their counterpart
vanilla bonds by looking at differences in their yield curves.
A report that is relevant to our yield curve analysis is by Luby (2012), which
“analyzes two representative BAB transactions issued by the State of Ohio highway
capital improvement program in 2010 subsequent to the creation of the BAB pro-
gram.” This analysis uses a matched pair analysis, because “we do not need econo-
metric models to control for the differences between the compared groups since they
are effectively the same except for bond type (matched on issuer, credit, maturity,
coupon, repayment source, etc.).” This is similar to the green-vanilla matched pair
analysis approach that we use to compare yields for green muni bonds vs vanilla.
Furthermore, this BAB matched pair comparison is also relevant to our green bonds
because there are additional paperwork and transactional requirements for BABs,
similar to the reporting requirements for labelled green bonds. In both of the trans-
actions, Luby found that yields were lower for the BABs compared with their tax-
exempt counterparts.
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An additional report about BAB performance that the US Treasury 2011 is-
sued is relevant to our analysis in that their regression analysis is based on a simi-
lar premise and technique for data selection that we have used for our green bond
yield curve analysis. In these reports, their estimation method “relied on comparing
BAB yields with tax-exempt yields for a selected sample of issuers who issued both
BABs and tax-exempt bonds on the same day.” Their motivation for this technique
is similar to ours:
This estimation method allows for a comparison that nets out any dif-
ferences between BABs and tax-exempt bonds that are due to issuer-
specific characteristics or to trends in bond yields over time. This ap-
proach eliminates many potential sources of the difference between
BABs and tax-exempt yields that are unrelated to the direct effect of
the BABs program. For example, BABs issuers may have consistently
different risk profiles than non-BABs issuers. Also, interest rates vary
from day to day, and changed considerably throughout the two years
that BABs were available. Failure to account for such differences, in-
cluding differences in risk profiles or in time of issuance, could affect
the accuracy of the comparison of BABs and tax-exempt yields and
confound the estimates of the direct effect of the program. The esti-
mation method in this analysis also controls for several observed char-
acteristics of the bonds themselves, including their maturity and call
features.
The specifics of our yield curve analysis are detailed in Chapter 7.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the existing research that looks at pricing dynamics for the
green bond market, and also introduces the main techniques for market analysis that
can be used to assess the performance of these bonds. The next chapter will outline
how we collected our green municipal bond data, and will assess any differences in
liquidity amongst this data.
Chapter 5
Data and Liquidity
This chapter describes how we aggregated our bond data, and the constituents and
characteristics of this data. The liquidity of the green-labelled bonds in our data
set was also checked against the non-green-labelled bonds in order to determine if
there was any significant difference.
5.1 Overview
The first major undertaking in this research was the creation of the data sets used in
our analysis. Because the green bond market is very new, especially within the US
municipal bond market, it was necessary for us to manually aggregate the relevant
bond data because there were no relevant pre-existing data sets.
The first data set that was created was the green-labelled and climate-aligned
muni bond data set, as described in detail below in Section 5.2. At time of writing,
this was currently the only extant muni bond data set that includes climate-aligned
but non-green-labelled bonds, which enabled us to draw out deeper insights into the
market, due to the fact that there are still far more climate bonds being issued than
green-labelled.
The second data set was constructed in order to facilitate deeper like-for-like
analysis between labelled green bonds and their closest non-green or “vanilla” coun-
terparts. This was also a unique dataset in that it was the only one extant at time of
writing that brought together green and vanilla bonds that were issued by the same
issuer at the same time under the same offering statement. As described in Section
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5.3, this collection of bonds was further refined down into pairs of green and vanilla
bonds that are as close to identical as possible in order to unpack any yield and
pricing differences.
Both data sets took a great deal of screening and filtering in order to obtain
a reasonably large and consistent sample of representative climate and green muni
bonds that have been issued in the past few years, and these datasets are unique to
this analysis.
5.2 Index Data
With the aim of constructing a green municipal bond index, we worked in coop-
eration with the Climate Bonds Initiative to compile a database of climate-aligned
and green-labelled US muni bonds issued in 2014, 2015, and the first half of 2016.
This data set of climate-aligned and green-labelled municipal bonds is unique, be-
cause until now no one has captured a view of both the labelled and unlabelled US
green muni bond market. One of the key points of labelled green bonds is that
the green label aids in discoverability, so that identifying them for inclusion in the
database was straightforward. However, labelled green muni bonds make up only a
small segment of the climate-aligned muni bond market (see Table 5.1), therefore in
order to get a more comprehensive view of the market, the unlabelled but climate-
aligned bonds had to be manually located and checked for eligibility. This is a key
distinguishing feature of our data set.
In order to capture the non-green-labelled but climate-aligned muni bonds, sev-
eral key word searches were performed, and each potential bond had its use of pro-
ceeds declaration checked in its Official Statement. If the use of proceeds indicated
that the proceeds from the bond would fund projects that would qualify for the
green label according to the Green Bond Principles (GBP), they were added to the
climate-aligned bond database. In order to be included in the climate-aligned cate-
gory of the database, the official statements of each bond issuance were scrutinized
to ensure that the use of proceeds disclosed therein fell within the guidelines laid out
by the Green Bond Principles (GBP). We used the GBP as the criteria because we
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Year Amount Issued ($M) Number Labelled
2016 Q1-2 $6,242 651 240
2015 14,661 1,853 617
2014 9,362 1,352 230
2013 776 150 3
2012 228 117 0
2011 148 115 0
2010 474 127 0
2009 11 12 0
Table 5.1: Green and Climate issuance by year, including the number of green labelled
bonds.
wished to conform to an external standard of what constitutes “green” rather than to
rely on a subjective internal interpretation. Because the GBP largely address green
infrastructure standards, the bonds that qualified for inclusion fell into the following
broad categories: water, waste, transport, and energy, as shown in Table 5.2.
This manually collected data was combined with an existing non-comprehensive
collection of unlabelled but climate-aligned bonds that spanned the years 2009-
2013. We included every CREB (Certified Renewable Energy Bond) and QECB
(Qualified Energy Conversation Bond) issued, particularly for the years 2010-2012
when that segment of the market was most active under the ARRA (American Re-
construction and Recovery Act) stimulus plan. All green-labelled muni bonds were
included from 2013 (when the first one was issued) through the first half of 2016.
We were restricted by earlier lack of issuance in the climate sector of the muni
bond market in addition to the labor involved in manually checking each bond’s
use of proceeds for eligibility, therefore we were unable to comprehensively cover
unlabelled issuances for the years pre-dating 2014.
After the bonds were collected, there were over 4,300 bonds in the database
spanning six years. Because US muni bonds are typically issued in series, each
individual issuance is broken down into series of bonds with different coupons and
maturities. The same official statement covers each series of bonds, so the use of
proceeds across a given series of bonds is consistent.
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the number and amount of issuance has grown con-
sistently year on year, however it is also evident from this table which years (2009-
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Sector Amount Issued ($M) Number
Transport $18,631 1,062
Water 6,676 1,558
Energy 3,969 1,379
Multi-sector 2,034 280
Waste and Pollution Control 591 98
Total $31,902 4,377
Table 5.2: Green and climate municipal bond issuance broken down by sector.
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Figure 5.1: Amount of climate-aligned and labelled green municipal bonds issued by the
top five most active states in $M.
2013) have incomplete data discovery for the climate-aligned but non-labelled
bonds. Eligible bonds that were issued before 2014 were inconsistently captured
in the data for reasons explained previously, and so there are more extant than the
data reflects, except for a subset of tax credit energy bonds that were consistently
identified across all years due to CREBs and QECBs being easily identified as qual-
ifying clean energy-related bonds (see Section 3.8). Additionally, the green muni
bond database allows us to show which states have been most active in the green
infrastructure bond market over the considered time period, as shown in Figure 5.1,
along with their corresponding GDPs. We also broke down the green and climate-
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State Num Issues Total Amount $M Num Green Green Amount $M
CA 548 3,286 114 1,447
MA 346 2,776 193 2,441
NY 535 10,269 173 1,543
TX 327 1,887 6 254
WA 187 2,665 61 1,196
Table 5.3: The number and amount of green and climate-aligned issuances by the top five
most active states 2009-2016.
Moody’s Rating Amount Issued ($M) Number
Aaa $4,526 542
Aa 3,863 952
A 69 79
Baa 16 1
S&P Rating Amount Issued ($M) Number
AAA $0 0
AA 4,005 697
A 95 106
BBB 177 23
Table 5.4: Green and climate muni bonds broken down by Moody’s and S&P ratings.
aligned bonds in the database by their S&P or Moody’s ratings, when available, as
shown in Table 5.4.
In terms of the time to maturity of the green and climate aligned bonds, Figure
5.2 shows that most of these bonds were issued with 10 to 20 year durations, fol-
lowed by 5 to 10 years. This is in alignment with the relatively long-term nature of
green infrastructure investment.
The overall characteristics of the bonds in the green and climate aligned index,
the labelled green index, and the S&P US municipal bond index is shown in Table
5.5. Despite collecting a sizeable database of green infrastructure related munic-
ipal bonds, the number of index-qualifying constituents is significantly smaller in
the green (680) and climate aligned (1,200) indices compared with the S&P muni
index (180,000), with a corresponding disparity in overall index market value. Be-
cause the index methodology normalized the indices by market cap, the trends of
the smaller green indices would still be expected to be similar to the larger S&P in-
dex. As can be seen, the Yields to Maturity, Par Weighted Coupons, and Weighted
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Figure 5.2: The tenor breakdown of green and climate muni bonds.
Climate + Green Green-Labelled S&P Muni
# Constituents 1,200 680 97,851
Total Value ($M) 17,751 9,888 1,691,563
Yield to Maturity 2.37% 2.50% 2.98%
Par Weighted Coupon 4.42% 4.53% 4.38%
Weighted Avg Maturity (yrs) 13.8 15.3 12.2
Table 5.5: Index characteristics for the Climate-Aligned, Green-Labelled, and S&P Muni
indices.
Average Maturities are consistent to within half a percent, or three years, respec-
tively. Because of this equivalency in characteristics, it is an indicator that the green
muni indices can be used as valid benchmarks for this market sector.
In addition to the creation of the climate-aligned and green-labelled indices,
we also created sub-indices in order to benchmark each of the following sectors:
energy, water, and transport. We took a particular focus on energy for the following
reasons. First, it is straightforward to distinguish bonds for green energy infras-
tructure from conventional fossil fuel based infrastructure. In other sectors, like
transport or water, the boundaries between traditional projects that are able to qual-
ify for the green bond label are more blurred. Additionally, there is a clear and more
robust set of data for bonds related to clean energy and energy efficiency.
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We were constrained by paucity of data before 2014 since the muni bond sur-
vey has not yet reached into prior years to search out relevant climate-aligned but
unlabelled bonds. Therefore, in the older non-energy data, we are restricted to la-
belled green bonds, which didn’t have market activity until 2013. In particular, the
water index wasn’t active until mid-2014, and this is why our benchmarking time
frame starts on 1 October 2014 and not earlier, and also allows us to more easily
annualise our returns by ending the benchmark on 1 October 2017.
5.3 Yield Curve Data
Once the green indices were constructed, we then wanted to take a closer look at
the yield differential between green muni bonds and conventional “vanilla” muni
bonds, since the preliminary results of the index indicated a difference in perfor-
mance. In order to better explore the difference, we constructed a second data set
that was comprised of all the green municipal bonds that have ever been issued in
the US in conjunction with vanilla bonds. Our primary motivation in using this ap-
proach is summed up by Michaelsen (2018), who states that, “the true test of a green
bond price difference would be to have two identical bonds (i.e. same issuer, tenor,
format) pricing on the same day – something few issuers would be willing to do.”
While that is true for the larger global corporate bond market, it is not uncommon
for US municipal bonds issuances to be a mix of “green” and “vanilla”. This means
that our dataset gives us the unique ability to quantitatively and rigorously check for
greenium in this market.
Because municipal bonds are generally issued in series, with the same official
statement and use of proceeds covering each series of bonds, this aspect of the muni
market gave us a unique opportunity to be able to compare the yields of green bonds
with their direct vanilla counterparts. Therefore, we collected a set of muni bonds
from EMMA where an issuer has issued one or more green bonds in the same series
(at the same time) as one or more vanilla bonds, where they are covered by the
same Official Statement. This enabled us to compare like for like in that the bonds
are grouped into green/vanilla series with the same issuer, same credit rating, and
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Bond Data Set Number Issue Amt $M
Green Series Bonds 548 5,279
Vanilla Series Bonds 667 8,255
Green Bonds from Pairs 472 2,692
Vanilla Bonds from Pairs 472 2,333
Table 5.6: The number of bonds and their volumes in the data sets spanning January 2015
to October 2017.
same time of issue. Within those series, the individual bonds will have different
issue amounts, coupons, and tenors, along with their differing green statuses. We
found 50 series of muni bonds issued between June 2013 and January 2018 that
include both green and vanilla bonds, covering a total of 1,215 bonds, 548 of which
were green (see Table 5.6). Similar to the index data, the green/vanilla series are all
investment grade, as shown in Table 5.7. The tenors of these bonds are shown in
Table 5.8, and the amount of issuance by sector is shown in Table 5.9.
This data set was further restricted down to 472 pairs of green and vanilla bonds
where the pairs had the same issuer, use of proceeds, issue date, maturity date, and
coupon. This enabled us to be able to directly compare the yields of green and
vanilla bonds and eliminate differences in credit and duration risk. However, there
was a slight difference in the issue sizes (shown in Table 5.6), with the green bonds
having a total issue size 108% that of the vanilla bonds. Nevertheless, this data set is
the only known green bond data set of this size and homogeneity which allows our
pricing analysis to have an unusual degree of rigour, most since the other pricing
studies are restricted by lack of comparable issuance. This data selection was done
so that we could rule out the influence of any differences in credit risk, tax status,
duration risk, and liquidity risk as much as possible in order to gain insight into
the value of the green label when compared to nearly identical assets in the strict
pairings case, or at a minimum, contemporaneous assets in the series case.
It was important to ensure that the bonds in the data set had the same tax
status, because tax advantages are frequently given to muni bond issuances, which
influences their effective yields: what may look like a higher yield tax-exempt bond
may end up having the same effective yield as a taxable bond once these discounts
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Rating band Num Pairs Num Bonds
AAA/Aaa 191 664
AA+/Aa1 224 612
AA/Aa2 260 714
AA-/Aa3 185 429
Table 5.7: The ratings bands for the green/vanilla muni bond pairs, and for the total
green/vanilla data set, of which all are at least A-rated. All of the bonds in this
data set have been rated, and some bonds have both S&P and Moody’s ratings
so they could appear twice in the totals.
Tenor
Green Vanilla Overall
Year Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
2014 14.1 6.50 9.89 6.28 11.4 6.65
2015 13.3 7.19 12.6 7.89 13.0 7.49
2016 14.3 7.32 12.2 6.89 13.0 7.12
2017 11.9 7.44 12.8 7.94 12.3 7.70
Table 5.8: The means and standard deviations of the tenors for the green and vanilla mu-
nicipal series bonds in our set.
are included in the lifetime cashflow of the bond. Therefore, because the yields
can be considerably different between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, we made sure
that we compared like for like in our analysis, and excluded the (few) taxable bonds
from the yield curve analysis.
5.4 Liquidity
As a check to determine if there is an observable difference in liquidity between
the green bonds and the rest of the municipal bond market, the collected bond trade
data was used to assess the liquidity of their respective markets (with the climate-
Sector Amount Issued ($M) Number
Transport $438 65
Water 5,458 509
Energy 5,358 664
Multi-sector 2,153 119
Waste and Pollution Control 415 94
Natural Capital 161 79
Table 5.9: Issuance broken down by sector.
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aligned and vanilla bonds serving as proxies for the non-green bonds). This was
done in order to see if the an index based on the green market would be relevant
in comparison to the overall muni market, since, in order to gain any insights from
the green and climate indices and yield curves, they must be representative of a set
of bonds with market characteristics similar to the prevailing muni bond market. If
there is a difference in the liquidity of the green muni bond market, then this could
have a distorting effect on the prices of those bonds through a liquidity premium.
Liquidity is a form of market price elasticity, and is defined as the ability for an
an asset to be sold onto a market without causing significant change in the asset’s
price, and is often measured from the differences in bid and ask prices, which would
be the most rigorous way of checking market liquidity. Schestag et al. (2016) also
outlines alternative approaches to measuring liquidity, some of which also rely on
intraday trading data, quotes, or transaction costs, which we also did not have access
to. Instead, the metrics that we used for analysis were based on price, volume, and
trade frequency.
Since it was not possible to obtain the direct bid-ask spreads in order to de-
termine the liquidity of the markets in the traditional sense, we used the Index of
Martin (Gabrielsen et al., 2011) as a volume and price-based proxy for liquidity for
the green-labelled vs unlabelled bonds in our sample.
The Index of Martin is a volume-based liquidity index for a basket of assets,
taking the form:
IoM(i, t) =
N
∑
i=1
(Pit−Pit−1)2
Vit
(5.1)
where Pit is the closing price for asset i on day t, and Vit is the trading volume for
each asset i on that day t. The reason that we used the Index of Martin rather than
the more common liquidity ratio is that the Index of Martin is “a suitable index
for the market as a whole, while the liquidity ratio is best suited for a single asset”
(Gabrielsen et al., 2011). A higher value for the Index of Martin indicates less
market liquidity due to the influence of price dispersion, such that each trade has a
larger effect on the day to day prices. The smaller the change in prices with respect
to traded volume, the lower the ratio, and the higher the liquidity of the market.
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(Grossman and Miller, 1988). This metric is actually a component of Amihud’s
illiquidity measure as described in (Schestag et al., 2016).
We also found the number of Zero Trading Days (ZTDs) for the bonds in our
data sets as another proxy for liquidity. Both Febi et al. (2018) and Zerbib (2016,
2018) also look at differences in liquidity in the green bond sector via bid-ask
spreads, however Febi also uses the LOT liquidity measure, whereas Zerbib uses
ZTDs. Because Zerbib uses synthetic bonds for benchmarking, that paper does
not perform a direct comparison of liquidity for green bonds against conventional
bonds. We use the ratio of ZTDs to the total number of days traded for each bond in
our sample in order to determine if there is a difference between the green-labelled
and non-labelled bonds, where the lower the ratio, the more liquid. This is also
discussed in Schestag et al. (2016), where they state that because this “does not
measure transaction costs directly, we classify it in the group of ‘other liquidity
measures.’”
The converse measure, or the number of days where trading actually occurred,
is another component of Amihud’s illiquidity measure (AI) (Schestag et al., 2016):
AI =
N
∑
i=1
1
T Di
∗ IoMi (5.2)
where T Di is the number of days where each asset was traded, and the IoM corre-
sponds to Eq. 5.1. This expression weights the Index of Martin for each asset by the
number of the bond’s “active” days in the market, before summing over all assets.
5.5 Liquidity Results
To attempt to determine the liquidity of the green muni bond market relative to
non-green-labelled muni bonds, we calculated the Index of Martin using Equation
5.1. We performed this calculation on the two disparate bond data sets that we have
aggregated, along with the strict green/vanilla bond pairings in order to take the
broadest view possible.
As can be seen from Table 5.10, the normalized Index of Martin value is
higher for both of the larger green datasets: the green index bonds and the green
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Bond Data Set Issue Amt $M IoM Ratio AI Ratio
Green Index Bonds 9,716 1.92 1.86
Climate Aligned Index Bonds 22,186 1.72 1.11 1.70 1.09
Green Series Bonds 5,279 1.28 1.16
Vanilla Series Bonds 8,255 1.21 1.06 1.07 1.08
Green Bonds from Pairs 2,692 1.48 1.38
Vanilla Bonds from Pairs 2,333 1.54 0.96 1.42 0.97
Table 5.10: The normalized Index of Martin calculated from the traded prices and volumes
of the bonds in the aggregated data sets (the green and climate-aligned index
bonds spanning January 2015 to October 2017, and the green and vanilla series
bonds spanning January 2015 through December 2017). The Index of Martin
and Amihud metric have both been normalized by the total issue amount of
assets in each basket, and the ratio of these values for each green/vanilla dataset
is shown.
series bonds that we used to calculate the yield curves. The green index bonds
(n = 944) had an Index of Martin of 1.92 compared with the Climate-Aligned
Bonds (n= 2,486), which had an Index of Martin of 1.72. The ratio of these values
(green/climate) for the overall index data set is 1.11 for the Index of Martin, and
1.09 for the Amihud ratio.
For the green and vanilla series bonds that were used to calculate the yield
curves, the number of bonds are more evenly divided between green (n = 712) and
vanilla (n = 779). In this set of bonds, the green bonds still had a higher Index
of Martin of 1.28 compared with 1.21 for the vanilla bonds. After normalizing by
total issue amount, the green/vanilla ratio is 1.06, and 1.08 for the Amihud metric.
When we focus only on the strict green/vanilla pairs of bonds within this dataset,
the green bonds have a slightly lower Index of Martin value of 1.48, whereas the
vanilla bonds have 1.54. When normalized by issue amount, the green/vanilla ratio
is 0.96 for the index of Martin, and 0.97 for the Amihud ratio. In this dataset, the
bonds in each basket are identical except for the label status, and the average issue
amount of the green bonds is 8% larger than the vanilla bonds.
The Amihud illiquidity ratios appear to be consistent with the Index of Mar-
tin values within 2%. These findings are also consistent with the Index of Martin
findings in that the climate index bonds were found to be about 10% more liquid
than the green bonds. In the green and vanilla combination pairs data set, the green
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Mean ZTD SD IoM AI t-test p-value
Green Index 0.971 0.043 1.92 1.86 -6.671 3.603e-11***
Climate Index 0.982 0.035 1.72 1.70
Green Series 0.904 0.120 1.28 1.16 2.8351 0.0046**
Vanilla Series 0.882 0.151 1.21 1.07
Green Pairs 0.930 0.092 1.48 1.38 0.90553 0.3654
Vanilla Pairs 0.924 0.104 1.54 1.42
Table 5.11: The mean ratios of Zero Trading Days (ZTDs) to trading days for the green
bonds and the vanilla bonds in our sample, along with t-test values to assess
their statistical significance. The normalized IoM and AI are also shown for
reference.
Year # GTDs # VTDs Green/Vanilla Amihud Green/Vanilla Martin
2015 216 184 0.445 0.751
2016 238 225 1.669 1.1813
2017 251 247 1.165 1.050
2018 250 248 0.798 0.701
Table 5.12: The Amihud and Martin illiquidity ratios along with the number of active ag-
gregated trading days calculated for the strictly paired green (GTDs) and vanilla
(VTDs) bonds in our data set, broken down by year.
bonds are actually found to be slightly more liquid than their vanilla counterparts.
For each bond, we also found the number of zero trading days (ZTDs), and
divided this by the total number of potential trading days. This ZTD ratio was com-
pared for the green-labelled bonds against the non-labelled bonds, and the average
of these ratios is shown in Table 5.11. The green bonds in our sample showed only
slightly less activity than the vanilla bonds. Using ZTDs as a proxy for liquidity, for
the pairs of bonds, there is no statistically significant difference, and only marginal
significance for the series bonds, which is consistent with our Index of Martin find-
ings. There is a statistically significant difference for the index bonds, however the
difference in means implies that by this measure the green bonds are only 1% more
liquid than the climate bonds. Overall, the ZTDs agree with the IoM and AI ratios
in terms of relative liquidities: the green and vanilla series bonds seem to be the
most liquid by both measures.
To look closer at any potential differences between the strictly paired green
and vanilla bonds, we looked at the development of the Amihud illiquidity metric
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5.2 on an annual basis from 2014 to 2017, as shown in Table 5.12. We show this
analysis for the pair data because this helps to isolate any differences in liquidity
that would arise from investor demand rather than differences in the bonds making
up the sample. We also show the aggregated number of trading days for each of
the green and vanilla sets of bonds. These aggregated trading days differ from the
ZTDs in that the ZTDs are calculated for each asset before being averaged, and the
active trading days are the total number of days in sample where any of the assets
have traded. This is shown for reference: traded days per asset are used for the
Amihud calculation. This table shows that there is wide variance in the liquidity
ratios for 2015 and 2016.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter provided an overview of the data sets that were used as the basis for
our analysis of the green municipal bond market. We also assess the liquidity of
these green bonds and compare them against non-green-labelled bonds, in order
to determine whether or not any significant differences in liquidity could lead to a
liquidity premium effect. Trading volume has limitations for representing market
liquidity, however we were limited by access to market data in performing more
comprehensive analysis. In our analysis, we found that the results from the Index
of Martin metric were consistent with those from the zero traded days approach and
the Amihud Illiquidity ratio.
The index bonds did show a slightly higher liquidity for the climate bonds
relative to the green bonds in the index bond sample, however given that this set
of bonds is comprised of a wider variety of issuers, it would be surprising to find
identical results between the two classes of bonds. It was not possible to calcu-
late similar liquidity metrics for the benchmark S&P indices for the sake of direct
comparison. Nevertheless, using the climate bonds as a proxy, we did not observe
a difference in liquidity greater than 10% between the green index bonds and the
climate bonds by any of these metrics. In particular, the strictly paired green and
vanilla bonds exhibited both Index of Martin and Amihud metrics that indicated
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that the green bonds in this sample were slightly more liquid than the vanilla over
the broader timeframe being considered, and this is also consistent with their . We
nevertheless observe a wide variance in results of these ratios over time as show in
the evolution of the Amihud ratios in the past few years, as shown in Table 5.12.
In aggregate, these liquidity ratios indicate that it is still too early in the devel-
opment of this market to indicate any clear trends in differences in liquidity between
the green bonds and their non-labelled counterparts. Overall, the metrics indicate
that the green bonds have comparable liquidity with the muni market, and therefore
support the relevance of the green and climate aligned indices to serve as a valid
benchmarks.
The next chapter will describe the methodology that was used to construct the
bond indices, along with with fixed income mathematics that was used to calculate
the descriptive characteristics of the bond indices and benchmark their performance.
Chapter 6
Green Municipal Bonds Index
Benchmarking
This chapter describes how we used the data that we collected as described in Chap-
ter 5 to construct indices for the green-labelled and climate-aligned bonds. These
indices were benchmarked against existing municipal bond indices in order to eval-
uate their performance compared with the overall municipal bond market.
6.1 Green Muni Bond Index Construction
We created bond indices specific to the green-labelled and climate-aligned munici-
pal bond market in order to test the competitiveness of the green sector of the muni
bond market against the overall muni bond market. We used the S&P bond index
construction methodology in order to optimize the consistency between our gen-
erated climate indices and the S&P market benchmark indices. These indices are
market-value-weighted indices, where the total return “is calculated by aggregating
the interest return, reflecting the return due to paid and accrued interest, and price
return, reflecting the gains or losses due to changes in [price]” (S&P Dow Jones In-
dices, 2016). The market values, interest returns, and price returns were calculated
according to this methodology, and an attempt was to keep the construction rules as
consistent as possible between the climate indices and the S&P benchmarks. Ac-
cording to Brown (1994), these indices are tracker bond indices weighted by market
value, rather than issue amount, since “it is a better measure than the amount in the
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issue, since it allows one to compare issues with different coupons and lives”. Sum-
mary statistics and benchmarking statistics, such as modified duration, volatility,
returns, and correlation, were calculated from the daily returns of the indices using
the standard approach outlined in Investments, chapter 8 (Bodie et al., 2011).
To establish their performance relative to the overall market, the green muni
indices were compared with their respective S&P muni indices. S&P muni indices
were chosen as the benchmarks because of three reasons: 1) the size of the S&P in-
dices allow them to stand in as a proxy for the overall muni market, 2) the S&P has
also created many muni subindices (i.e., by state, by sector, etc.) that also allow sub-
sector comparisons with the green muni data to determine relative performance by
geography and by sector, and 3) S&P Global Indices share their index methodology
publicly (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017a) so that we could use their methodology
with our data for consistency.
Once the green muni bond data was aggregated and the liquidity was checked
as described in Section 5.4, we were able to construct the green muni bond indices.
In order to draw valid comparisons between our green muni bond indices and the
S&P ones, we followed their eligibility criteria for bond inclusion as closely as pos-
sible. Following these guidelines, a bond must be issued by a US state or local US
government or agency (i.e., must be a municipal bond) “such that interest on the
bond is exempt from US federal income taxes” (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017a),
although they do have a taxable muni bond sub-index. The bonds must be denom-
inated in USD, with a minimum issuance size of $2 million (or $1 million in the
case of the ARRA index).
The ARRA index was comprised of the tax credit bonds, particularly the
CREBs and QECBs, that were issued as part of the 2008 economic stimulus package
(as described in Section 3.8). This sub-index had two of the selection criteria lifted:
the constituent bonds were not subject to the trading frequency conditions, and they
were also exempted from the $2 million lower size threshold. This is because there
were only 632 CREBs and QECBs in total in the database, and their average issue
size was $1.99 million, with 504 of those bonds under $2 million. Therefore, in
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order to have a sufficient sample size, and one that reflects the fact that QECBs in
particular were issued in smaller sizes by smaller issuers, we loosened the index se-
lection criteria. With this in mind, we have compared them against the S&P Build
America Bonds (BAB) index, which has similar issue size (the minimum size is $1
million for this index), infrastructure sector relevance, and tax credit characteristics
(S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017b).
Next, market price data for each bond for each trading day was acquired in or-
der to be able to gauge the price performance. For this, we used the end of day price
for each bond, and if a bond didn’t trade on a given day, the last traded end of day
price was used, so that a price was established for each bond on each day of its dura-
tion until the cut-off of 1 October 2017. In total, over 4 million prices were included
in the database for analysis. However, lack of trading frequency created difficulty
in selecting the most eligible bonds for the green indices, because frequently muni
bonds are buy-and-hold securities (Chiang, 2017; O’Hara and SIFMA, 2012). This
translates into a problem of “stale prices”, where the price for a bond may not have
changed in considerable time due to lack of market activity. As the period of inac-
tivity lengthens, the last traded price may drift from the actual market value of the
bond based on its decreased duration.
We addressed the problem of stale prices by selecting only bonds that had
recent trading activity and would therefore have more granular pricing histories.
To do this, we examined the number of trades for each bond in order to see the
overall distribution of trade frequency. Based on this analysis, we determined that
27% (n=1200) of the bonds in the database had been traded at least 10 times, so
these were the ones that we considered eligible for index inclusion. Of these bonds,
40 had been traded 100 times or more, and the most frequently traded green muni
bond had been traded 417 times. As can be seen from the relative infrequency with
which these bonds are traded, it was essential that the index only included the most
frequently traded assets in order to prevent the use of prices that had become out-
dated due to lack of activity, and similar approaches of filtering index inclusion by
trading activity have been taken by other bond indices (FTSE, 2017). Some concern
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could arise that these frequent price movements could also induce asynchronous
trading effects, which is an issue that we address in greater detail in Section 6.5.
While this technique of filtering by activity mitigates the issue of indexing stale
bonds, the price movements for the climate bonds were less frequent compared with
the S&P indices, and this has an affect of dampening volatility. The primary reason
for this is because the S&P indices are based on a different pricing data source
that uses interpolated matrix pricing for every bond in the index, whereas we are
using only actual traded prices due to data availability and because it avoids the
controversy over the reliability of bond price data (Kagraoka, 2005). Additionally,
because our index is specifically focussed on green infrastructure muni bonds, the
pool of eligible bonds was much more restricted than the S&P indices, which is
reflected in Table 6.1, which shows the number of bonds in each index along with
their total market values.
Like the S&P indices, the green muni indices were rebalanced monthly on the
first of the month. Bonds that are added to the index at rebalancing must have a
date of issue within three months of the rebalancing date, and must have at least
one month in duration remaining before maturity. S&P also require the bonds that
they include to be held by a mutual fund, however this restriction is not one that we
imposed largely due to lack of data and also because it would have potentially been
too restrictive on the eligible pool of green muni bonds.
Once a portfolio of bonds consistent with the eligibility criteria was created,
the index calculation methodology was implemented as outlined in the S&P Fixed
Income Index Mathematics Methodology (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). This
methodology is a market value-weighted index, which consists of calculating the
market value for each included security on each day, and then finding a weighted
average of the daily market values for all the included bonds in order to calculate
the interest return and price return for each asset daily. The daily market values and
total returns were combined in aggregate along with the daily cash position (from
coupon payments) to obtain an overall index return, which in turn yielded the daily
index values. The accrued interest and cash coupon payments were calculated on
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Index # Par value $M Avg Asset Size $M
Climate 919 $17,751 $19
Green 680 9,888 15
Energy 344 3,456 10
Transport 903 20,394 23
Water 556 5,589 10
ARRA 481 1,209 3
CA 126 1,689 13
NY 236 6,203 26
MA 78 1,206 15
TX 77 1,302 17
WA 110 3,004 27
S&P Investment Grade Muni 97,851 $1,691,563 $17
S&P Public Power 3,146 59,664 19
S&P Transport 10,273 229,948 21
S&P Water/Sewer 5,604 80,547 14
S&P BAB 6,933 148,244 21
S&P CA 27,033 367,918 13
S&P NY 12,794 264,340 20
S&P MA 4,518 68,506 15
S&P TX 22,467 210,721 9
S&P WA 6,382 64,348 10
Table 6.1: The number of constituents and par value of the green and climate-aligned na-
tional and sector municipal bond indices, along with the number of constituents
and par value of the S&P national and sector municipal bond indices as of mid-
2017.
a 30/360 day count basis, in conformity with the S&P methodology and usual day
count convention for US municipal bonds. In particular, we applied the ISDA 2006
date adjustment rules (ISDA, 2006).
6.2 Index Methodology
In order to construct our market value weighted indices, we followed the S&P
methodology (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016) as follows. The bond issue and trad-
ing price data was loaded into the database, then we calculated the daily market
value for each asset based upon their closing prices for each day. The market value
at close on day t was calculated as:
MVt = PARt ∗ (Pt +AIt)100 (6.1)
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where PARt is the par amount of the index security as of the last monthly rebalanc-
ing, Pt is the clean price (that is, the price excluding accrued interest) of the asset
on day t, and AIt is the interest accrued on that asset up to and including day t.
Once the market values for each asset were calculated for each day, these valu-
ations were used to calculate the interest returns and price returns for each asset on
each day. The interest return is calculated as
IRt =
(AIt−AIt−1+Cpnt)
MVt−1
(6.2)
and the price return is calculated as
PRt =
(Pt−Pt−1)
MVt−1
(6.3)
where AIt is the interest accrued on day t (or t−1 for the day before), Cpnt is any
coupon payment made on that day, MVt−1 is the market value for the previous day,
and Pt is the clean price for the bond on day t (t−1 for the previous day). The total
return is the combination of the interest return and the price return, T Rt = IRt+PRt .
Then, these values were used to create an overall index return for the aggre-
gated assets in the index. The index returns are calculated each day for the price
returns, interest returns, and total returns for the overall index such that:
IndexT Rt =∑
i
T Ri,t
IndexPRt =∑
i
PRi,t
IndexIRt =∑
i
IRi,t
(6.4)
which is a sum over all the respective returns for each asset per day. The index
returns can then be used to create the index values, which are:
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T RIVt = T RIVt−1 ∗ (1+ IndexT Rt)
PRIVt = PRIVt−1 ∗ (1+ IndexPRt)
IRIVt = IRIVt−1 ∗ (1+ IndexIRt)
(6.5)
The total index returns are created so that they begin at a value of 100 at the
beginning of the index (t = 0), and this value is adjusted upwards or downwards ac-
cording to the movements in the market valuations and any bond coupon payments
that arise on an iterative day-to-day basis. This total return value enables us to en-
capsulate the overall performance of a collection of assets, in this case the green
and climate-aligned bonds, so that they can be compared with other indices. Once
we had calculated the index returns for each day for the green-labelled bonds, we
did the same with the climate-aligned bonds in combination with the green-labelled
bonds. From there, we created sub-indices where the same methodology was ap-
plied to bonds specific to a sector or issued by a particular state.
The climate indices were constructed from the 1,200 most frequently traded
bonds, which were narrowed down by including those with issuance size of at least
$2M, which amounted to 919 green and climate-aligned bonds. For each trading
day, any bonds that were “active” on that day (bonds that were issued before the day
being considered, and that matured at least a month after the day being considered)
had their end of day trading price and accrued interest used to create their market
values for that day (Eq. 6.1). These market values, along with any coupon payments
that day, were used to calculate the index return (Eq. 6.2), price return (Eq. 6.3),
and total returns on each day. These values were summed across all active assets
on each day to calculate the overall index returns (Eq. 6.4) and these returns were
used to find the overall index values, IRIV, PRIV, and TRIV (Eq. 6.5). This same
method was repeated on the same set of bonds, but narrowed down even further to
look at the green-labelled bonds only.
Similarly, sub-indices were created for the climate energy, water, and transport
sectors. These sub-indices were created by selecting the relevant bonds for each
6.3. Fixed Income Mathematics and Descriptive Characteristics 129
sector, then ensuring that the same criteria that applied to the national climate muni
index also applied to the sub-indices, namely that the issue size was at least $2
million, and that the bonds included had at least 10 trades. We also created five sub-
indices, one each for each of the top five largest green muni bond issuing states:
California (CA), Massachusetts (MA), New York (NY), Texas (TX), Washington
(WA) as shown in Table 6.1.
6.3 Fixed Income Mathematics and Descriptive
Characteristics
In order to ensure that our indices were comparable to the S&P indices, we first
compared the overall characteristics of the bonds that made up our indices. The
descriptive characteristics that are commonly used for bond indices are: overall
yield to maturity, par weighted coupon, weighted average maturity, and modified
duration.
The performance of an individual bond can be assessed by the overall cash-
flows that occur as a result of buying a bond. The price paid for a bond influences
the yield, or overall returns, of the bond. The relationship between the purchase
price and the cashflows of the coupon payments and final redemption of the bond is
given by the yield to maturity, which encapsulates all the of the cashflows over the
lifetime of the bond. As described by Bodie et al. (2011), “The yield to maturity
(YTM) is defined as the interest rate that makes the present value of a bond’s pay-
ments equal to its price. This interest rate is often interpreted as a measure of the
average rate of return that will be earned on a bond if it is bought now and held until
maturity.” It is important to note that many municipal bonds have early redemption
provisions in the form of early call dates, which is also reflected in the market prices
of the bonds. Callable muni bonds are popular with issuers because historically it
has enabled them to exercise the option to call in the bonds and then refinance them
at lower rates. Therefore, for callable bonds, the yield to maturity actually needs to
be calculated as yield to call, which we did using the call dates, where applicable.
In order to calculate the Yield to Maturity for the index data, we gathered all
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of the bonds issued in each month and used their issuance data and market trading
prices to calculate their respective yields to maturity, or in the cases where there the
bond has an early redemption option, yield to call. In order to calculate the yield
to maturity/call, we used the following equation with the last traded price for each
asset per day:
Price =
N
∑
t=1
Payment
(1+ r)t
+
Par
(1+ r)Nend
(6.6)
where N is the total number of coupon payments outstanding, with Nend being the
number corresponding to the last payment, and t is the time period between pay-
ments (in the case of muni bonds which pay out twice a year, this is a six month
interval). Payment is the amount of the coupon payment, Par is the par value of the
bond, $100 in this case, and r is the coupon interest rate that the bond pays to the
holder (Bodie et al., 2011). In order to solve for yield to maturity, an optimization
using Newton’s technique is performed (Weiming, 2015).
In order to calculate the weighted average overall Yield to Maturity (or Call)
for the index constituents, we used the traded yields (which correspond to the yield
to worst, or call, from the traded prices as disclosed by EMMA) along with the trade
amounts as the weightings to calculate the weighted average per day:
WeightedAvgYTM =
∑N yNsN
∑N sN
(6.7)
where yN is the traded yield of the Nth asset, and sN is the size of that trade.
We use a similar approach to calculate the weighted average coupon and ma-
turity for each day, but weighted by the initial issue amount, in order to establish
values for the overall par weighted coupon and maturity. The weighted average
coupon gives an indicator of the overall coupon rates that are being offered by the
bonds in the index, and the weighted average maturity gives an indication of how
long it will be on average before the bonds in the index mature.
Bodie et al. (2011) gives an effective outline of bond pricing relationship based
on the term structure of interest rates as described by Malkiel (1989). The relation-
ship between bond prices and yields are inversely proportional, such that an increase
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in yield to maturity (Eq. 6.6) creates a smaller change in price than a decrease of
equal size. The longer the tenor of a bond, the more sensitive it is to changes in
interest rate environment, because there are outstanding cashflows that are more
discounted, with more distant cashflows being most impacted. Bond prices become
less sensitive to changes in yield as their maturity approaches. Finally, interest rate
risk is inversely proportional to bond coupon rates, and the sensitivity of bond prices
to changes in yield is also inversely proportional to the current yields to maturity.
Taken together, these principles explain why it is important to ensure that we
are comparing like with like as much as possible when benchmarking bond indices
or comparing yield curves. These principles can all be tied in together in the concept
of duration, which is important because it helps to describe the effective maturity of
bonds. Bonds with higher coupons making more coupon payments have a shorter
overall effective duration, since more of their cashflows are transacted in a shorter
time frame. As interest rate risk is higher for longer term bonds, duration is a way
of measuring this risk through price sensitivity to interest rate changes.
The first effective maturity formulation was the Macaulay duration, which is
the weighted average of the times to each coupon payment or principle repayment:
D =
T
∑
t=1
t×wt (6.8)
where
wt =
CFt/(1+ y)t
Price
(6.9)
and CFt is the cash flow at time t, y is the bond’s yield to maturity, and T is the
time of maturity. Modified duration takes this concept a step further, and encapsu-
lates the idea that longer tenor bonds are more sensitive to changes in interest rate
environment, such that:
∆P
P
=−D× (∆(1+ y)
1+ y
) =−D∆y (6.10)
where the proportional price change is equal to the proportional change in yield
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times duration (Eq. 6.8).
As related to Maikel’s bond pricing principles, there are also some principles
for duration. First, the duration of a zero-coupon bond is equal to its time remaining
until maturity, and if maturity is held stable, the duration of a bond is lower when its
coupon is higher. Furthermore, if coupon is held constant, duration increases with
respect to time to maturity, and duration is higher when yield to maturity is lower,
all else being equal.
As stated in the Handbook of Municipal bonds Feldstein and Fabozzi (2008),
“Simply put, duration is a measure of the approximate sensitivity of a bond’s value
to rate changes. More specifically, duration is the approximate percentage change in
value for a 100 basis point change in rates.” Because of the many factors that come
into calculations of duration, durations can vary widely among a basket of traded
bonds, and this is why we compare durations across our indices.
Overall, the importance of this calculation is summarised by Zipf (2003): “We
use duration as a measure of bond risk. Its importance is linked to bond volatility.
Modified duration is a better measure of bond volatility, or bond risk.” In particular,
we used modified duration for use in index comparison, which is a measure of
percentage change in the price of a bond in response to a percentage change in
yield. Our programmatic approach follows that of Weiming (2015), who uses the
following definition:
Modified duration∼= P
−−P+
2(P0)(dY )
(6.11)
where dY is the change in yield, P+ is the price of the bond in response to a increase
in yield by amount dY , P− is the price of the bond after the yield is decreased, and
P0 is the initial price. This approach has the caveat that dY must be a small change,
because the yield curve is usually not linear. With this approach, we calculate the
modified duration based upon the bond’s par, time remaining to maturity, coupon,
and frequency of coupon payments (twice annually). Having calculated the modi-
fied duration for each bond on a given day, we can then calculate a weighted average
based on either initial issue amount or trade size in order to obtain a weighted aver-
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age modified duration for the entire index.
6.4 Index Benchmarking
Once these values were calculated for the bonds making up each index and sub-
index, we compared them with the S&P index values to see if they are consistent.
This step ensures that we are comparing similar baskets of securities with similar
yields and maturities. Once this check was completed, we then moved on to bench-
mark the returns of our climate muni indices against those of the S&P muni indices.
The returns calculations were based on the time frame spanning October 2014
to October 2017, since this span is much more active than previous years due both
to data availability and also to the number of eligible bonds issued and traded. We
used the raw index TRIV values (Eq. 6.5) for our indices and the S&P indices in
order to perform a benchmark analysis of the returns (the S&P TRIV values were
available to download from their website). The Climate and Green indices were
specifically benchmarked against the S&P Investment Grade Municipal Bond index
because it has similar credit rating and tenor profile as our set of bonds (see Tables
5.4 and 5.5).
The daily index values for the climate, green, and S&P indices formed a time
series that could then be benchmarked. These time series each consisted of a TRIV
value calculated for each day, according to the methodology given above. The first
step was to establish the daily logarithmic returns, which are defined as
Log Return = Rdaily = ln
(
T RIVt
T RIVt−1
)
(6.12)
where TRIV is the index total return value for day t, and T RIVt−1 is the total re-
turn for the day before. These calculations were based on log returns rather than
geometric returns because our subsequent calculations were made easier (such as
Sharpe ratio and annualization of returns) by starting with logarithmic returns (Ba-
con, 2008; Bodie et al., 2011).
The first thing to compare was the annual returns for each of the indices. First,
the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) was calculated over the time period
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spanning 1 October 2014 to 1 October 2017 for each of the indices. This was done
with the formula:
CAGR(t0, tn) =
(
V (tn)
V (t0)
) 1
tn−t0 −1 (6.13)
where t0 and tn are the start and end times, and V (t0) and V (tn) are the TRIV values
corresponding to these times. Since we have kept our analysis to a timeframe of
exactly three years, the exponential term simplifies to 1/3. We also calculated the
annual rates of return for each of these years on a rolling basis from October to
October.
Next, the TRIV values were used to calculate the excess returns and the rel-
ative returns. Excess returns are defined as returns achieved above those given by
the risk-free rate, r f . The risk-free rate is a proxy for a low-risk “safe” investment
used as a form of minimum guaranteed returns, which the index in question should
outperform to be successful. We used monthly 3-month Treasury Bill (T-Bill) data
as provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (2018), and the average of
these values over the relevant time period was used as r f , and this was subtracted
from the overall returns in order to establish the excess returns. Similarly, the rela-
tive returns were found by taking the difference between the returns of the climate
indices and the returns of their respective benchmarks. The excess returns were
used to calculate the Sharpe Ratio (Eq. 6.15), and the relative returns were used to
calculate the Information Ratio (Eq. 6.16). The risk free rate, r f , is also used in the
alpha calculations (Eq. 6.17).
In the context of finance, volatility (σ ) is the variation in the trading prices
over an interval of time, and is measured from the standard deviation in the logarith-
mic returns. From the index data, we specifically measured the historical realised
volatility, rather than the implied or forecast volatility, as:
σannual = Standard Deviation(Rdaily)∗
√
360 =
√
∑i=1 n(Ri−Ravg)2
n−1 ∗
√
360
(6.14)
in accordance with Bodie et al. (2011), where Rdaily are the daily log returns speci-
fied in Eq. 6.12, i is the daily return on day i, and we use
√
360 as the annualization
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factor because used the 30/360 trading day standard in order to be consistent with
ISDA (2006) trading rules.
Two common values that are used to benchmark the performance of an asset or
a collection of assets and to calculate the risk-adjusted returns are the Sharpe Ratio
and the Information Ratio. The Sharpe Ratio is considered “the industry standard
for measuring risk-adjusted returns,” (Kidd, 2011) and is defined as:
SR =
Ravg− r f
σavg
(6.15)
where Ravg is the average returns on the assets, σavg is the average standard deviation
of Ravg, and r f is the average risk free rate. The Sharpe Ratio “measures a portfolio’s
added value relative to its total risk” in the form of excess returns above the risk
free rate (Kidd, 2011). We compare the Sharpe Ratios of the climate indices with
their S&P counterparts in order to check the relative performance of the indices in
comparison with the risk free rate. The higher the Sharpe Ratio, the greater the
expected excess returns.
We also benchmark the returns of the indices directly using the Information
Ratio, which is defined as:
IR =
Rindex−Rbenchmark
σ(index−benchmark)
(6.16)
where in this case, Rindex is the average daily returns of the (climate) index over the
time period under consideration, Rbenchmark is the average daily returns of the bench-
mark (S&P) index, and σ(index−benchmark) is the standard deviation of the difference
in those daily returns. Like the Sharpe Ratio, higher values for the Information
Ratio indicate stronger performance.
Two more important values to consider when benchmarking the performance
of an index are alpha (α) and beta (β ), which are values that are derived from the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Bodie et al., 2011). Overall, β is a measure
of an asset’s volatility relative to a benchmark, and α is a measure of the active
returns of the asset compared with the benchmark. The CAPM makes use of the
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security characteristic line (SCL), which is a linear regression performed on the
returns of the index, and the excess returns of the benchmark relative to the risk free
rate, known as the Single-Index Model (Bodie et al., 2011).
When a regression is performed on the excess returns of the climate index with
the excess returns of the benchmark index, the SCL linear equation that results is of
the form:
Ri = αi+β IRB(t)+ ei(t) (6.17)
where Ri = ri− r f are the excess index returns, r f is the risk free rate, RB = rB− r f
are the benchmark excess returns, β is the systematic risk, and ei are the residuals.
Stated even more generally, this corresponds to a linear equation of the form:
Y = α+βx (6.18)
such that the slope of the line corresponds to the index’s beta, and the intercept, α
is the expected excess return when the benchmark excess return is zero, however β
can also be calculated directly from the returns as:
β =
Cov(ri,rb)
Var(rb)
. (6.19)
The daily TRIV values were used to create daily log normal returns for each
index. These returns were used to perform a regression for each pair of indices in
order to find the alpha and beta from the SCL Eq. 6.17. The volatility (Eq. 6.14),
Sharpe (Eq. 6.15), and Information Ratios (Eq. 6.16) were also calculated for each
index/pair from the log returns. The daily log returns were also used to calculate
the CAGR. With all of these values, we can then compare the performance of the
climate indices with their S&P counterparts, which we discuss in the next section.
6.5 Results of Index Benchmarking
In order to form as comprehensive view of the market as possible, we performed a
benchmarking analysis on the climate indices and sub-indices compared with their
closest equivalent S&P muni index. Furthermore, we also benchmarked the green
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Climate Index S&P Index
Climate S&P Investment Grade Muni
Green S&P Investment Grade Muni
Energy S&P Public Power
Transport S&P Transport
Water S&P Water/Sewer
ARRA S&P BAB
NY S&P NY
CA S&P CA
MA S&P MA
TX S&P TX
WA S&P WA
Green Climate
Table 6.2: The pairs of the climate indices with their S&P muni index benchmark counter-
parts.
labelled index against the broader climate-aligned index, with the pairings as shown
in Table 6.2.
The performance chart showing returns relative to the first day of the bench-
marking period is depicted in Figure 6.1. A summary of annual returns in the form
of CAGR (see Eq. 6.13) for the different indices is shown in Table 6.3. The overall
climate-related indices (across all sectors) plus the climate-aligned sector indices
for water, energy, and transport are shown in Figure 6.2, and the returns for the
state indices for California (CA), New York (NY), Massachusetts (MA), Washing-
ton (WA), and Texas (TX) in Figure 6.3.
All of the indices being considered, both climate-related and S&P, show pos-
itive growth over this timeframe. However, a key point of creating the climate-
related muni indices was to enable us to benchmark their performance against the
closest equivalent S&P muni indices. Table 6.5 shows the risk-adjusted relative
returns in the form of the information ratio and the alpha of each climate index
compared with their corresponding S&P muni benchmarks. The information ratio
was calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the logarithmic returns of
the climate indices and the S&P benchmarks for the timeframe spanning 1 October
2014 to 1 October 2017 (in order to have three round years of data). These val-
ues were annualised on a 360-day basis, in accordance with the 30/360 day count
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Figure 6.1: The returns of the climate-aligned and green-labelled municipal bond indices
for 2014-2017 in relation to the S&P Muni Index. Rebased so that 2014-10-01
= 100; GDP for reference.
Climate Index CAGR Volatility S&P Muni Index CAGR Volatility
Climate Aligned 4.50% 0.73% S&P Investment Grade 3.05% 1.89%
Green Labelled 4.54% 0.87% S&P Investment Grade 3.05% 1.89%
Energy 6.16% 0.90% S&P Public Power 2.96% 1.98%
Transport 4.99% 1.04% S&P Transport 3.71% 2.20%
Water 5.32% 2.34% S&P Water & Sewer 3.36% 2.10%
ARRA 5.60% 0.44% S&P BAB 5.26% 6.09%
CA 6.17% 1.56% S&P CA 3.47% 2.07%
NY 5.31% 1.37% S&P NY 3.22% 1.87%
MA 4.48% 1.08% S&P MA 2.84% 1.86%
WA 5.90% 1.31% S&P WA 2.82% 1.98%
TX 4.49% 1.37% S&P TX 3.08% 1.94%
Table 6.3: Compound Annual Growth Rate and annualised volatilities for the period span-
ning October 2014 to October 2017.
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Climate Index S&P Muni Index Tracking Error
Climate Aligned S&P Investment Grade 1.45%
Green Labelled S&P Investment Grade 1.49%
Energy S&P Public Power 3.20%
Transport S&P Transport 1.28%
Water S&P Water & Sewer 1.96%
ARRA S&P BAB 0.34%
CA S&P CA 2.70%
NY S&P NY 2.09%
MA S&P MA 1.64%
WA S&P WA 3.08%
TX S&P TX 1.41%
Table 6.4: Tracking errors in the returns of the climate indices compared with their respec-
tive benchmarks over October 2014 to October 2017.
standard explained in Section 6.3.
As shown in Table 6.5, the pair with the highest information ratio was the
Climate Energy sector index compared with S&P Muni Public Power, with a ratio
of 1.39 for October 2014 to October 2017, and a corresponding alpha of 3.8%.
Climate-aligned Transport also had an information ratio of 0.56 relative to the S&P
Muni Transport index, with an alpha of 2.9%. The overall climate-aligned index
had a information ratio of 0.75 (α = 4.0%) against the S&P Muni, and the Green-
Labelled index had a ratio of 0.80 (α = 4.0%) against the same. In terms of the
state indices, the California Climate index was the strongest performer with 6.17%
CAGR, with an information ratio of 0.95 (α = 3.4%) relative to its S&P counterpart.
In terms of tracking errors, all of the climate indices posted returns greater than their
benchmarks, as shown in Table 6.4, with the energy index showing the greatest
difference from its S&P Public Power benchmark.
These alpha and beta values were confirmed by performing linear regressions
on the logarithmic excess returns of the Climate and Green indices against the S&P
Investment Grade Muni index. This was done in order to determine the coefficients
for the Security Characteristic Line (SCL) as shown in Eq. 6.18. The results of these
regressions is shown in Table 6.6. The alpha for the green index from this regres-
sion is 3.84%, and the alpha for the climate index was estimated to be 4.04%. Not
only are these values for α and β consistent with those calculated from the correla-
6.5. Results of Index Benchmarking 140
Index vs Benchmark Information Ratio Alpha% Beta
Climate vs S&P Muni IG 0.75 4.0% 0.12
Green vs S&P Muni IG 0.80 4.0% 0.15
Energy vs S&P Public Power 1.39 3.8% 0.20
Transport vs S&P Transport 0.56 2.9% 0.10
Water vs S&P Water & Sewer 0.47 3.3% 0.12
ARRA vs S&P BAB 0.01 5.3% 0.01
CA vs S&P CA 0.95 3.4% 0.00
NY vs S&P NY 0.83 3.1% 0.02
MA vs S&P MA 0.70 2.8% 0.02
WA vs S&P WA 1.20 2.8% 0.01
TX vs S&P TX 0.53 3.1% 0.01
Table 6.5: The risk-adjusted relative returns (information ratio), excess returns (alpha), and
correlations (beta) of the climate indices compared to their corresponding S&P
benchmarks for the time span 1 October 2014 - 1 October 2017.
Regression of Climate/Green index returns against S&P returns.
Coefficient Std Error t-value p-value
Green α 0.0384 0.0047 8.585 <2e-16 ***
Green β 0.1426 0.0013 10.855 <2e-16 ***
Climate α 0.0404 0.0040 10.04 <2e-16***
Climate β 0.1120 0.0011 10.04 <2e-16***
Table 6.6: The results of the linear regressions performed on the excess returns of the cli-
mate and green indices against the excess returns of the S&P Investment Grade
benchmark index, along with their statistical significance.
tions and covariances (shown in Table 6.5), but the t-values and p-values for these
regressions indicate a high level of statistical significance for these coefficients.
Table 6.7 shows the three-year annualised returns for the Climate and Green
Labelled indices along with the S&P Muni. The Green Labelled index does not
have three-year returns prior to 2013 since that is the year that green-labelled muni
bonds entered the market. The earlier years showed stronger performance across
the board, both for the climate indices and the overall muni bond market.
Figure 6.4 shows the rolling information ratio calculated for the climate-
aligned and green-labelled indices benchmarked against the S&P muni index. There
is a considerable increase in the information ratios at the end of 2016, which occur
during the only period of time in which these indices experienced significant losses
within the timeframe being considered. Inspection of the index returns plots (Fig-
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Climate + Green Green only S&P
2017-2014 4.10% 4.70% 3.40%
2016-2013 4.60% 6.90% 3.80%
2015-2012 4.80% 3.30%
2014-2011 5.80% 5.70%
2013-2010 7.00% 6.00%
2012-2009 7.90% 7.60%
Overall 5.70% 5.20% 4.90%
Table 6.7: Three-year annualised returns for the Climate and Green indices, along with
their S&P counterparts.
Figure 6.2: Green municipal indices by sector for Energy, Transport, and Water, along with
the overall climate-aligned and green-labelled muni indices, and the S&P mu-
nicipal index.
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Figure 6.3: Green municipal indices by state, and their corresponding state S&P municipal
index.
Energy Water Transport ARRA
# Constituents 147 214 456 632
Total Value ($M) 1,259 2,540 11,453 9,888
Yield to Maturity 3.28% 2.98% 2.50% 2.50%
Par Weighted Coupon 4.73% 4.68% 4.53% 4.97%
Weighted Avg Maturity (yrs) 15.32 14.8 13.58 16.14
S&P Power S&P Water S&P Transport S&P BAB
# Constituents 4,442 10,937 10,273 6,684
Total Value ($M) 61,701 107,831 229,948 147,811
Yield to Maturity 3.02% 3.20% 3.35% 4.04%
Par Weighted Coupon 4.68% 4.61% 4.50% 6.06%
Weighted Avg Maturity (yrs) 11.61 14.75 14.57 17.99
Table 6.8: The climate sub-sector index characteristics along with their S&P counterparts.
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Figure 6.4: Rolling information ratio for the Climate-aligned (blue) and Green-labelled
(green) indices benchmarked against the S&P Muni index with a window size
of 365 days.
ures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) shows that this corresponds with a downturn in the overall
market that occurred at the time of the presidential election in early November 2016.
The entire municipal bond market was affected by these election results, however
we were interested to compare the drawdowns across the climate indices with their
S&P counterparts.
Table 6.9 shows the drawdowns that occurred in the aftermath of the elec-
tion for the fourth quarter of 2016. The overall S&P muni index experienced a
6.13% drawdown, while the climate-aligned and green-labelled indices only in-
curred 3.97% and 4.62% in losses, respectively. However, the index that incurred
the largest drawdown of 10.93% was the climate energy index, compared with only
5.5% for the S&P public power index. The differences in these relative losses could
indicate that the climate and green indices were more resilient against losses in
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Index Drawdowns
Climate 3.97%
Green 4.62%
Energy 10.93%
Transport 8.01%
Water 5.28%
ARRA 5.68%
S&P Muni 6.13%
S&P Public Power 5.50%
S&P Transport 7.11%
S&P Water and Sewer 6.68%
S&P BAB 8.00%
Table 6.9: Drawdowns experienced in the aftermath of the Presidential election in the last
quarter of 2016. The overall climate and green indices experienced a smaller
downturn after the election than their S&P Muni index.
the overall market, however some of the individual climate sector indices experi-
enced larger drawdowns than their S&P counterparts, such as the the transport index
(8.01% compared with 7.11%) and especially the energy index (10.93% compared
with 5.50%). It is understandable that the climate-aligned and green energy sub-
index would have the largest exposure to policy risk at the time of the election,
given that part of the Trump election platform was support for the coal mining and
fracking industries.
The biggest source of discrepancy between our climate indices and the S&P
indices is that the volatilities appear to be markedly different. This is primarily at-
tributable to the difference in the source of our pricing data: S&P prices will have
come from a pricing data service like Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters, who provide
constantly updated market prices. Where a bond may not have been traded for a
while, these services provide matrix prices, which are fixed income prices based
upon an asset’s characteristics and surrounding similar assets, interpolating the rel-
evant prices to provide a best estimate of a market price. By contrast, due to data
availability, and also because we wanted to create the most rigorous index possible,
we used actual transactional prices from EMMA, which are trades that have actu-
ally been executed, rather than interpolated prices (Kagraoka, 2005). There is also
the additional difference that the climate indices are comprised of a much smaller
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number of constituents as compared with their S&P counterparts, which could lead
to less opportunities for prices to move as there are fewer bonds trading on a day to
day basis.
Another factor to be considered in this approach is the potential for asyn-
chronous trading effects (Campbell et al., 1996). Because our index data uses end
of close daily traded prices, and because sometimes the bonds in our sample don’t
trade for periods of time, this could cause asynchronous effects to arise. The use
of matrix prices by the commercial indices also potentially masks this issue, giving
the illusion of price movement on days where an asset wasn’t actually traded.
Nonsynchronous trading effects could potentially have an impact on the re-
turns generated by that asset, including the mean, variance, and cross-correlation
coefficients. The price of an asset that has less liquidity, and is therefore traded less
frequently would exhibit price movements that appear to jump further and less often
than a more liquid asset which would show a continuous movement of prices, and
therefore returns. Measuring the asset returns using a fixed period timeframe (such
as daily), the disparity between this and the actual, less frequent, trades generates a
behaviour where the price reverts infrequently to the fair value of that asset.
Various models have been introduced in literature to estimate the effect of this
non-trading behavior, including Lo and MacKinlay (1990). However, where non-
zero expected returns are measured, negative serial correlation in individual assets
can be demonstrated, but when comparing the non-observed return errors between
two different portfolios or indexes, they are found to be negligible when assuming
markets that are not substantially volatile and the two portfolios have reasonably
similar non-trading probabilities (Campbell et al., 1996). Also, when consider-
ing the first order serial correlation effects, it was noted by Perry (1985) that non-
stationary trading effects were significantly less than the overall serial correlation.
Furthermore, it was shown by Atchison et al. (1987) that the level of autocorrelation
empirically observed in indexes greatly exceeds the amount predicted by the effects
of nonsynchronous trading, implying that other price-adjustment delay factors play
a more significant role in this.
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According to their disclosed methodologies (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016;
S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017a), the S&P do not include non-stationary effect ad-
justment in the calculation of their indexes. Consequently, this effect was deter-
mined to be of insufficient magnitude to be included, and doing so would have led
to unequal comparison with third party indexes such as the S&P.
6.6 Conclusions
Index benchmarking is one of the best ways to assess the performance of an asset
class against the overall performance of a market sector, especially because it en-
ables many-to-many comparison. An index is also a time series, so it allows us to
assess how the behavior of an asset class evolves over time. Index benchmarking
gives most information about secondary market prices, by following the fluctuations
in traded prices after issuance.
In particular, we were interested to see how green muni bonds performed com-
pared with the overall muni bond market. To this end, our objective was to create
indices in order to benchmark the performance of the green labelled and climate
aligned muni bonds respective to their conventional muni bond counterparts. In or-
der to best be able to rigorously construct and benchmark the green muni market via
an index, we deliberately chose the S&P indices for benchmarking since their index
returns data was available and their methodology was transparent. It is of utmost
importance in the process of benchmarking to compare like with like as much as
possible, so this approach ensured we used the same calculations on as similar a
data set as possible.
Using only traded prices enables us to check for trading activity and to filter
out bonds that do not appear to have much liquidity (see Section 5.4). We ran an
unfiltered prototype version of the index that includes all available bonds above the
threshold size, and it made very little difference on the returns. However, this is a
less rigorous approach, especially as the bonds in the sample reach maturity over
the years and the last traded prices potentially drift from their actual market values.
The disadvantage of our use of end of day traded prices is that our prices do
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not fluctuate as much as matrix prices since they are based on actual trades, which
in turn makes our volatility look abnormally low compared with the S&P data.
Unfortunately, this introduces an element of inconsistency into our benchmarking
comparison, however it does not change the fact that the overall percentage returns
and trend characteristics are still directly comparable. This caveat more directly
applies to any of the risk-adjusted returns in terms of the Sharpe and Information
Ratios, alpha, the beta, etc.
For example, because the mathematical definition of the Sharpe Ratio requires
the excess returns to be divided by the volatility (see Eq. 6.15), and the volatility
of the climate indices is lower than the S&P indices due to the fact that we use
actual trading prices rather than matrix prices, this gives the impression that our
climate indices are performing unusually well compared with the S&P. While the
values in Table 6.5 indicate that the climate sector indices showed strong market
performance, these values are skewed by the very low beta coefficients. In every
comparison, the betas are all positive indicating that the climate index follows the
same movements of the S&P benchmark, however the average beta was only 0.07,
indicating that the price movements of the climate indices are considerably damped
compared with their benchmarks. Furthermore, we do not include non stationary
effect adjustment in the calculation of our indices because doing so would have led
to unequal comparison with third party indexes such as the S&P, and it is unlikely
to have much effect on the returns according to the analysis in Section 6.5.
Nevertheless, the climate indices exhibit the same directional movements and
trends as the S&P benchmarks. Because the returns and trends are robust across the
indices, and since these are calculated solely upon price movements rather than any
volatility measures, they are directly comparable. On a returns and trends basis, the
climate indices have consistently outperformed their S&P counterparts, as shown
in Figs 6.2 and 6.3, and Table 6.3. As shown in the tracking errors (Table 6.4),
the climate energy index showed the highest tracking error, outperforming its S&P
Public Power benchmark by 3.2%, and the ARRA index most closely tracked its
benchmark, the S&P BAB index, with a tracking error of only 0.34%.
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Overall, similar to the national muni indices, the sector sub-indices demon-
strate performance that is competitive with their respective S&P counterparts. These
sector subindices are quite small in terms of constituents, however their index char-
acteristics are nevertheless comparable to their S&P benchmark counterparts (see
Table 6.8). The ARRA index is anomalous in that it is quite a small index, and it
contains CREBs and QECBs. These types of muni bonds are nominally taxable, al-
though they benefit from tax credits (see Section 3.8). As such, they are considered
ineligible for the usual S&P muni indices, however their inclusion in the climate
indices was crucial in order to build a comprehensive index that accurately reflected
the state of the market, particularly for the clean energy sector. These bonds are an
important source of sector-specific pricing data, however, their tax status could po-
tentially affect their effective yields for domestic retail investors. Therefore we have
created a separate ARRA index comprised of solely CREBs and QECBs, which was
benchmarked against the S&P Build America Bond (BAB) muni index, which has
similar tax credit treatment. These subindices are of particular interest because they
have the longest running lifetime of any of the green muni indices given that they
are able to be generated since 2010. In particular, the green energy subindex ex-
perienced CAGR of 6.16% compared with 2.96% from the S&P municipal public
power index over the benchmark timeframe. The ARRA-specific index, which is
comprised of tax credit muni bonds (see Section 3.8) similar to the S&P BAB index,
posted a CAGR of 5.60% compared with 5.26% from the S&P BAB index.
In terms of drawdowns (see Table 6.9), the overall S&P muni index expe-
rienced a 6.13% drawdown in the aftermath of the Presidential election, while
the climate-aligned and green-labelled indices only incurred 3.97% and 4.62% in
losses, respectively, which indicates some additional resilience against policy risk
in the overall climate indices. However, the index that incurred the largest draw-
down of 10.93% was the climate energy index, compared with only 5.5% for the
S&P Public Power index. This is unsurprising that the climate energy index saw
the largest drawdowns (see Table 6.9) when considered in the context of expected
changes in green energy policies as a result of the Trump administration coming to
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power. Overall, however, the other sector indices exhibit drawdowns greater than
their S&P benchmarks, indicating that investing in more sustainable infrastructure
via green and climate-aligned muni bonds can in some contexts expose the investor
or issuers subject to additional losses from increased policy risk. Interestingly, the
aggregated overall indices show resilience against this, exhibiting smaller draw-
downs.
Due to the fact that green bonds and green municipal bonds are such a new as-
set class, it is unfortunately not possible to investigate their long-term performance
over a timeframe beyond five years. It is also worth noting that all of the assets in
the green muni and fossil fuel muni indices have long maturities, so no portfolio
allocation analysis or rebalancing was performed. This was done explicitly so as
not to introduce any investment strategy or optimization in order to get a broad and
unbiased view of market activity. If the index portfolios were actively managed or
optimized, they would be likely to produce higher returns.
Analysis via index benchmarking only gives insight into the secondary market
rather than into the primary issuance market. Nevertheless, if green muni bonds
are trading at higher prices in the secondary markets, that indicates that the buyers
may be willing to accept lower primary yields in return for greener investments,
which leads to a cheaper cost of capital for issuers. As stated by Chiang (2017),
“pricing reflects supply and demand, and any developments that fuel demand could
cause green bond yields to fall.” This work supports the previous findings of a
green secondary premium in the corporate green bond market (Preclaw and Bak-
shi, 2015; Beaumont and Kinmonth, 2017; Bos et al., 2018) and in the municipal
market (Karpf and Mandel, 2018; Baker et al., 2018). On the issuer side, if a green
premium can be found in the primary markets, this could lead to a cheaper cost
of borrowing and therefore save taxpayers money (Stringer, 2015; Chiang, 2017),
which is why the next chapter will look closer into this subject.
Our findings that the green muni indices are competitive with the standard
market indices should lend reassurance to investors and policy makers. Of par-
ticular note is the fact that the green-labelled muni bond index outperformed the
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climate-aligned (unlabelled) muni bond index, indicating that there is some value to
labelling eligible muni bonds as green. A key motivation behind green labelling is
that it aids discovery and could encourage a more diverse investor base, along with
encouraging more direct financial engagement with the citizens that stand to ben-
efit from the infrastructure that the bond finances. This is key because “states and
municipalities can incur extra cost and additional work – getting a second opinion,
reporting on the use of proceeds, impact reporting, among other things – to issue
explicitly labelled green bonds” (Saha, 2016).
In this chapter we described our methodology behind the construction of bond
indices based on green and climate-aligned municipal bonds, along with the bench-
marking of these indices against the standard S&P municipal indices in order to
ascertain their relative market performance. The objective of this analysis was to
compare the market dynamics of the green and climate muni bond sector against
that of the prevailing muni bond markets, and to see the evolution of their relative
performance over time.
We observed that the climate municipal indices generally outperformed the
S&P municipal indices, both in terms of annual growth rates and in terms of risk-
adjusted returns, however the latter may be skewed by the lower volatilities of the
climate indices. When broken down by sector and state, all three green sector
subindices perform at or above their corresponding S&P benchmarks. Furthermore,
These results demonstrate that, at least over the relevant time frame, green labelled
and climate aligned US municipal bonds are competitive with their conventional
counterparts. However, while index benchmarking can compare the performance
of an asset class, in the next chapter we will discuss the use of yield curves and
analyze the spreads between the green yield curves and their conventional counter-
parts to take a closer look at potential greenium in the green municipal bond sector,
especially in the primary market.
Chapter 7
Green Municipal Bonds Yield
Analysis
In this chapter, we will outline our methodology and findings from the analysis of
the yields of a set of green municipal bonds and their “vanilla” (non-green-labelled)
counterparts. The main approach to this analysis will use yield curves, which can
show if there is any difference, or spread, between the yields (and therefore prices)
of the green bonds and the vanilla bonds. We will also perform linear regression
analysis to help reveal if there if is a green premium present in the primary or sec-
ondary markets.
7.1 Yield Curve Analysis
We used the dataset that was created as described in Section 5.3, which was com-
prised of contemporaneous series of green and vanilla bonds. These bonds were
used to construct yield curves in order to investigate whether the green muni bonds
in this data set exhibited a green premium (“greenium”) or not. The dataset con-
sisted of series of municipal bond issuances where green bonds were issued simul-
taneously with vanilla bonds, and this data was also refined to create a subset of
matched pairs of green and vanilla bonds, which are (mostly) identical except for
the green label.
If a green bond has a greenium, it has lower yields and correspondingly higher
prices than similar vanilla bonds, indicating that investors are possibly willing to
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make a tradeoff between yield and a green label. In this data set, the green and
vanilla bonds in each series are issued at the same time, by the same issuer, and
covered by the same Official Statement. This consistency in the data makes it easier
to directly compare the green bonds with the vanilla bonds and pull out any pricing
differences.
First, as in the index analysis, we checked the relative liquidity of the green
and conventional muni bonds as described in Section 5.4, and found that the liquid-
ity for these green bonds was similar to the vanilla bonds, therefore any difference
in yields is due to other factors rather than any difference in liquidity. Once that
check was complete, we constructed yield curves for both green and vanilla bonds.
This was done with the initial yields at issue for the primary market, and by us-
ing traded market prices to investigate performance after issuance in the secondary
market. The yield curves were constructed using the Svensson technique, which is
an extension of the Nelson-Siegel method of construction (Svensson, 1994; Nelson
and Siegel, 1987), and is described in more detail as follows.
The Nelson-Siegel technique is a way of fitting a curve to known yield to matu-
rity and time remaining until maturity bond data, which is done in order to interpo-
late and extrapolate the behaviour of a more complete yield curve from a limited set
of bond data. It uses a more responsive equation for curve fitting rather than a stan-
dard polynomial fit, and is a more robust way of modelling than linear regression,
since yield curves are generally non-linear.
The Nelson-Siegel model (Nelson and Siegel, 1987) uses the following equa-
tion to fit the curve:
y(m) = β0+β1
[1− exp(−m/τ)]
m/τ
+β2
(
[1− exp(−m/τ)]
m/τ
− exp(−m/τ)
)
(7.1)
where y(m) and m are the yield to maturity and time remaining until maturity, re-
spectively. The parameters β0, β1, β2 and τ , are fitted, in this implementation, a non-
linear least-squares curve fitting technique via the SciPy optimize library (SciPy.org,
2018) is used. β0 is interpreted as the long-term levels of interest rates; β1 is the
short-term; β2 is the medium-term; and τ is the decay factor. The Svensson model
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Figure 7.1: The yield curve for Arizona Board of Regents University of Arizona series of
bonds issued in November 2016.
(Svensson, 1994) is an extension of the Nelson-Siegel model which adds an addi-
tional “hump” term, and is referred to as the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson (NSS) model.
The additional term specified by the NSS model, in addition to Eq. 7.1, is:
+β3
(
[1− exp(−m/τ2)]
m/τ2
− exp(−m/τ2)
)
. (7.2)
The data that was used for the NSS yield curve modelling consisted of the
market traded yields for the set of green and vanilla simultaneous bond issuances,
along with the remaining lifetime of the bond at the time of each trade. For the pri-
mary market, the time remaining is the tenor. All of the bonds issued in each month
had their issuance data and market trading prices used to calculate their respective
yields to maturity, or in the cases where there the bond has an early redemption
option, yield to call. In order to calculate the yield to maturity/call and modified
duration (see Table 7.1), we used the same method as we did for the yield to matu-
rity for the index data (see Eqs. 6.6 and 6.10). We first used the strict green-vanilla
pairs so that we were comparing like with like to the greatest extent possible in or-
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Number Modified Duration Maturity Tenor
Climate Index 1,200 9.7 14.0 15.8
Green Index 330 10.4 15.0 17.3
Green + Vanilla Series 1,215 7.9 15.0 15.9
Green + Vanilla Pairs 944 8.0 16.3 17.5
Green-only Partners 472 7.9 16.3 17.5
Table 7.1: Weighted average characteristics for the green municipal bond data sets. The
index values are for the end of the index (1 October 2017) and the green+vanilla
values are averaged over December 2017.
der to perform a preliminary matched pair analysis. Yield curve analysis was first
performed on the total green and vanilla series data, and then, where possible, on
the matched green and vanilla pairs only.
There were a total of 50 green and vanilla combination series, however eight
of these series had too few bonds to be able to model a Svensson yield curve, which
requires at least 5 points in order to perform a fit. While some of the series yield
curves did indicate that some green muni bonds were issued with prices inside their
yield curves (for example, see Figure 7.1), these were not sufficient to give an over-
all view of the market. Despite the fact that this technique is commonly used (as
described in Section 4.2), there was no clear trend for greenium on a series by series
basis.
In order to incorporate a broader view across the full dataset, we constructed
yield curves for each month where there were a sufficient number of bonds (greater
than 5) to do so. It was more relevant to sample the bonds for each month across
all series outstanding rather than for each series because the financial environment
(i.e., interest rate environment) at issue is likely to change over time, and monthly
sampling enabled us to build a large enough data set to construct yield curves that
were relevant to the market’s prevailing conditions at the time.
Each bond was considered in turn and had its remaining lifetime (until maturity
or call) and yield added to an aggregate list of all monthly issuances. If the bond
was green labelled, it was added to a list of green issuances, otherwise it was added
to a list of vanilla issuances. These lists were sorted by the time remaining and then
used to create monthly yield curves using the Svensson methodology according
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Figure 7.2: The aggregate primary market yield curve for December 2017.
Figure 7.3: The aggregated monthly yield curve for the secondary market for December
2017.
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to the method described above in Eq. 7.2 for each month between June 2013 and
January 2018. The weighted average of those bonds’ time remaining to maturity (or
call, where applicable) was calculated, as were the weighted averages of the initial
offering yields and coupons. For the primary market, the amount of each bond’s
issuance was used to weight these averages. A monthly yield curve (as shown in
Figure 7.2) was constructed from the entire aggregate bond data set for that month,
and then for the green bonds and vanilla bonds only, respectively. There were not
enough bonds in the data set to consistently create monthly primary green yield
curves for comparison until the beginning of 2015.
The secondary yield curves were constructed using the final trading price of
each bond per day, or the last closing price available, along with the remaining
times to maturity of the bonds at the time of the trade. We used the same method
as used for the primary market, but for the secondary market we used the size of
the trades to weight the average yields and time remaining. Like the primary yield
curves, an overall curve was fitted for the combined green and vanilla trading data
(as shown in Figure 7.3), and then green and vanilla curves were overlaid separately
where sufficient data was available. Similar to the primary yield curves, there was
not enough green bond data available to reliably generate monthly yield curves until
the beginning of 2015.
For both the primary and secondary yield curves, an average monthly spread
was found between the green yield curve, the vanilla yield curve, and their differ-
ences with respect to the overall aggregate yield curve. Measuring the green and
vanilla spreads separately enables us to decompose their trends individually. The
spreads were calculated by iterating over each time to maturity and checking the
yields that correspond to that time for the overall curve, the green curve, and the
vanilla curve, and taking the differences. These differences were averaged for the
month for each type to create an overall monthly average yield spread between
the green bonds and the overall yield curve, and the overall monthly average yield
spread between the vanilla bonds and the overall yield curve. The difference be-
tween the green and vanilla spreads reveals any pricing differential, or premium.
7.1. Yield Curve Analysis 157
For the strict green-vanilla pairs, a more direct approach was used in addition
to finding the spreads between NSS yield curves. The actual yields were compared
at the same times across the set of bond pairings. This approach was taken because,
in this case, we could use actual traded prices rather than yields extrapolated from a
best fit Svensson curve, since each bond pairing had the same time to maturity and
coupon. It was not possible to use this approach for the the larger series datasets,
since in the case of this dataset, the pairs could be matched up by the time remaining
on the bond and coupon, whereas similar bonds making up each series in the larger
dataset may have identical time remaining, but different coupons, which is why they
could not be included in the strict pairings.
We first compared the initial yield at each for each pair to see which bond
had the lower yield, green or vanilla. We collected all the bond pairs issued in
each month, and then calculated the average initial yield weighted by issue size to
see which class of bonds had the overall premium for each month. The difference
in the average yields between the green bonds and the vanilla bonds in the pair-
ings was measured as a spread in basis points. The average spread between the
green members of the bond pairings and their vanilla counterparts was measured
for every month with data available, from the end of 2014 through December 2018.
This spread represents the total difference in price between the green bonds and the
vanilla bonds, rather than measuring the distance between the green yields and the
aggregate yields, and then the distance between the vanilla yields and the aggregate
yields. This is because for pairs of bonds, the average would split the difference,
so it is more straightforward to represent these spreads with one number, the mag-
nitude, and a sign, representing the direction with negative indicating a stronger
greenium signal (because the green yields would be lower in that case).
The advantages of this approach that there was no extrapolation or interpo-
lation of prices, and it was based solely upon actual transaction prices. The pair
data set was smaller than the overall series data, meaning that it was not possible
to generate monthly yield curves in a majority of months since they did not have
the required minimum of 5 issuances. This technique enabled us to still be able
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Initial Yield
Green Vanilla Difference
Year Mean (%) Std Dev Mean (%) Std Dev Spread (bp)
Series Bonds
2014 2.63 0.775 2.11 0.874 52
2015 2.49 0.871 2.33 0.993 16
2016 2.27 0.724 2.11 0.741 16
2017 2.23 0.726 2.34 0.761 -11
Paired Bonds
2014 2.24 0.815 2.20 0.755 6
2015 2.30 0.903 2.30 0.928 0
2016 2.24 0.715 2.22 0.689 2
2017 2.30 0.707 2.29 0.695 1
Table 7.2: The means and standard deviations of the initial offering yields for the green
and vanilla municipal series bonds in our set. Note the presence of greenium in
2017.
to measure the spreads in the bond yields since even one bond pairing could have
their yields compared. Additionally, this technique was equally applicable to the
secondary market traded prices so that we could also examine any trend in their
spreads.
7.2 Results of Yield Curve Analysis
Overall, 1,215 bonds were located where there were more than five vanilla and
green counterparts within the same issue, totalling 42 separate bond issues. For
example, the Arizona University Board of Regents bond issue for November 2016
(shown in the yield curve in Fig. 7.1) was comprised of 43 bonds, 22 of which
were labelled green. Overall, there were 548 green bonds, and 667 vanilla. The
overall characteristics of this data set is shown in Table 7.1, along with the index
descriptive characteristics for reference. These values are largely consistent across
both the index data and the series data.
Of the 1,215 bonds, 56 green bonds exhibited a premium at issue (10.22% of
the green bonds), compared with 29 vanilla bonds (4.35% of the vanilla bonds).
The average initial price for the greenium bonds was 118.08± 4.52, and for the
vanillium bonds it was 117.63± 4.30. There is not a clear signal for greenium
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Figure 7.4: Spreads between the green and vanilla aggregate yield curves in the primary
market.
in the municipal bond market by comparing these average values, however there
were twice as many green bonds issued with a premium compared with the vanilla
bonds. The average lifetime of the premium bonds, both green and vanilla, was
about 16.0±6.2 years. Looking only at the bonds issued in 2017, 744 bonds were
issued in this data set, 375 of which were labelled green. Of these bonds, 73% of the
vanilla bonds were issued at a premium, and 69% of the green bonds were issued at
a premium.
The average initial yields from 2013-2017 for the full green and vanilla data
set is shown in Table 7.2. For the complete set of bonds, the only year with a
clear greenium was 2017, with initial average yields of 2.23% for the green, and
2.34% for the vanilla, a potential greenium of 11bp. Looking only at the strict
green/vanilla pairs (where their tenor and coupon match), the overall average initial
yield is 2.29% for the green, 2.24% for the vanilla. However, for 2017 only, it is
2.30% for the green, and 2.29% for the vanilla, a difference of only 1bp.
The average green spreads and the vanilla spreads in the primary and the sec-
ondary markets are shown for each year in Table 7.3. The annual average spreads in
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Figure 7.5: Spreads between the green and vanilla aggregate yield curves in the secondary
market.
Year Primary Std Dev Secondary Std Dev
2014 0.002 0.628 0.667 3.431
2015 0.136 2.033 -0.176 2.393
2016 0.330 0.781 -4.183 5.835
2017 -2.114 5.256 -10.841 3.814
Table 7.3: The weighted average spread between the green and vanilla series bonds in basis
points, along with the standard deviations for these means.
the primary market show that from 2014-2016, the vanilla had the overall premium,
while the green bonds were sold at a discount, whereas in 2017, the signs flipped,
such that the green bonds sold at a premium of 2bp. The annual average results from
the secondary market also show a trend of increasing greenium from 2015 onwards,
with a difference of over 10bp in 2017. However, the standard deviations on these
monthly means are relatively large, which implies that some of these values will not
have high statistical significance.
These findings are supported by plotting the monthly average spreads over
time for the primary and the secondary markets. The plot of the monthly spread in
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Year Primary Std Dev Secondary Std Dev
2014 0.325 1.125 0.551 1.910
2015 0.078 0.833 -0.092 0.585
2016 -0.014 0.783 -0.528 0.576
2017 -2.223 2.256 -2.691 2.882
Table 7.4: The weighted average spread between the green and vanilla strict pairings in
basis points, along with the standard deviations for these means.
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Figure 7.6: Spreads between the green and vanilla pairs in the primary market.
primary yields (Fig. 7.4) shows that there is an increasing greenium price signal at
issuance, especially since late 2016. Overall, however, the green spread trend line is
relatively flat, but the vanilla trend line is sloping slightly upward, leaving room for
an increasing greenium at issuance in the markets from 2018 onwards, assuming the
trend holds. For the secondary markets, the plot of the monthly average yields (Fig.
7.5) shows that there is a clearer trend towards widening spreads, and deepening
greenium, which supports the findings in Table 7.3.
When a linear regression is run on the green and vanilla primary and secondary
spreads, the resulting slope coefficients indicate that there is a trend of widen-
ing spreads, with the green yields decreasing, and the vanilla yields increasing,
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Figure 7.7: Spreads between the green and vanilla pairs in the secondary market.
Series Coefficient Error t-value p-value r2
Green Primary -1.240 1.086 -1.142 0.258 0.02
Vanilla Primary 1.665 0.990 1.683 0.098 0.05
Green Secondary -3.649 0.513 -7.117 1.87e-09*** 0.47
Vanilla Secondary 3.00 0.556 5.394 1.32e-06*** 0.33
Table 7.5: The results of linear regressions in the spreads over time for the green primary
series bonds, the vanilla primary series bonds, the green secondary series bonds,
and the vanilla secondary series bonds.
as shown in Table 7.5. These results are not statistically significant in the case of
the primary market, however there is high statistical significance for the secondary
market, which is consistent with Figs. 7.4 and 7.5.
For the strict green and vanilla pairs, as shown in Table 7.2, the primary green
bonds have exhibited a slight average greenium since data was available (2015 on-
wards). Table 7.4 shows that the spreads are increasing in both the primary and
secondary markets. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Fig. 7.6, the trend for this gree-
nium for the pairs is relatively flat across time. When looking at the spreads in the
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secondary market, there is a downward trend in the spreads present from the begin-
ning of 2015, shown in Figure 7.7, indicating a trend towards increasing greenium.
The standard deviations shown in Table 7.4 for the monthly averages are quite large,
therefore in the context pair analysis, this technique does not provide clear evidence
for greenium in the primary market, however it adds to the supporting evidence of
greenium in the secondary market.
The advantages of this yield curve spread analysis technique are that it enables
us to break down trends in spreads on a monthly (or even daily) basis, given a suf-
ficiency of data. Furthermore, unlike traditional regression analysis, the NSS yield
curve fitting method allows us to maximize the utility of a limited number of data
points by allowing us to construct yield curves across a broader range of maturities
than we would otherwise have data for, especially in the early years of labelled green
municipal bond issuance (2014-2015). Nevertheless, we also conducted regression
analysis on this data to see if the findings were complementary, as discussed below
in Section 7.3.
7.3 Regression Analysis
In addition to the yield curve analysis techniques, we also performed linear regres-
sions on our data set. For the primary market, we did a linear regression on the initial
yields against tenor, and for the secondary market we performed panel regressions
using the traded yields against outstanding lifetime of the bond at the time of the
trade. In order to perform these regressions, we used the following specifications:
PrimaryYieldit = f (Tenor,Year,GreenBond,Rating,Sector,State,Year, IssueAmount)
(7.3)
SecondaryYieldit = f (RemainingLi f e,Date,Year,GreenBond,Rating,
Sector,State,Year, IssueAmount,TradeAmount)
(7.4)
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For the primary market, the issued yields for the bonds in our sample were
regressed against their tenor in years. For the secondary market, we regressed traded
yields against the remaining life of the bond at the time of the trades. In these
specifications, as shown in Eqs. 7.3 and 7.4, we captured the green bond status
of each bond using a GreenBond dummy variable, which was set to “1” for all
labelled green bonds, and zero otherwise. Rating consisted of a value from 1 to
10 corresponding to the S&P or Moody’s credit rating, with 10 corresponding to
the highest rating, or AAA/AA+. Sector was a value corresponding to the use of
proceeds for each bond, where Energy = 1, Multi-sector = 2, Water = 3, Transport
= 4, Waste and Pollution Control = 5, and Natural capital = 6. State consisted of
the two-letter United States postal abbreviation for the issuing state. Year is the
year in which the bond was issued. IssueAmount is the size of the bond in USD. In
the secondary market regressions, we also include TradeAmount, or the amount of
each individual trade, and Date, the date the trade was executed. These factors were
used in our regression in order to fully capture their potential effects on the yields of
the bonds in the sample, in order to help isolate the effects of the green bond status,
and also to help the model have the highest correlation to the data as possible.
Importantly, we used the Bloomberg BVAL municipal yield benchmarks
(Bloomberg, 2018) in order to normalize our yield data. We subtracted out the
BVAL yield for the appropriate tenor or time remaining for each of our yield values
before running the regressions. This is a key step that some previous works have
missed out: unless the yields are normalized in this manner, the regressions are in
actuality being run on yield curves, which are, by definition, non-linear, as shown
in Fig. 7.9. By subtracting out the base curve, we linearized our yield data before
regressing, which yields more robust results.
Previous studies (Baker et al., 2018; Karpf and Mandel, 2018) have run their
regressions on the straightforward yields against the life remaining on the bonds,
which is essentially a linear regression over a non-linear yield curve. These studies
benefit from artificially high statistical significance scores due to the fact that the
yield curves exhibit a strongly functional form, albeit not linear. It is the differences
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PRIMARY SERIES
Year Bonds Green Factor Error t-value p-stat r2
Overall 1,425 -0.0329 0.0155 -2.710 0.007** 0.55
2014 133 0.0166 0.0307 2.118 0.0361* 0.56
2015 159 -0.0207 0.0218 -0.946 0.345 0.72
2016 368 -0.0308 0.0323 0.443 0.658 0.82
2017 742 -0.0509 0.0158 -3.227 0.00131** 0.56
PRIMARY PAIRS
Year Bonds Green Factor Error t-value p-stat r2
Overall 880 0.0111 0.0120 0.927 0.35434 0.66
2014 50 0.0402 0.0305 1.318 0.194 0.56
2015 133 0.004 0.0169 0.243 0.808 0.74
2016 254 0.0025 0.0351 0.072 0.942 0.83
2017 435 0.006 0.0172 0.352 0.725 0.70
Table 7.6: The results of a fixed effects regression of primary issuing yield spread against
tenor for the series and the paired bonds in our data set, both pooled and broken
down by year.
between the green bond yields and their conventional counterparts that is measure-
ment being investigated, much like the daily returns are the significant variable for
the index regressions. In order to best unpack the trends in the green premiums from
the bond yields, it is important to subtract out the underlying general bond yields in
order to de-trend the data and attain a more linear data set of spreads. We did this by
subtracting out the Bloomberg aggregated municipal bond yields for the appropriate
tenors. Once this was done, we then performed the regression analysis in order to
explore the yield differences between the green bonds and the conventional bonds.
Studies that do not normalize their data in this way are giving misleading statistics.
We performed fixed effects linear OLS regression analysis on the yields at
issue for the primary market, and panel regressions (pooled by CUSIP and trade
date) on traded yields in the secondary market. The determinants that correspond
to the “green bond” factor from these regressions are shown in Table 7.6 (for the
primary results), and 7.7 (for the secondary results). These tables show the green
regression coefficient for the entire pooled data set across all years, and then broken
down for each year from 2014 to 2017, for both the entire green and vanilla series
data set, and for the strict pairs only.
7.3. Regression Analysis 166
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0
1
2
3
4
0 10 20 30
Time to Maturity (years)
In
itia
l Y
iel
d 
(%
)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Greenness
Figure 7.8: Regression over raw yield data (top) compared with a regression on the spreads
of the same data with the base yield curve subtracted out (bottom). The yield
curves at top are non-linear, so that performing an OLS regression on top of this
unnormalized data could lead to spurious results. The normalized data is much
noisier, so that has a lower r2 = 0.26 compared with 0.71 for the unnormalized
regression.
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Figure 7.9: Normalized regression
7.3. Regression Analysis 167
SECONDARY SERIES
Year Bonds Trades Green Factor Error t-value p-stat r2
Overall 1,387 20,828 -0.0233 0.005 -4.3850 1.165e-05*** 0.21
2014 149 388 -0.0269 0.0377 -0.7123 0.4767 0.26
2015 334 2,810 -0.0101 0.0096 -1.0478 0.2948 0.15
2016 626 5,315 -0.0184 0.0122 -1.5430 0.1229 0.17
2017 1,372 12,184 -0.0382 0.0066 -4.1018 4.127e-05*** 0.32
SECONDARY PAIRS
Year Bonds Trades Green Factor Error t-value p-stat r2
Overall 812 12,093 0.0155 0.0074 1.7816 0.075 0.29
2014 48 48 0.0730 0.0409 0.6594 0.513 0.20
2015 194 1,403 0.0138 0.0102 1.3477 0.17798 0.25
2016 382 3,312 0.0668 0.01337 0.0325 0.974 0.18
2017 806 7,330 0.0175 0.0079 2.1469 0.0318* 0.38
Table 7.7: The results of a pooled panel OLS regression of yield spread against time re-
maining for the secondary traded bond series and pairs in our data set, both
pooled and broken down by year.
As shown in Table 7.6, there was an overall negative green bond factor of
-0.0329, indicating an overall tendency towards greenium at issue, however this re-
sult only has moderate statistical significance (t-value = -2.710). Negative green
coefficients are also found in all individual years except 2014, but with low signifi-
cance until 2017. When looking solely at the green and vanilla matched pairs, there
is no clear signal for greenium at issue, which is consistent with our yield spread
analysis findings.
For the secondary market, pooled OLS regression was performed on the traded
yields for the green and vanilla series bonds, and also the green and vanilla paired
bonds. To do this, the price data for each bond was sampled on the tenth of each
actively traded month over the years 2014-2017. First, a regression was done over
the entirety of the pooled data, and then was also performed for each year in the
sample for both the series and the paired bonds.
The resulting secondary market green factors are shown in Table 7.7. The over-
all pooled panel regression had a resulting green bond factor of -0.0233, indicating
a greenium in the secondary prices, with strong statistical significance. There is a
consistently negative green factor for all years in our sample, with 2017 showing
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the strongest value of -0.0382 with high statistical significance. This is in alignment
with our findings from the yield curve spread analysis. However, the pair analysis
has only positive green bond coefficients, indicating that there seems to be no strong
greenium signal in the secondary paired market data, despite our other findings to
the contrary.
Part of the difference in these findings is likely to be attributable to the the
fact that annual data is insufficiently granular for bond performance analysis. Also,
these regressions only help to quantify trends in the spreads, and do not decompose
the spread into green and vanilla contributions, unlike yield curve analysis. Annual
yields generally do not have enough resolution to gain practical insight into bond
trading trends, therefore the regressions were also done on the secondary data for
each month in 2017, the results of which are shown in Table 7.8. These regressions
also indicate a statistically significant greenium signal in the majority of the months
of 2017, with the coefficient and significance getting stronger as the year progresses.
When a fixed effects regression is performed over the entire data set on yields at
issue, we find that there are significant relationships between tenor, rating, and state
where issued, with marginal relationships with the year of issue and the green status
of the bond, as shown in Table 7.9. The panel regression on the secondary trade
data shown in Table 7.10 also indicates that issuing state, time remaining, rating,
and notably, green bond status are significant determinants. Issue amount was also
significant, but with a magnitude of nearly zero, as in the primary regression, and
similarly for trade amount. Both of these regressions exhibit an overall greenium.
7.4 Conclusions
Yield curves allow us to take a more detailed view about the performance of a set of
related bonds at a particular point in time, and in particular can pick up differences in
pricing/yield between bonds (or a set of bonds) both at time of issue in the primary
market, and after issue in the secondary market. While spread analysis via yield
curves cannot easily capture the evolution in prices over time like an index can, it
enables us to see differences in yield across tenors at a given time, which in turn
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Month Number Green Factor Error t-value p-stat r2
January 722 0.0011 0.0348 0.3467 0.729 0.33
February 747 0.0275 0.0305 1.0132 0.311 0.34
March 836 -0.0078 0.0270 -0.3328 0.8297 0.35
April 881 -0.0153 0.0249 -0.1210 0.2626 0.36
May 965 -0.0146 0.0224 -0.3308 0.1836 0.38
June 1,044 -0.0208 0.0234 -0.8250 0.068 0.40
July 1,083 -0.0147 0.0232 -0.784 0.433 0.43
August 1,114 -0.0202 0.0238 -1.3095 0.211 0.44
September 1,109 -0.0377 0.0191 -1.0661 0.0992 0.45
October 1,109 -0.0238 0.0187 -1.2469 0.2126 0.44
November 1,226 -0.0482 0.0211 -2.6733 0.0076 ** 0.42
December 1,348 -0.0429 0.0187 -2.2851 0.0225 * 0.40
Table 7.8: The results of fixed effects regressions of secondary yield spread against tenor
for the 2017 bonds in our data set, broken down by month.
Coefficient Estimate Error t-value p-stat
Tenor 1.626e-02 9.571e-04 16.987 < 2e-16***
Rating -5.623e-02 6.629e-03 -8.483 < 2e-16***
State 1.202e-02 1.578e-03 7.622 4.56e-14 ***
Year 1.539e-02 7.255e-03 -2.122 0.0340*
Green Bond -3.130e-02 1.155e-02 -2.710 0.007**
Sector -1.301e-02 5.527e-03 -2.354 0.0187*
Issue Amt 3.231e-10 2.450e-10 1.318 0.1876
Table 7.9: The results of a fixed effects regression of the primary yield data, pulling out
the significance of factors like state, issue amount, etc. This regression has r2 =
0.56.
Coefficient Estimate Error t-value p-stat
Remain 1.247e-02 3.950e-04 31.569 < 2e-16 ***
Rating -5.316e-02 2.390e-03 -22.246 < 2e-16 ***
Year 1.873e-04 1.904e-04 0.984 0.325
Green Bond -4.653e-02 5.605e-03 -8.301 < 2e-16 ***
Sector -2.172e-02 2.659e-03 -8.170 3.25e-16 ***
State 1.399e-02 5.910e-04 23.674 < 2e-16 ***
Issue Amt -1.419e-09 1.068e-10 -13.281 < 2e-16 ***
Trade Amount -7.154e-10 7.902e-10 -0.9054 0.365
Table 7.10: The results of a panel regression of the secondary yield data, pulling out the
significance of factors like state, issue amount, etc. This regression has r2 =
0.40.
7.4. Conclusions 170
can give better resolution for detecting greenium, especially at issue in the primary
market.
We used yield curves to assess the performance of seasoned green labelled
muni bonds in the secondary market relative to their vanilla counterparts, and also
at the differences in their initial offering yields compared with yields at issue for
the green and vanilla bonds in the primary market. Any presence of a greenium
in the primary markets could be a signal that investors are willing to pay more for
green bonds, and in turn could enable green bond issuers to leverage this demand
and could lead to a cheaper cost of borrowing, therefore ultimately saving taxpayers
money (Stringer, 2015; Chiang, 2017). One of the points of friction for green bond
issuance is the transactional costs involved in doing the additional paperwork for
green assessment and reporting transparency, and issuers frequently ask if there is a
pricing advantage that would help them to offset this additional cost. This is why the
search for greenium has been of such importance in the corporate bonds markets,
however they are hampered by lack of comparable bonds and overall lack of data.
The recent volume of issuance of green muni bonds enabled us to undertake the
most rigorous survey of green bond premiums so far. When looking at the spreads
in the green muni market, there is a downward trend in the green series spreads
present from the beginning of 2015 in the primary and the secondary markets, as
shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. It is also of note that the primary linear regression line
crosses the x-axis, indicating an overall average greenium, in early 2017, which is
also indicated in Table 7.3. These findings are also consistent with the performance
of the green and climate indices, which show especially strong returns with respect
to the overall market after the presidential election in late 2016. At minimum, these
spreads indicate that so far investors have been willing to pay a little more for the
green labelled bonds at time of issue, or at least they have not bought them at a
discount. The greenium results from the analysis of secondary market prices also
support the findings of a green secondary premium in the corporate green bond mar-
ket (Preclaw and Bakshi, 2015; Beaumont and Kinmonth, 2017; Bos et al., 2018)
and in the municipal market (Karpf and Mandel, 2018; Baker et al., 2018), along
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with the findings from our index benchmarking in Chapter 6.
As stated by Michaelsen (2018), “the true test of a green bond price difference
would be to have two identical bonds (i.e. same issuer, tenor, format) pricing on the
same day”, which he asserts is rare. However, because of the number of issuances
and amount of activity in the US muni bond market, we were able to identify several
instances of these for pair analysis. There is no other known study out there that
has completed the same like-for-like analysis of green vs vanilla bonds, although
a similar approach has been used for BABs (Luby, 2012), and an approach using
synthetic pairs is used by Zerbib (2016, 2018), however this analysis is based on
synthetic bonds rather than actual traded bond data. This means that our dataset
gives us the unique ability to quantitatively and rigorously check for greenium in
this market based on real transactions.
Looking specifically at the green/vanilla pair yields, where the issuer, tenor,
and format are the same for both the primary and secondary markets, we find that
yields for green muni bonds are indeed slightly lower than their vanilla counterparts.
At issue in the primary market, an weighted average overall greenium of over 2 bp
emerges in 2017 (see Table 7.4). The greenium signal in the secondary market
is even clearer. As shown in Figure 7.7, there is a trend towards greenium from
the beginning of the data set, with an actual greenium signal materializing in late
2016. By contrast, the trend of the green spreads in the primary market as shown in
Figure 7.6 is relatively flat, however it has consistently remained below the x-axis,
indicating a possible small but consistent greenium at issue. Table 7.5 summarizes
these observations by showing that the slope coefficient for the secondary green
muni market line is more negative than the primary. Both, however, are negative,
and the secondary green slope has high statistical significance.
We also performed regression analysis to help provide further evidence for
these findings. While regression seems to be the main method used in the previous
literature (Karpf and Mandel, 2018; Baker et al., 2018; Febi et al., 2018; Zerbib,
2016, 2018) for detection of greenium, in this research it was not our primary ap-
proach because regression analysis does not have sufficient time resolution to pick
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up greenium as it arises. The previous literature breaks down their findings into
years, but a year is not a small enough time frame in order to truly capture trends
in yields for a bond market. This is why we relied on measuring yield spreads on a
monthly basis, and also why we constructed indices which have daily resolution to
capture the time series nature of pricing changes in the market.
Nevertheless, the findings from the regressions are consistent with the evidence
from the yield curve analysis. Table 7.6 shows both an overall primary greenium
for the total series data set, and that this greenium gets stronger from 2015 onward.
The secondary market (see Table 7.7) also shows an overall greenium, with the
largest magnitude arising in 2017. These regressions picked up no clear evidence
for greenium for the pairs, however.
In fact, while there seems to be support for the presence of a recent greenium in
the secondary market using multiple analysis techniques, the evidence for greenium
in the primary market, where most of the interest in this subject lies, is much less
conclusive. The best evidence for primary greenium would be to see a consistent
signal for lower yields at issue for green bonds in a like-for-like paired analysis.
While there is some sign of a possible greenium at issue in Table 7.4, it is very
inconclusive due to lack of clear signal in the data. This is further shown in Table
7.6, where while there is some potential primary greenium at issue for the overall
series data set, there is no sign of this for the strictly paired data. The lack of clear
primary greenium signal in the pair analysis could be attributed to paucity of data,
both due to lack of overall issuance of eligible bonds, and also due to short time
horizons given the possible pool of bonds only started in late 2013. Overall, for the
strict pairings in our whole sample (2014-2018), 51 issued with a greenium, and 82
with an anti-greenium. When broken down by year for the past couple of years, as
shown in Table 7.11, there could be a possible inflection point in 2017 where more
bonds in these pairs issued with a greenium than an anti-greenium. Unfortunately,
the data is too sparse to draw hard conclusions from, and this could be one of the
reasons why there is more observable greenium in the secondary market, where
there is more trade data, than in the primary market, or even why there is more
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Year Green # Vanilla # Total Pairs
2016 8 31 139
2017 27 26 237
2018 6 1 103
Table 7.11: The number of like-for-like green and vanilla paired bonds issued per year, and
how many of these issued with a greenium or vanillium (all others being issued
at equal prices).
potential evidence for primary greenium in the series non-paired analysis, which
also draws from a larger sample (Nseries = 1519, 47% green; Npairs = 944, 50%
green) .
Future work could build on the regression results shown in Tables 7.9 and 7.10.
Both of these regressions indicate that the greenium factor is not strongly correlated
to issue amount or trade amount indication no strong support for a size premium,
however it would be interesting to perform a Fama-French multi-factor analysis
(Fama and French, 1992) on the paired sets of bond data in order to further unpack
the effects of bond issue size on any potential greenium. We are again constrained
by the amount of data available at present: when we look at the average issuing
yield for the large bonds in our pair samples versus the small bonds, any differences
in yield are consistent with accompanying differences in tenor and/or credit, namely
that the largest bonds have an average tenor nearly twice that of the small bonds.
We would need enough bonds in our pair data to be able to draw a sufficiently large
sample of small bonds of a particular tenor against large bonds with the same tenor
issued at the same time (to ensure a consistent interest rate environment), and the
data is insufficient for that approach at this time.
Taken altogether, the green and vanilla bond spread analysis generally indi-
cates a small possible greenium in the primary markets, and a greenium in the sec-
ondary markets that has been noticeable and increasing in the past two years, which
is consistent with our findings from the green and climate indices. In the secondary
markets, there appears to be an inflection point in 2015 where the overall yields for
the green bonds first dipped lower than the vanilla bonds yields, and a greenium has
been present since. Although the number of years of data is limited, leaving aside
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the strict pairings, the primary market trends seems to lag behind the secondary mar-
ket trends by two years, such that 2017 is the first year on record with any detectable
greenium in the green muni markets. As this is the end of our collection of data, it
remains to be seen what will happen in the future, but if it holds consistent with the
trends of the past couple of years, there could be an overall primary greenium of 3-5
bp in 2018. However, this could be thwarted or amplified according to surrounding
policy: the tax code was changed in 2018, and the interest rate environment could
change further.
This chapter outlined our yield curve analysis techniques and details the find-
ings from this analysis. The search for greenium has been an important motivation
in recent literature (see Section 4.2) because it can both demonstrate whether or not
the market is willing to pay more for green bonds, and as a result, issuers of green
bonds could potentially leverage this demand to secure a lower cost of capital when
issuing new bonds. The next chapter will bring our findings together and discuss
future trends and recommendations for policies to help expand the green municipal
bond market.
Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions
The last two chapters have described how we have used two difference analysis
techniques, index benchmarking and yield curve analysis, to assess the performance
of the green municipal bond market over the past few years. This chapter will bring
together the results of that analysis and provide further context for the implications
of these findings.
8.1 Context
Green municipal bonds are an increasingly important financial instrument where
the use of proceeds of these bonds goes specifically to finance more sustainable
and resilient infrastructure. This bond market provides insight into the financing
activities of urban areas in the United States, since American cities use municipal
bonds extensively to fund the development of their infrastructure. This work has
provided a comprehensive summary of the development of this market, case studies
where these bonds have been used to raise funds for more sustainable infrastructure,
and an analysis of how green muni bonds have performed in the market so far.
Labelled green bonds have only existed in the US muni market since 2013,
and this research leverages the subsequent four years of market data to assess the
performance of these bonds in comparison with conventional muni bonds. If green
municipal bonds perform well and hold their value relative to the overall market,
then this could encourage more investors to buy them. A green premium at issue
would be advantageous for issuers of green muni bonds, because this could lead
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to an overall cheaper cost of capital. Investors willing to pay higher prices for
green bonds means that issuers can repay with lower interest rates, therefore ulti-
mately saving tax payers money. Furthermore, strong performance by green muni
bonds can also enable municipal and state authorities to advance support for lo-
calized green policies. Increased demand could lead to more green muni bonds
being issued, which feeds directly back to financing greener and more sustainable
infrastructure for American cities.
Green muni bonds are also a way to mitigate the current climate of policy un-
certainty under the current American political regime, especially where infrastruc-
ture spending and tax cuts coincide. Municipalities have significant political and
fiscal power in the United States, and as such American cities could be key to re-
ducing emissions in the US. Indeed, as a result of the Trump administration pulling
out of Paris Agreement in 2017, the US Conference of Mayors issued a press re-
lease reaffirming their commitment to sustainable investment and climate change
mitigation, stating that “mayors will continue to harness their collective power to
continue to lead the nation on this critical issue, regardless of what happens at the
national level” (United States Conference of Mayors, 2017). The green muni bond
market is a natural extension of this movement in that they enable these American
cities to directly finance their climate-related efforts.
8.2 ESG Motivations
One advantage of green muni bonds is that there can be differentiation across this
product sector that allows the issuers to tailor their offerings to the meet the needs
of investors because the use of proceeds is tracked much more closely for labelled
green bonds. Specifically targeting ESG investors is a key point of issuing green
bonds: it allows an issuer to market themselves to a broader segment of potential
investors, and overall a larger pool of investors can lead to a lower cost of capital
through more competition. The fact that green bonds are generally more oversub-
scribed at issue than conventional bonds are (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018b) is
evidence of this.
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One of the best ways to help grow the market is to show that sustainable in-
vesting does not have to be a compromise. To this end, we don’t actually have to
demonstrate the that green muni bond market outperforms the conventional muni
bond market, but rather it is sufficient to show that they perform equivalently, so
that the need to balance ESG returns against financial returns is negated.
In the fixed income universe, bonds prices are generally driven by the buyers
(investors), however issuers look to the prices paid in the marketplace in order to
determine the pricing structure of new issuances by judging what the market will
bear. As stated by Saha and D’Almeida (2017), and as actually happened with the
SSE green bond issued in 2017 (John, 2018), because demand currently outstrips
supply, green muni bonds can help leverage demand to achieve better bond terms.
To this end, the presence of greenium could further enable issuers to access lower
costs of capital, and as long as there is greenium in the secondary markets, then
issuers can adjust their primary market issuance terms to take advantage of this.
Therefore, greenium, or at least pricing at par, is fundamental for making or
breaking the green bond market . That is why this research focused on the detection
of greenium in the primary and secondary markets through two different methods:
index benchmarking and yield curve analysis. These methods are two of the most
commonly utilized methods for assessing the financial performance of an asset or
an asset class, and they allow us to gain insight into the performance of the green
and climate-aligned municipal bond market.
8.3 Data and Liquidity
This research focused on the municipal bond market in the US for a few reasons.
Firstly, the bond data was more readily accessible for the US muni bonds as opposed
to other bond markets. Secondly, the US muni bond market is large and mature, so
that there was more likely to be significant amount of green muni bond issuance.
Thirdly, our motivation was to explore financing green infrastructure for cities, and
so municipal bonds, which are bonds issued by cities, enabled us to have direct
insights into to the debt capital market that underpins infrastructure investment in
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American cities. By collecting data on green and climate-aligned muni bonds, we
were able to assess the performance of this asset class relative to the overarching
municipal bond asset class. The main advantage of looking at the US muni bond
market is that the sheer number of bonds being issued enabled us to have a larger
sample size than the corporate bond market would. Because municipal bonds are
usually issued in series, this means that we were able to collect nearly 5,000 green
and climate-aligned bonds on which to base our analysis.
Our index data is unique in that it includes unlabelled but climate-aligned
bonds from 2014-2016 (our bond data collection terminated in mid-2016, although
price gathering continued until October 2017), as detailed in Section 5.2. As can
be seen in Table 5.1, there has consistently been many more climate-aligned bonds
issued than green-labeled bonds, so their exclusion would have meant only looking
at a fraction of the potential market. Hitherto, no other green bond study has cap-
tured the climate-aligned muni bond aspect of this market. Our findings are more
robust as a result of doing the manual data mining that was required to collect this
data and create a climate-aligned index.
Furthermore, the labelled green bonds in the data set are bonds that have ex-
plicitly self-labelled as such. Other research has included what they refer to as
“green” bonds, but these bonds may actually not necessarily be identified as green
by the issuers themselves, but rather labelled as such by data syndication services
such as Bloomberg (Karpf and Mandel, 2018; Baker et al., 2018), much in the same
manner in which we have identified our climate-aligned bonds. However, we have
not asserted that climate bonds are identical to labelled green bonds because they
have not gone through the due diligence of labelling as such, and have not as a result
agreed to the higher levels of transparency and reporting. Therefore our green bond
database includes only those bonds which the issuer has very intentionally labelled
as green, signalling their commitment to the GBP. The combination of data mining
for climate-aligned bonds along with respecting the integrity of the green label of
the issuer-declared labelled bonds means that our dataset captures these distinctions
more clearly than other similar data sets, and enables us to more accurately capture
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the market dynamics of this class of bonds.
The bond data set used for the yield curve analysis is similarly unique, in that it
captured every green municipal bond that has ever been issued in the US from 2013
to 2017 in conjunction with one or more vanilla bonds, as described in Section 5.3.
This allowed us to take snapshots of the market and compare the performance of
bonds that are issued by the same issuer on the same day with the same Official
Statement, and means that we can compare like-for-like much more rigorously than
any previous study. We found 42 series of issuances that were comprised of both
green and vanilla bonds, totalling 1,215 bonds, 548 of which were green. Within
this dataset, 521 green and vanilla bond pairs were found where the issuer, time of
issuance, maturity date, and coupon were identical. The only variation allowed was
in the green label, issue size, and, the focus of this study, price.
Questions have arisen around the liquidity of green bonds compared with non-
green bonds, because some attribute any potential greenium to a liquidity premium
arising from less liquidity in the green bond sector, as described in Section 5.4. Our
bond data indicates that overall the liquidity of the green muni bonds is similar to
that of the non-green muni bonds. Overall, the data indicates that, at least when
using a volume-based metric, the liquidity of the green labelled bonds is similar
to that of the non-labelled bonds, and therefore no significant differences in liq-
uidities should arise when comparing the green index against a similar benchmark.
These results carry the caveat that volume-based liquidity metrics are best used as
estimates since they may or may not reflect the true market dynamics as would be
expected compared with bid-ask prices (which we did not have access to). We also
compared the zero traded days (ZTDs) frequency and the Amihud ratio between the
two groups of bonds and also found these measures to be similar, as shown in Table
5.11 and 5.12. This implies that the green premium will largely arise from other
factors besides liquidity, since by these metrics, the liquidity is comparable for the
green and vanilla bonds in our sample.
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8.4 Market Performance of Green Muni Bonds
The main focus of this research was to benchmark the performance of the green
municipal bonds against the prevailing conventional municipal bond market. Two
techniques for analysis were used to perform this benchmarking: index analysis and
yield curve analysis.
We describe our index construction and benchmarking analysis in Chapter
6. The main indices that we benchmarked were the climate index, consisting of
green-labelled and climate-aligned bonds, and the green index, consisting of only
the green-labelled bonds. These indices were compared with the S&P Investment
Grade municipal bond index, a commercial index that is a market standard bench-
mark.
The climate and green indices both saw returns of 4.5% from 2014 to 2017,
compared with a CAGR of 3% from the S&P Investment Grade Municipal Bond
Index. The Energy, Transport, and Water sector subindices posted similar returns
of around 5% over this timeframe, compared with about 3% from the S&P sec-
tor indices (see Table 6.3). The state climate indices also outperformed their S&P
state index counterparts by about 2% on average. When the climate indices are
benchmarked directly against their S&P counterparts in order to calculate their In-
formation Ratios, the resulting values range from 0.01 to 1.39, with alphas ranging
from 2.8 to 5.3%, as shown in Table 6.5. The overall climate indices also exhibited
smaller drawdowns than the S&P index, however as shown in Table 6.9, the sector
subindex drawdowns were greater.
The reliability of our risk-adjusted returns are hampered by the fact that our
index is based on actual transaction prices rather than matrix pricing, in the way that
commercial bond indices are. This leads to the appearance of lower volatility in our
climate indices, however their trends and performance can still be benchmarked.
There is additionally a need to update all of the pricing data for the bonds in the
data sets, and also to update the data sets with green and climate muni bonds that
have been issued since 2016, along with back filling the climate-aligned bonds for
the years prior to 2014.
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As a complementary technique to index benchmarking, we also created a data
set of green municipal bonds that were issued in the same series as conventional
(vanilla) muni bonds. This data enabled us to perform a like for like analysis of any
differences in yield through yield curve analysis, as described in Chapter 7.
Across a set of over a thousand bonds, 548 of which were green and 667 were
vanilla, spanning the years 2014 through 2017, we found strong evidence for gree-
nium in the secondary markets (shown in Fig. 7.5 and Table 7.10), and more ten-
tative evidence for the first signs of greenium in the primary markets (see Fig. 7.4
and Table 7.9). Tables 7.3 and 7.5 summarize our overall findings from the analysis
of monthly yield spreads between the green bonds and the vanilla bonds. Further,
we performed linear regression analysis that confirmed these findings (see Tables
7.6 and 7.7). The regression results also indicate a statistically significant greenium
in the secondary market in 2017, and slight support for greenium in the primary
market in 2017, but overall no support for greenium at issue in the matched pairs
analysis.
Due to the fact that green bonds and green municipal bonds are such a new as-
set class, it is unfortunately not possible to investigate their long-term performance
over a timeframe beyond five years. It is also worth noting that no portfolio alloca-
tion analysis or rebalancing was performed. This was done explicitly so as not to
introduce any investment strategy or optimization in order to get a broad and unbi-
ased view of market activity. If the index portfolios were optimized or rebalanced,
they would be likely to produce even higher returns.
Index benchmarking and yield curve analysis both indicate that there is a
present and growing greenium in the secondary market. The index technique only
focuses on secondary market prices, but those findings are in alignment with the
secondary market greenium signals that the yield curves also indicate to be present
since 2015. The yield curve analysis allowed a closer look at greenium occurring
on issue in the primary markets, but the results there were much less conclusive,
with no clear signal for greenium at issue in the matched pair analysis.
Both analysis techniques show that the green bonds in our data set have not
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only held their value with respect to conventional muni bonds, but have generally
experienced a premium (greenium) in the secondary markets. This demonstrates
that green muni bonds can provide stable returns and outperform the market, even
when compared on the level of sectors and states. These findings echo those of
the greenium research outlined Section 4.2, most of which also found signals for
greenium in their analyses. The combination of a potential small premium in the
primary market combined with a larger premium in the secondary market presents
an ideal buy-and-hold ESG investment strategy if these market conditions hold.
By buying green muni bonds at issue, they then generally experience better price
returns compared with their vanilla peers. This is supported by evidence from both
the green and climate indices outperforming the S&P and from the increasingly
clear greenium signals from the secondary market yield curves. By buying these
bonds at issue, investors are in effect getting ahead of the curve.
An increasing greenium in the primary market would help to lower capital costs
for green infrastructure, and pricing in the secondary market could lend pressure
to primary market prices, since secondary market prices are an indicator of what
the market will bear. As stated in the latest CBI pricing report (Climate Bonds
Initiative, 2018b), “when green bond curves have a handful of maturity points, they
could be used as a reference for pricing new green bonds. If green bonds were
trading tighter than vanilla bonds, we would reasonably expect to see a consistent
greenium emerging”. According to Zerbib (2016), “the secondary market structure
seems to have the potential for increasing the green bond issuance and offering a
primary yield which is slightly lower than that observed on the conventional bond
curve”, which is what our yields demonstrate towards the end of the sample.
In the primary market, it is the issuers that benefit from a greenium at issue.
However, in the secondary markets, the beneficiaries of green bonds selling onwards
at higher prices are the existing holders of those bonds who are selling them on,
not the original issuer. It could be that bond traders are better at leveraging the
resale secondary market for higher prices on green bonds due to relative scarcity
of available green bonds, whereas the issuers of green muni bonds and the banks
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constructing their offering deals have not had sufficient data yet to achieve similar
levels of performance in their offers. This is supported by the fact that any sign of
greenium at issue did not appear until 2017 in our analysis.
As a caveat, some issuers and investors are concerned about the potential shift
of demand away from green bonds if there a consistent greenium does arise. This
point was also brought up by Zerbib (2016), stating that “while a negative premium
favors the issuing of green debt, it subdues the appetite of investors that are not
compelled to dedicate part of their balance sheets to the purchase of green assets. If
the equivalent conventional debt gives greater yields, green debt will be forsaken by
those investors who do not have to meet any green investment obligations.” Issuers
and investors are worried that an obvious greenium coming into the dynamics of
the muni market could potentially trigger a flight to yield, acting as a deterrent for
green bond investment. However, Zerbib (2018) follows up on these comments in
their most recent paper, stating, “a [low] premium should therefore not constitute a
disincentive to invest in green bonds,” but rather, ”it demonstrates investors’ appetite
for green bond issuance.”
Therefore, while the existence of greenium at issue could help foster more
green bond issuance which is key towards helping develop green and sustainable
infrastructure, the market can only realistically bear a small greenium, if any, long-
term. Rather than investors paying more for green bonds, if there is sufficient supply
of unlabelled climate-aligned bonds, they could simply do a little more research and
buy those instead at a relative discount rather than sacrifice yield for the green label.
If demand is lessened for green bonds because their prices are higher, then investors
will be forced to look elsewhere for more suitable investments and the prices would
come down again.
8.5 Why is there a Greenium?
Given our observation of a greenium in the secondary market and the first possible
“green shoots” of greenium in the primary market brings rise to the question: why
would there be a pricing difference for the green bonds in our sample if they are
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constructed the same as the non-green bonds in our data? Assuming that we have
successfully ruled out any other sources of premium (such as liquidity, credit, size,
etc.), and holding all other things to be equal, the factor that remains as the source
of the greenium is market demand. Because green bonds are constructed the same
as their vanilla counterparts, the class of possible buyers between the two classes
is the same. However, there is an additional class of buyers of green bonds that
consists of individuals and institutional investors that have an ESG/SRI mandate
which specifies that they must invest in more sustainable assets. These buyers will
be specifically targeting green bonds, therefore adding additional price pressure to
that sector of the bond market. In short, conventional bond buyers will be happy to
buy a bond that fits their criteria, regardless of if it is green or not, whereas more
targeted sustainable investors will be specifically looking at green bonds that fit
their mandates, so they are in effect competing against the conventional investors
for the same assets, but with more demand pressure with their specialist mandates.
Even if these investors are a much smaller segment of the investors, the fact that
they would be restricted to the smaller number of green bond assets means that they
could be the source of the greenium. The most obvious example of this effect could
possibly be seen from the fact that green bonds are not excluded from the standard
bond indices, but green bond indices exclude anything not qualifying as green.
This is consistent with the findings from Baker et al. (2018), who state that
given a simple asset pricing framework, two predictions arise: That green bonds
will sell for a premium, and that green bond ownership is more concentrated. Their
work finds evidence for both of these assertions, and states that the greenium in their
green muni bond sample is “a natural flip side to the Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)
result that sin stocks are associated with higher returns.” This is also consistent with
other findings that increasing investor appetite for more environmentally sustainable
investment can increase investment flows to this sector. Riedl and Smeets (2017)
found that social preferences and social signalling play a role in SRI decisions,
and that financial motives were secondary, suggesting that “investors are willing to
forgo financial performance in order to invest in accordance with their social pref-
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erences.” Similarly, Hartzmark and Sussman (2017) found evidence that investors
value sustainability, and Brodback et al. (2018) give survey evidence that “personal
values have an impact on individual investment decisions, in particular preferences
for socially responsible investing.”
The investor base for green bonds at present includes all of the traditional bond
investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks, in
addition to those who have ESG mandates. The municipal market will also include
individuals who will also have their own investment preferences, which could have a
pricing impact. As a path to future research, it would be an interesting to investigate
the types of investors that are buying green muni bonds to try and unpack their
motivations and try and measure their effects on this market.
It could come to pass in the future that green muni bonds that are issued as
a result of the business models described in Chapter 3 achieve a scale that could
affect the pricing of this sector of the bonds market. However, at present, there
are currently no green-labelled municipal project bonds, and the majority of green
muni bonds are general obligation and not revenue bonds (Saha and D’Almeida,
2017). Furthermore, where deals are constructed around private industry contrac-
tual arrangements like PPAs, they usually lose their tax-exempt status (Kreycik,
2011), which means that they were not eligible for our yield analysis. Therefore,
these special types of green muni bonds are not, at present, the source of any pricing
differential.
8.6 International Perspectives
While our data focuses on the US, our key findings can be more broadly applicable,
since the US municipal bond market can serve as a potential model for other coun-
tries and regions that are looking to tap into the debt capital markets to finance their
own infrastructure. Indeed, some of the case studies outlined in Section 3.9 have
been replicated in other countries, such as South Korea and the United Kingdom,
who looked to these models for inspiration. In general, other countries have shown
interest in the successes of the US municipal bond market and have established
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similar local lending markets.
Internationally, the use of green bonds is growing in popularity as a finance
mechanism for renewable energy and energy efficiency in cities and regions around
the world, such as Paris, Sweden, and London (FMDV, 2014). This is a much-
needed growth sector, as “climate-friendly assets in the portfolios of EU institu-
tional investors is tiny– at best it is between 1-2%” (Financing the Future Consor-
tium, 2015). However, despite some bond issuance activity from European cities,
“the region’s municipal green bond market is still at an embryonic stage, and faces
challenges including a lack of large-scale green infrastructure projects and a lack of
market standardization” (Moody’s, 2016).
In Europe, some regions have set up municipal bond agencies so that they can
pool their resources and access cheaper financing in order to better leverage their
assets. In Sweden and Finland, municipal bond agencies have been instrumental in
the use of bond financing to invest in their local infrastructure. Finland’s MuniFin
currently has a lending portfolio of EUR19.2 billion and has stable Aaa and AA+
credit ratings. It invests in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure on the behalf
of over 300 Finnish municipalities (MuniFin, 2014). In Sweden, Kommuninvest
(2015) manages a lending portfolio of SEK 222.8 bn on behalf of 280 regional
members, and has a credit rating of Aaa/AAA, and Gothenburg was one of the first
cities to issue a green municipal bond (OECD, 2017a). Their successes are inspiring
other countries, such as the UK and France, to create their own municipal bond
agencies (Local Government Association, 2014; Agence France Locale, 2015).
In many markets, municipal bonds are classified as sub-sovereign bonds, a
sector which has been growing in recent years. In 2014, sub-sovereign bond debt
totalled about EUR500 billion for the top seven most active EU countries (Vetter
and Zipfel, 2014). At present, the European sub-sovereign market is only about
15% of the size of the US municipal bond market, which could mean that it has
growth potential, especially for European cities that are searching for capital for
infrastructure development. In fact, it is not only European regions that may be
seeking to expand their municipal bond reach, but this seems to be a global trend
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that is developing in China, India, Latin America, and in other regions, such as the
green city bonds issued by Cape Town and Johannesburg in South Africa (Climate
Bonds Initiative, 2017d).
Green bonds are especially seeing growth in the Asian markets, especially in
China (Kidney and Oliver, 2014), which was the largest issuer of green bonds in
2016 (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2016). Ng and Tao (2016) state that for Asian coun-
tries, “green bonds could also improve overall publicity and improve organization
image, thereby broadening their access to capital,” and that “one way to encourage
broader participation of SME RE players in the bond market and deepen the capital
market is to facilitate retail bond issuance.” According to a report on green bond is-
suance in the emerging markets by the Sustainable Banking Network et al. (2018),
“as of June 2018, China is the largest issuer with USD57.1 bn in issuance, followed
by Mexico with USD6.7 bn and India with USD6.6 bn.”
8.7 Recommendations
In order for green bonds in general, and green municipal bonds in particular, to
be adopted both by issuers and investors they will have to prove their worth in the
capital markets both in terms of financing climate-friendly projects and in terms of
making solid financial returns. While there is clear demand for socially responsible
investing (SRI) (Chandler, 2018), even the greenest of the institutional investors
and asset managers are subject to fiduciary duty, such that their investment strategy
must put priority on returns before sustainability. The fact that fiduciary duty is
biased towards a solely profit-driven regime is currently under question at present,
especially in the context of the state-run pension funds and their responsibilities to
their stakeholders (Kidney and Oliver, 2014; Global Commission on the Economy
and Climate, 2014; Ellsworth and Spalding, 2013).
Climate risk, particularly the risks due to damages from natural disasters trig-
gered by climate change, along with the risk of stranded assets, is not priced into
the current investment universe. This has the dual effect of leaving sustainable in-
vestments short changed and unprotected assets such as vulnerable infrastructure at
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risk (Ellsworth and Spalding, 2013; Global Commission on the Economy and Cli-
mate, 2014). For example, the carbon credit markets are an attempt to try and limit
emissions while assigning a monetary value to them as one way to try and capture
some of this financial risk. In some cases, such as in Europe, these markets are now
appreciating at a rate faster then their fossil fuel counterparts despite a rocky start.
As mentioned in the case studies (Section 3.9.1), there are state SREC markets in
the US, of which New Jersey has the largest. It is an interesting example of climate
federalism that there is not an overarching national carbon market, the creation of
which would run counter to the prevailing doctrine of the current Trump regime.
However, a national US carbon market would perform more efficiently, and also
open the market to those states that hitherto do not have carbon markets. The cre-
ation of a national carbon market would be a step forward in accordance with the
Stern review’s recommendation for there to be a global carbon market set up (Stern,
2007).
All of these factors would tie into the green municipal bond market: with a
national carbon market, this would enable new cashflows to help kick start more
clean energy projects, and these revenues could be leveraged by green muni bonds
to finance more sustainable infrastructure projects. Additionally, changing the fidu-
ciary duty mandate of institutional investors to consider sustainability as well as
profitability would increase investor demand in green muni bonds.
These are top down means of encouraging growth, but bottom up growth also
must be considered. On the supply side, there needs to be more bankable green
infrastructure projects in the pipeline in order to meet increasing investor appetite
for green bonds. A common problem is that many green infrastructure projects,
particularly clean energy related ones, are too small or segmented for efficient bond
financing. However, with standard contracting and aggregation, this can be over-
come in certain contexts, as is illustrated by the PACE bonds (Section 3.9.4). The
larger institutional investors such as pensions and insurance funds generally only
like to invest in large, benchmark size bonds ($250M and up), so aggregation is the
best way to bridge the gap between smaller scale clean energy projects and larger
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scale institutional investors (Fulton and Capalino, 2014).
To this end, the establishment of more green banks is also key to growing the
green muni bond market. Although it is currently unlikely that a national US green
bank would be established in the current political climate, if every state instead
established their own, these green banks could act as warehouses for projects and
aggregate them into larger bond issuances. This would be especially helpful to
achieve scale in the clean energy sector. While transport and water infrastructure
projects are generally monolithic, renewable energy and energy efficiency projects
are more fragmented, especially at the MUSH (municipal, university, school, and
hospital) level that is most active in the muni bond market. There are already a
few green banks that have been established in a few states with proven successes
in this sector, as discussed in Section 3.9.5. These state green banks could work
in tandem with state-established sustainable energy utilities (see Section 3.9.3) in
order to foster more clean energy projects and bring them to market.
Another important mechanism to increase the green municipal bond market
would be to establish and leverage more tax credits to help encourage more sustain-
able infrastructure projects. The use of CREBs, QECBs, and BABs (see Section
3.8) has demonstrated that both issuers and investors are receptive to tax credit
bonds, and more of these types of bonds could be used to help establish momentum
by leveraging an increasing appetite for sustainable investing.
Finally, while there is already awareness and political will in the larger cities
and states (especially California and New York) that creates demand for green in-
frastructure and the subsequent issuing of green muni bonds to finance it, sustain-
ability and climate change is a matter of either ignorance or outright antipathy in
the less-populous regions of the US. In this context, it would be helpful to shift the
dialogue away from climate change and more towards the creation of green collar
jobs and their resulting economic benefits for those regions (Gessesse et al., 2017).
Additionally, amongst the smaller states, there is an overall lack of education about
ways to access the green muni bond market. For example the CREBs and QECBs
were underutilized in many states, despite benefiting from a subsidy from the federal
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government. An outreach push to the smaller states about the advantages of invest-
ing in sustainable infrastructure and its green collar job growth benefits would help
to build out the green bond markets in these areas, and potentially save taxpayers a
considerable amount of money, while curbing carbon emissions.
8.8 Conclusions
Green municipal bonds could be one of the best possible ways to increase the mo-
mentum of ESG investment and close the sustainable infrastructure gap in American
cities, however until recently it has been impossible to benchmark their performance
due to lack of data. Furthermore, the uptake of green muni bonds in the US is cur-
rently hampered by a “combination of sporadic deal flow, small offering size, index
ineligibility, illiquidity, and lack of standardization limits market activity” (Chiang,
2017). Therefore, we undertook a survey of the market and the construction of
green and climate-aligned municipal bond indices to investigate whether, over the
considered time period, the green sector of the muni bond market is competitive
with the conventional muni bond market. We also performed yield curve analysis
of a set of green muni bonds that were issued simultaneously with as conventional
“vanilla” bonds to look for evidence of greenium or other pricing differences.
The overarching objective of this research was to help foster more investment
in green infrastructure for cities via green muni bonds by demonstrating that bond
investors can reliably buy climate and green muni bonds without affecting their
returns. We show that in doing so they can fulfill both their fiduciary duty and meet
ESG investment mandates. At the same time, the continued presence of greenium
helps to incentivize bond issuers to take advantage of the more favorable terms for
green muni bonds by building out a more sustainable infrastructure pipeline and
then bringing these projects to the bond market.
The evidence of a pricing differential in the market between the green mu-
nicipal bonds and conventional muni bonds shows that there is increasing demand
from investors for these green bonds. This early success in the market should be
leveraged as much as possible by issuers who could take advantage of the current
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buyer’s market in order to help push through a greener, more sustainable infrastruc-
ture agenda, and potentially access the debt markets with a lower cost of capital.
This could improve quality of life in American cities, cut carbon emissions, im-
prove infrastructure resilience, and save taxpayer money. The presence of greenium
demonstrates that better, more sustainable infrastructure can be developed in the
US, and can be more attractive to investors than conventional infrastructure invest-
ments. This is an excellent opportunity for investors and issuers to work together to
improve the daily lives of millions, both in the US and around the world.
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